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来源类型Article
规范类型其他
DOI10.1098/rspb.2012.2498
The evolution of cooperation by social exclusion.
Uchida S
发表日期2013
出处Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 280 (1752)
出版年2013
语种英语
摘要The exclusion of freeriders from common privileges or public acceptance is widely found in the real world. Current models on the evolution of cooperation with incentives mostly assume peer sanctioning, whereby a punisher imposes penalties on freeriders at a cost to itself. It is well known that such costly punishment has two substantial difficulties. First, a rare punishing cooperator barely subverts the asocial society of freeriders, and second, natural selection often eliminates punishing cooperators in the presence of non-punishing cooperators (namely, "second-order" freeriders). We present a game-theoretical model of social exclusion in which a punishing cooperator can exclude freeriders from benefit sharing. We show that such social exclusion can overcome the above-mentioned difficulties even if it is costly and stochastic. The results do not require a genetic relationship, repeated interaction, reputation or group selection. Instead, only a limited number of freeriders are required to prevent the second-order freeriders from eroding the social immune system.
主题Evolution and Ecology (EEP)
关键词Evolution of cooperation Ostracism Costly punishment Second-order freerider Public goods Evolutionary game theory
URLhttp://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/10539/
来源智库International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/129630
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Uchida S. The evolution of cooperation by social exclusion.. 2013.
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