全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Mixed strategy under generalized public goods games.

G2TT

来源类型	Article
规范类型	其他
DOI	10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.05.011
	Mixed strategy under generalized public goods games.
	Zhang Y; Wu T; Chen X; Xie G; Wang L
发表日期	2013
出处	Journal of Theoretical Biology : 52-60
出版年	2013
语种	英语
摘要	The relationship between group's contribution and public goods produced often exhibits nonlinearity, which constitutes the generalized public goods game. Far less attention has been paid to how the mixed strategy evolves in such generalized games. Here, we study the effects of nonlinear production functions on the evolution of the mixed strategy in finite populations for the first time. When the group size and the population size are comparable, cooperation is doomed irrespective of the production function. Otherwise, nonlinear production functions may induce a convergent evolutionary stable strategy (CESS) or a repeller, but cannot yield the evolutionary branching. Moreover, we particularly consider three representative families of production functions, intriguingly which all display the hysteresis effect. For two families of production functions including concave and convex curves, a unique CESS or a unique repeller may occur even if the group size is two. Whereas for the third class encompassing symmetrically sigmoidal and inverse sigmoidal curves, the coexistence of a CESS and a repeller only occurs if group size is above two, and two saddle-node bifurcations appear. Our work includes some evidently different results by comparing with the evolution of continuous investment or binary strategy.
主题	Evolution and Ecology (EEP)
关键词	Nonlinear production function Finite populations Adaptive dynamics
URL	http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/10336/
来源智库	International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/129679
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Zhang Y,Wu T,Chen X,et al. Mixed strategy under generalized public goods games.. 2013.