G2TT
来源类型Article
规范类型其他
DOI10.1016/j.physa.2013.04.031
Cautious strategy update promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game.
Liu Y; Zhang L; Chen X; Ren L; Wang L
发表日期2013
出处Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 329 (17): 3640-3647
出版年2013
语种英语
摘要In the realistic world, individual cautiousness can be often involved or observed when a rational indvidual makes a decision. However, it remains unclear how such individual cautiousness influences the evolution of cooperative behavior. To this end, we consider a Fermi strategy updating rule, where each individual is assigned a cautiousness index that controls its learning activity, and then study the evolution of coperation in the spatial prisoners dilemma game. Interestingly, it is found that cooperation can be significanly promoted when individuals cautiousness is considered. In particular, there exists an optimal range of the degree of cautiousness resulting in the highest cooperation level. The remarkable promotion of cooperation, as well as the emerging phase transition is explained by configurational analysis. The sensitivity of cooperation to initial states with different fractions of cooperators is also discussed. The result illustrates that high densities of cooperators can be established at small initial fractions of cooperators. The detailed mechanism for such phenomenon is explained by analyzing the typical initial configurations.
主题Evolution and Ecology (EEP)
关键词Prisoner's dilemma Cooperation Cautious
URLhttp://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/10429/
来源智库International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/129752
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Liu Y,Zhang L,Chen X,et al. Cautious strategy update promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game.. 2013.
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