全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Excessive abundance of common resources deters social responsibility selection experiments teach us about fisheries-induced evolution?

G2TT

来源类型	Article
规范类型	其他
DOI	10.1038/srep04161
	Excessive abundance of common resources deters social responsibility selection experiments teach us about fisheries-induced evolution?
	Chen X; Perc M
发表日期	2014
出处	Scientific Reports 4: no.4161
出版年	2014
语种	英语
摘要	We study the evolution of cooperation in the collective-risk social dilemma game, where the risk is determined by a collective target that must be reached with individual contributions. All players initially receive endowments from the available amount of common resources. While cooperators contribute part of their endowment to the collective target, defectors do not. If the target is not reached, the endowments of all players are lost. In our model, we introduce a feedback between the amount of common resources and the contributions of cooperators. We show that cooperation can be sustained only if the common resources are preserved but never excessively abound. This, however, requires a delicate balance between the amount of common resources that initially exist, and the amount cooperators contribute to the collective target. Exceeding critical thresholds in either of the two amounts leads to loss of cooperation, and consequently to the depletion of common resources.
主题	Evolution and Ecology (EEP)
URL	http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/10972/
来源智库	International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/129932
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Chen X,Perc M. Excessive abundance of common resources deters social responsibility selection experiments teach us about fisheries-induced evolution?. 2014.

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srep04161.pdf（950KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览