| 来源类型 | Article
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| 规范类型 | 其他
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| DOI | 10.1098/rsbl.2013.0903
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| Rewards and the evolution of cooperation in public good games. |
| Uchida S
|
| 发表日期 | 2014
|
| 出处 | Biology Letters 10 (1): p. 20130903
|
| 出版年 | 2014
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Properly coordinating cooperation is relevant for resolving public good problems, such as clean energy and environmental protection. However, little is known about how individuals can coordinate themselves for a certain level of cooperation in large populations of strangers. In a typical situation, a consensus-building process rarely succeeds, owing to a lack of face and standing. The evolution of cooperation in this type of situation is studied here using threshold public good games, in which cooperation prevails when it is initially sufficient, or otherwise it perishes. While punishment is a powerful tool for shaping human behaviours, institutional punishment is often too costly to start with only a few contributors, which is another coordination problem. Here, we show that whatever the initial conditions, reward funds based on voluntary contribution can evolve. The voluntary reward paves the way for effectively overcoming the coordination problem and efficiently transforms freeloaders into cooperators with a perceived small risk of collective failure. |
| 主题 | Evolution and Ecology (EEP)
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| 关键词 | Public good game
Evolution of cooperation
Reward
Punishment
Coordination problem
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| URL | http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/10999/
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| 来源智库 | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/130096
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Uchida S. Rewards and the evolution of cooperation in public good games.. 2014.
|
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