| 来源类型 | Article |
| 规范类型 | 其他 |
| DOI | 10.1007/s10018-016-0143-8 |
| Regulation versus subsidies in conservation with a self-interested policy maker. | |
| Palokangas T | |
| 发表日期 | 2017 |
| 出处 | Environmental Economics and Policy Studies 19 (1): 183-196 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This article examines the following case. A set of countries produce goods from labor, government input and natural resources. Because the conservation of natural resources in any country yields utility (e.g., through biodiversity) in every country, and because there is no benevolent international government, a resident of the countries is chosen as the regulator to whom conservation policy is delegated. The countries influence the regulator by their political contributions. In this common agency setup, the following result is proven: as long as the minimum conservation standards are implemented, conservation subsidies are welfare decreasing, involving excessive conservation. This suggests that there should be no "co-financing" for designated conservation sites in the EU NATURA 2000 project. |
| 主题 | Advanced Systems Analysis (ASA) |
| 关键词 | ecological habitats biodiversity regulation conservation subsidies NATURA 2000 project |
| URL | http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/11915/ |
| 来源智库 | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/131001 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Palokangas T. Regulation versus subsidies in conservation with a self-interested policy maker.. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| Regulation%20versus%（127KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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