全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Simple incentives and group dependence for successful payments for ecosystem services programs: evidence from an experimental game in rural Lao PDR.

G2TT

来源类型	Article
规范类型	其他
DOI	10.1111/conl.12277
	Simple incentives and group dependence for successful payments for ecosystem services programs: evidence from an experimental game in rural Lao PDR.
	Salk C; Lopez M-C; Wong G
发表日期	2017
出处	Conservation Letters 10 (4): 414-421
出版年	2017
语种	英语
摘要	In this paper, we use a new game-based tool to evaluate the immediate and longer-term behavioral change potential of three different payment for environmental services (PES) delivery mechanisms: direct payments for individual performance, direct payments for group performance and insurance. Results from four rural shifting-cultivation dependent communities in Lao PDR suggest that easily understood group-oriented incentives yield the greatest immediate resource-use reduction and experience less free-riding. Group-based incentives may succeed because they motivate participants to communicate about strategies and coordinate their actions and are perceived as fair. No incentive had a lasting effect after it ceased, but neither did any crowd out the participants’ baseline behavior. Temporary reductions in resource dependence may provide a buffer for development of new livelihoods and longer-term change. Games like the one developed here can help policymakers appropriately target environmental incentive programs to local contexts and teach program participants how incentive schemes work.
主题	Ecosystems Services and Management (ESM)
关键词	experimental games forest incentives Laos payments for environmental services REDD shifting cultivation swidden
URL	http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/13347/
来源智库	International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/131031
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Salk C,Lopez M-C,Wong G. Simple incentives and group dependence for successful payments for ecosystem services programs: evidence from an experimental game in rural Lao PDR.. 2017.

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