| 来源类型 | Article
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| 规范类型 | 其他
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| DOI | 10.2139/ssrn.2515968
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| Strategic investment in protection in networked systems. |
| Leduc MV; Momot R
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| 发表日期 | 2017
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| 出处 | Network Science 5 (1): 108-139
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| 出版年 | 2017
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | We study the incentives that agents have to invest in costly protection against cascading failures in networked systems. Applications include vaccination, computer security and airport security. Agents are connected through a network and can fail either intrinsically or as a result of the failure of a subset of their neighbors. We characterize the equilibrium based on an agent's failure probability and derive conditions under which equilibrium strategies are monotone in degree (i.e. in how connected an agent is on the network). We show that di_erent kinds of applications (e.g. vaccination, airport security) lead to very di_erent equilibrium patterns of investments in protection, with important welfare and risk implications. Our equilibrium concept is exible enough to allow for comparative statics in terms of network properties and we show that it is also robust to the introduction of global externalities (e.g. price feedback, congestion). |
| 主题 | Advanced Systems Analysis (ASA)
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| 关键词 | Network Economics, Network Games, Local vs Global Externalities, Cascading Failures, Systemic Risk, Immunization, Airport Security, Computer Security
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| URL | http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/14093/
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| 来源智库 | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/131049
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Leduc MV,Momot R. Strategic investment in protection in networked systems.. 2017.
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文件名：
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Strategic%20Investment%20in%20Protection%20in%20Networked%20Systems.pdf
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Adobe PDF
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