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来源类型Article
规范类型其他
DOI10.1109/LCSYS.2017.2777898
Learning Through Fictitious Play in a Game-Theoretic Model of Natural Resource Consumption.
Manzoor T; Rovenskaya E; Davydov A; Muhammad A
发表日期2018
出处IEEE Control Systems Letters 2 (1): 163-168
出版年2018
语种英语
摘要Understanding the emergence of sustainable behavior in dynamic models of resource consumption is essential for control of coupled human and natural systems. In this letter, we analyze a mathematical model of resource exploitation recently reported by the authors. The model incorporates the cognitive decision-making process of consumers and has previously been studied in a game-theoretic context as a static two-player game. In this letter, we extend the analysis by allowing the agents to adapt their psychological characteristics according to simple best-response learning dynamics. We show that, under the selected learning scheme, the Nash Equilibrium is reachable provided certain conditions on the psychological attributes of the consumers are fulfilled. Moreover, the equilibrium solution obtained is found to be sustainable in the sense that no players exhibit free-riding behavior, a phenomenon which occurs in the original open-loop system. In the process, via a Lyapunov-function based approach, we also provide a proof for the asymptotic global stability of the original system which was previously known to be only locally stable.
主题Advanced Systems Analysis (ASA)
关键词Human-in-the-loop control, game theory
URLhttp://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/15023/
来源智库International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/131338
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GB/T 7714
Manzoor T,Rovenskaya E,Davydov A,et al. Learning Through Fictitious Play in a Game-Theoretic Model of Natural Resource Consumption.. 2018.
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