| 来源类型 | Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
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| 规范类型 | 其他
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| Economic growth with political lobbying and wage bargaining. |
| Palokangas T
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| 发表日期 | 2009
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| 出处 | Proceedings of CAO'09: IFAC Workshop on Control Applications of Optimisation, 6-8 May 2009
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| 出版年 | 2009
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | This paper examines an economy with a large number of industries, each producing a different good. Technological change follows a Poisson process where firms improve their productivity through investment in R&D. The less there are firms in the economy or the more they can coordinate their actions, the higher their profits. Labor is used in production or R&D. All workers are unionized and their wages depend on relative union bargaining power. If this power is high enough, then there is involuntary unemployment. Both workers and firms lobby the central planner of the economy which affects firms' and unions' market power. The main findings of the paper can be summarized the follows. Unions' and firms' market power decreases the level of income at each moment of time. On the other hand, the greater the firm's share of value added or the higher union wages, more incentives the firm has to increase the productivity of labor through R&D. In this respect, there can be an optimal amount of unions' and firms' market power. Concerning the regulation of relative union bargaining power, the central planner can increase its welfare either (a) by increasing the level of income or (b) by speeding up economic growth. If (a) is more effective than (b), then the central planner eliminates union power altogether to have full employment. On the other hand, if (b) is more effective than (a), then the central planner supports labor unions to promote cost-escaping R&D. |
| 主题 | Dynamic Systems (DYN)
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| 关键词 | Extensive game
Maximum principle
Stochastic dynamic programming
Alternative offers game
Common agency
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| URL | http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/9054/
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| 来源智库 | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/132311
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Palokangas T. Economic growth with political lobbying and wage bargaining.. 2009.
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