全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): A survey on indirect reciprocity.

G2TT

来源类型	Book Section
DOI	10.1007/978-3-540-34428-5
	A survey on indirect reciprocity.
	Brandt H; Ohtsuki H; Iwasa Y; Sigmund K; Takeuchi, Y.; Iwasa, Y.; Sato, K.
发表日期	2007
出处	Mathematics for Ecology and Environmental Sciences. Eds. Takeuchi, Y. , Iwasa, Y. & Sato, K. , Berlin Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-34428-5 .
出版年	2007
语种	英语
摘要	This survey deals with indirect reciprocity, i.e. with the possibility that altruistic acts are returned, not by the recipient, but by a third party. After briefly sketching how this question is dealt with in classical game theory, we turn to models from evolutionary game theory. We describe recent work on the assessment of interactions, and the evolutionary stability of strategies for indirect reciprocation. All stable strategies (the 'leading eight') distinguish between justified and non-justified defections, and therefore are based on non-costly punishment. Next we consider the replicator dynamics of populations consisting of defectors, discriminators and undiscriminating altruists. We stress that errors can destabilise cooperation for strategies not distinguishing justified from unjustified defections, but that a fixed number of rounds, or the assumption of an individual's social network growing with age, can lead to cooperation based on a stable mixture of undiscriminating altruists and of discriminators who do not distinguish between justified and unjustified defection. We describe previous work using agent-based simulations for 'binary score' and 'full score' models. Finally, we survey the recent results on experiments with the indirect reciprocation game.
主题	Evolution and Ecology (EEP)
URL	http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/8250/
来源智库	International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/133994
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Brandt H,Ohtsuki H,Iwasa Y,et al. A survey on indirect reciprocity.. 2007.