全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Public good games with incentives: The role of reputation.

G2TT

来源类型	Book Section
DOI	10.1007/978-3-540-85436-4_5
	Public good games with incentives: The role of reputation.
	De Silva H; Sigmund K; SA, Levin
发表日期	2009
出处	Games, Groups, and the Global Good. Eds. SA, Levin , Berlin: Springer-Verlag. ISBN 978-3-540-85435-7 DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-85436-4_5 .
出版年	2009
语种	英语
摘要	Both the Trust Game and the Ultimatum Game reduce, in their most simplified versions, to a Public Good Game with an added incentive: namely a reward in the first case, and a sanction in the other. In this paper, the evolutionary game dynamics of these games is analyzed by means of the replicator equation. Positive and negative incentives have very different but complementary effects. We investigate the role of reputation, and show how occasional failures to contribute can lead to stabilizing cooperation.
主题	Evolution and Ecology (EEP)
URL	http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/8914/
来源智库	International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/134049
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	De Silva H,Sigmund K,SA, Levin. Public good games with incentives: The role of reputation.. 2009.