| 来源类型 | Other |
| 规范类型 | 其他 |
| Emission permit management with a self-interested regulator. | |
| Palokangas T | |
| 发表日期 | 2015 |
| 出处 | HECER Discussion Paper No.390, University of Helsinki , Helsinki, Finland. |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Heterogeneous countries produce goods from fixed resources and emitting inputs that cause simultaneous localized and global extenality problems (e.G. smog and global warming). Since there is no benevolent international government, the issue of emission permits is delegated to an international self-interested regulator whom the countries try to influence. A single country can exceed its emission permits with a fixed penalty. In this setup, this article shows that emission trading is welfare diminishing, because it grants less (more) permits to countries with realtively clean (dirty) localized technology. |
| 主题 | Advanced Systems Analysis (ASA) |
| 关键词 | smog GHG emissions emission quotas emission trading lobbying |
| URL | http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/11845/ |
| 来源智库 | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/135683 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Palokangas T. Emission permit management with a self-interested regulator.. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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