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Emission permit management with a self-interested regulator.
Palokangas T
发表日期2015
出处HECER Discussion Paper No.390, University of Helsinki , Helsinki, Finland.
出版年2015
语种英语
摘要Heterogeneous countries produce goods from fixed resources and emitting inputs that cause simultaneous localized and global extenality problems (e.G. smog and global warming). Since there is no benevolent international government, the issue of emission permits is delegated to an international self-interested regulator whom the countries try to influence. A single country can exceed its emission permits with a fixed penalty. In this setup, this article shows that emission trading is welfare diminishing, because it grants less (more) permits to countries with realtively clean (dirty) localized technology.
主题Advanced Systems Analysis (ASA)
关键词smog GHG emissions emission quotas emission trading lobbying
URLhttp://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/11845/
来源智库International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/135683
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Palokangas T. Emission permit management with a self-interested regulator.. 2015.
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