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来源类型 | Working Papers |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | WP-2015-004 |
Limit Pricing and the (In)Effectiveness of the Carbon Tax | |
Saraly Andrade de Sá and Julien Daubanes | |
发表日期 | 2015-04 |
出版年 | 2015 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | The conventional analysis of policy-induced changes in resource extraction is inconsistent with the actual way OPEC is exerting its market power. We claim that OPEC is practicing limit pricing, and we extend to non-renewable resources the limit-pricing theory. Facing a very inelastic demand, an extractive cartel seeks to induce the highest price that does not destroy its demand, unlike the conventional Hotelling analysis: the cartel tolerates some ordinary substitutes to its oil but deters high-potential ones. With limit pricing, policy-induced extraction changes do not obey the usual logic. For example, oil taxes have no effect on current oil production. Extraction increases when high-potential substitutes are promoted, and may only be reduced by supporting its ordinary substitutes. The carbon tax not only applies to oil; it also penalizes its ordinary (carbon) substitutes, whose market shares are taken over by the cartel. Thus the carbon tax ambiguously affects current and long-term oil production. |
关键词 | OPEC Demand elasticity Shale oil Limit pricing Carbon tax Non-renewable resources Monopoly power Oil substitutes |
URL | http://ceepr.mit.edu/publications/working-papers/623 |
来源智库 | Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research (United States) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/172777 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Saraly Andrade de Sá and Julien Daubanes. Limit Pricing and the (In)Effectiveness of the Carbon Tax. 2015. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
2015-004.pdf(463KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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