G2TT
来源类型Working Papers
规范类型论文
来源IDWP-2015-004
Limit Pricing and the (In)Effectiveness of the Carbon Tax
Saraly Andrade de Sá and Julien Daubanes
发表日期2015-04
出版年2015
语种英语
摘要

The conventional analysis of policy-induced changes in resource extraction is inconsistent with the actual way OPEC is exerting its market power. We claim that OPEC is practicing limit pricing, and we extend to non-renewable resources the limit-pricing theory. Facing a very inelastic demand, an extractive cartel seeks to induce the highest price that does not destroy its demand, unlike the conventional Hotelling analysis: the cartel tolerates some ordinary substitutes to its oil but deters high-potential ones. With limit pricing, policy-induced extraction changes do not obey the usual logic. For example, oil taxes have no effect on current oil production. Extraction increases when high-potential substitutes are promoted, and may only be reduced by supporting its ordinary substitutes. The carbon tax not only applies to oil; it also penalizes its ordinary (carbon) substitutes, whose market shares are taken over by the cartel. Thus the carbon tax ambiguously affects current and long-term oil production.

JEL classification: Q30; L12; H21

Keywords: OPEC; Demand elasticity; Shale oil; Limit pricing; Carbon tax; Non-renewable resources; Monopoly power; Oil substitutes

关键词OPEC Demand elasticity Shale oil Limit pricing Carbon tax Non-renewable resources Monopoly power Oil substitutes
URLhttp://ceepr.mit.edu/publications/working-papers/623
来源智库Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research (United States)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/172777
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Saraly Andrade de Sá and Julien Daubanes. Limit Pricing and the (In)Effectiveness of the Carbon Tax. 2015.
条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小 资源类型 版本类型 开放类型 使用许可
2015-004.pdf(463KB)智库出版物 限制开放CC BY-NC-SA浏览
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Saraly Andrade de Sá and Julien Daubanes]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Saraly Andrade de Sá and Julien Daubanes]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Saraly Andrade de Sá and Julien Daubanes]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享
文件名: 2015-004.pdf
格式: Adobe PDF

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。