G2TT
来源类型Policy Briefs
规范类型简报
来源IDPolicy Brief No. 99
Controlling Systemic Risk through Corporate Governance
Steven L. Schwarcz
发表日期2017-02-22
出版年2017
语种英语
摘要

Most of the regulatory measures to control excessive risk taking by systemically important firms are designed to reduce moral hazard and to align the interests of managers and investors. These measures may be flawed because they are based on questionable assumptions. Excessive corporate risk taking is, at its core, a corporate governance problem. Shareholder primacy requires managers to view the consequences of their firm’s risk taking only from the standpoint of the firm and its shareholders, ignoring harm to the public. In governing, managers of systemically important firms should also consider public harm. This proposal engages the long-standing debate whether corporate governance law should require some duty to the public. The accepted wisdom is that corporate profit maximization provides jobs and other benefits that exceed public harm. The debate requires rethinking for systemic economic harm. 

 

主题Trade & Finance
URLhttps://www.cigionline.org/publications/controlling-systemic-risk-through-corporate-governance
来源智库Centre for International Governance Innovation (Canada)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/180201
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Steven L. Schwarcz. Controlling Systemic Risk through Corporate Governance. 2017.
条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小 资源类型 版本类型 开放类型 使用许可
PB no.99.pdf(2582KB)智库出版物 限制开放CC BY-NC-SA浏览
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Steven L. Schwarcz]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Steven L. Schwarcz]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Steven L. Schwarcz]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享
文件名: PB no.99.pdf
格式: Adobe PDF

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。