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For more information about the Hard Power series, see www.aei.org/feature/a-hard-look-at-hard-power-assessing-the-defense-capabilities-of-us-allies-and-security-partners/.
Key points in this Outlook:
Japan’s ambition to play a larger role on the world stage and address the security problems posed by a rising China have led Tokyo to undertake institutional, policy, and defense reforms.
Japan’s military reforms are intended to move its defense force from a posture of passive deterrence to one that is agile and forward leaning.
Given Japan’s budgetary restraints, however, it is unclear whether its resources can match its strategic ambitions.
The following National Security Outlook by Toshi Yoshihara is the 14th in AEI’s Hard Power series. The Outlook is a timely analysis of the Japanese government’s changing security posture and the resulting changes in its defense policies and programs under the premiership of Shinzō Abe. Over the past two decades, Japan has increasingly viewed its security as tied to developments outside its surrounding waters. However, Japan’s long-standing interpretation of Article 9 of its constitution prohibited the nation from any military activity that was not directly tied to its self-defense. This interpretation included Japan denying itself the UN-sanctioned right to engage in collective self-defense-something the United States did not even ask Germany or Italy to forgo after World War II-and meant Japan was not a “normal” country. It was stuck in an anomalous position in which it could not exercise collective self-defense but relied, through the US-Japan Security Treaty, on collective self-defense for its national security. With a desire to play a more significant regional role and under the pressure of a rising and aggressive China, the Abe government has begun to shake off these self-imposed restrictions-a turn for which many in the United States had been hoping for some time.
—Gary Schmitt, Director, Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies at AEI
No longer is Japan the political shrinking violet of the immediate postwar years. Historians will look back on the first decades of the 21st century as a turning point for Japanese strategy, both in East Asia and beyond. From major national security decisions-including the recent move to assume a limited right of collective self-defense-to a shift in military posture to counter a rising China, Japan is steadily loosening the constraints on its security policy. Japanese hard power, which includes Japan’s first-rate but constitutionally handicapped military, will correspondingly play a more prominent role in Tokyo’s strategic calculus.
Understanding how Japanese policymakers will wield that hard power as an instrument of statecraft is thus crucial to Asian and global security. To explore how Japan’s newfound assertiveness will shape Japanese hard power, this Outlook will 1) assess recent developments in Japan’s national security establishment and the deteriorating regional environment, 2) evaluate Japan’s defense posture and military modernization efforts, and 3) identify the various financial and demographic constraints that could limit the material dimensions of Japanese strategy.
A “Normal” Japan at Last?
Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, who returned to power in late 2012 following the Liberal Democratic Party’s landslide victory in the Diet’s lower-house elections, has pushed aggressively to realize his ambitious agenda. Within a year of being elected, Abe instituted sweeping reforms to the national security apparatus. In December 2013, Japan announced the formation of a National Security Council (NSC) modeled after that of the United States. The council streamlines the prime minister’s decision-making process while breaking down the various bureaucratic barriers that have impeded effective crisis management. Tokyo also enacted a controversial state-secrets law that tightened the government’s control over sensitive and classified information, enabling the NSC to centralize the handling of intelligence.
Concurrent with the NSC’s creation, Tokyo issued three defense policy documents that furnish the roadmap for developing and sustaining Japanese hard power. The National Security Strategy (NSS), the first of its kind, sets forth “Japan’s fundamental policies pertaining to national security.”1 The document is a welcome expression of Japan’s long-term vision for securing the nation’s regional and global security objectives. The fifth National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) establishes Japan’s longer-term defense policy and force structure.2 The Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP) is a programmatic statement of defense requirements and acquisition plans over a five-year period.3 For the first time in Japan’s post-World War II history, Tokyo has produced policy documents that systematically align Japanese policy, strategy, and capabilities.
Notably, the NSS promotes the concept of “proactive contribution to peace” that commits Japan to an even more forward-leaning posture in world affairs. Describing the concept as a “fundamental principle of [Japan’s] national security,” the NSS argues that the security of Japan and of the wider international community have become indivisible: “Japan cannot secure its own peace and security by itself, and the international community expects Japan to play a more proactive role for peace and stability in the world, in a way commensurate with its national capabilities.”4 In other words, Japan advances global security by safeguarding its own neighborhood, while Japanese defense of the international order benefits Asian regional stability.
As such, the NDPG contends that Japan must “contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability and prosperity of the international community while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.”5 Indeed, Prime Minister Abe can look to Japanese contributions to international peace and security since the end of the Cold War as the basis for his foreign policy vision.
“For the first time in Japan’s post–World War II history, Tokyo has produced policy documents that systematically align Japanese policy, strategy, and capabilities.”
In a concrete manifestation of this proactive stance, the Abe administration relaxed Japan’s arms-exports ban, which had been in place for nearly five decades. Issued in April 2014, the new guidelines for transferring defense equipment intend to enhance technological cooperation with partners and friends, raising Japan’s profile in regional and global arms markets. The move quickly bore fruit. A week after the new policy was announced, Australia and Japan agreed to a joint research project on marine hydrodynamics for constructing new submarines.
In July 2014, the newly established NSC approved Japan’s research with Britain on the Meteor air-to-air missile and approved exporting a sensor component for the Patriot Advanced Capability-2 air defense system to the United States. A network of defense collaboration centered on developing hard power among like-minded nations could well emerge from these joint ventures. A proactive contribution to peace is thus as much about empowering other defenders of the status quo as it is about strengthening one’s own capabilities.
In an even more consequential move, Abe partially lifted Japan’s self-imposed ban on the right of collective self-defense, the hallmark of the nation’s post-World War II foreign policy. For decades, successive Japanese governments strictly followed the constitutional interpretation that permitted Japan to exercise the right of individual self-defense, which forbids Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) from aiding friendly or allied military units that have come under enemy assault.
This self-denial of a universal right, a right recognized under the UN charter, has long imposed a highly asymmetric and awkward arrangement on the US-Japanese alliance. Washington would be obliged by treaty to defend Japan should it be attacked, while Tokyo could not reciprocate without violating its constitution. To Abe and his followers, such a legal constraint has become untenable in an increasingly dangerous security environment.
Among the scenarios used to advance Abe’s initiative, two relating to the US-Japan alliance stand out. Imagine that a Japanese warship were in the vicinity of an American naval unit under attack and the warship took no action because of constitutional constraints. Imagine, too, that a Japanese destroyer equipped with the Aegis ballistic missile defense system were in a position to intercept a long-range missile headed for the United States, but the destroyer failed to do so owing to Japan’s ban on collective self-defense. To Abe and his lieutenants, if either of these crises occurred and Japan did nothing, then the alliance might not survive the subsequent political blowback in Washington. Thus, adopting the right to collective self-defense would signal Japan’s determination to act alongside the US military, sustaining the alliance’s integrity while enhancing allied deterrence.
In July 2014, after intense negotiations with the New Komeito-the Japanese government’s ambivalent junior coalition partner-Abe’s cabinet approved the reinterpretation of the constitution, allowing Japan to nominally exercise its right of collective self-defense. Under the new understanding, use of force would be permitted “not only when an armed attack against Japan occurs but also when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs.”6 However, in a compromise acknowledging the New Komeito’s concerns, the Japanese government attached three key conditions necessary to invoke the right:
Abe’s cabinet further acknowledged that “prior approval of the Diet is in principle required upon issuing orders” to the SDF for collective self-defense missions.8 By no means has Japan been unshackled from its constitutional restraints or from its exclusively defensive orientation.
“Limited collective self-defense will open the door for Japanese hard power to play a more effective and meaningful role in maintaining regional and global security.”
The cabinet decision represents just the first step in what will likely be a deliberate political process to operationalize this broader constitutional interpretation. The Abe administration will need to submit a legislative package to the Diet that would provide the proper legal framework for the SDF to help assist or defend allies and friends should they come under attack. At least 10 existing laws would be reviewed, updated, and revised in this process. Opposition parties will have another chance to litigate the issue.
In the meantime, changes in popular opinion or other domestic political developments, such as local election outcomes, could influence the momentum behind Abe’s initiative. Public debate and legislative scrutiny-integral to Japan’s open democratic system-will inevitably accompany this important shift in defense policy. Change will come incrementally through careful and transparent negotiations.
It is still unclear how the concept of limited collective self-defense will translate into operational practice for the US-Japan alliance. Planned revisions to the US-Japan defense guidelines, which spell out the allied division of labor, will reportedly incorporate an expanded defensive and logistical role for the SDF. Due for completion at the end of 2014, the guidelines could call on the SDF to provide maintenance, supplies, and fuel to American military units heading into a combat zone-all rear-area activities that were previously prohibited.
In addition to improving allied cooperation, the cabinet decision could broaden the scope of the SDF’s out-of-area operations. For example, the Abe administration has identified minesweeping as a potentially permissible action under UN Security Council authorization. Given Japan’s dependence on energy from the Persian Gulf region, the mining of the Strait of Hormuz could constitute a clear threat to the nation’s survival and well-being. This and other scenarios will likely be the subject of further debate when the government submits its legislative package to the Diet.
Japanese officials must strike a balance between adhering to the constraints of the cabinet decision and ensuring sufficient flexibility to account for the uncertainties of real-world military contingencies. Limited collective self-defense will open the door for Japanese hard power to play a more effective and meaningful role in maintaining regional and global security.
Japan’s Neighborhood Gets Rougher
Mounting pressures close to home, including China’s rise and North Korea’s unpredictability, largely explain the quickening pace of Japan’s normalization. China’s assertiveness in the East China Sea over the past five years has been most troubling to Japan. In September 2010, China reacted vociferously after Japanese law enforcement arrested a Chinese fishing-boat skipper who was filmed ramming Japanese Coast Guard vessels in the waters off the Senkaku Islands. Beijing used economic coercion, cutting off Japan’s only supply of rare-earth minerals critical to electronic manufactures.
After Tokyo nationalized the Senkakus in September 2012, Chinese maritime law-enforcement flotillas began making the rounds in the disputed waters near the islands, and China has insisted that the regular patrols are routine. In response, Japanese Coast Guard vessels have been working overtime to monitor and trail every Chinese “intrusion,” lest Tokyo concede Beijing’s jurisdictional claims. Japan and China have been staring each other down in the East China Sea ever since.
Beyond the Senkakus dispute, Japan and China are locked in a budding naval rivalry. As China’s rapidly modernizing navy extends its reach, it has become commonplace for Chinese naval flotillas to sail through Japanese-held narrow seas. Beginning in 2008 as sporadic forays into the Pacific, these expeditions now take place regularly year round. Moreover, the Chinese navy has steadily expanded the scope of its peacetime operations.
Notably, in July 2013, a surface action group steamed through the Sōya Strait (the first time Chinese units had conducted such a transit), circumnavigated Japan, and circled back to port by way of the international strait between Okinawa and Miyako Islands. Reflecting Tokyo’s growing concerns about China’s naval activism, Japan’s annual defense white papers meticulously report the courses taken by Chinese naval task forces.
“Tokyo clearly recognizes that China’s aggression is not a passing phenomenon; rather, it will likely intensify in the coming years.”
Chinese military aircraft, including fighter jets, have also ramped up flight operations over the East China Sea. In July, September, and October 2013, Y-8 airborne early-warning aircraft and H-6 medium-range bombers conducted long-range flight operations over the Pacific Ocean, passing between Miyako and Okinawa to reach the open sea.9 Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) launched a record number of intercepts against Chinese aircraft in fiscal year 2013, surpassing the number of scrambles in fiscal year 2012 by more than 30 percent.10
In November 2013, Beijing unilaterally declared an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea that requires all foreign aircraft entering the zone to submit flight plans to Chinese aviation authorities. The Chinese ADIZ pointedly overlaps with Japan’s, extending to the Senkakus. Given that China is committed to making these increased naval and air activities the new status quo, frequent run-ins between Chinese and Japanese forces within the relatively confined spaces of East Asian seas will likely be the norm in the coming years.
Japanese policy documents routinely express Tokyo’s misgivings about China’s maritime rise. The NSS asserts, “China has taken actions that can be regarded as attempts to change the status quo by coercion based on their own assertions . . . in the maritime and aerial domains, including the East China Sea and the South China Sea.”11 The NDPG further observes, “China has taken assertive actions with regard to issues of conflicts of interests in the maritime domain. . . . As for the seas and airspace around Japan, China has intruded into Japanese territorial waters, frequently violated Japan’s airspace, and has engaged in dangerous activities that could cause unexpected situations.” The report singles out China’s newly established ADIZ over the East China Sea as destabilizing, concluding, “As Japan has great concern about these Chinese activities it will need to pay utmost attention to them.”12
“Given defense spending trends, Japan may have trouble keeping up with the Chinese military.”
Successive editions of the Japanese Defense Ministry’s annual defense white papers have devoted more attention to China’s maritime activism. In response to recent Chinese provocations at sea, the 2013 edition uses unusually blunt language to admonish Beijing: “Some of these activities of China involve its intrusion into Japan’s territorial waters, its violation of Japan’s airspace and even dangerous actions that could cause a contingency situation, which are extremely regrettable. China should accept and stick to the international norms.”13
Since 2011, the defense ministry’s internal think tank, the National Institute for Defense Studies, has published annual reports on China’s security policy, offering a valuable regional perspective and a second opinion to the Pentagon’s assessment of Chinese military power. Notably, the institute devoted the entire 2012 issue to Chinese maritime strategy and activities.14
In the meantime, North Korea refuses to fade into the background. In a series of provocations in 2010, North Korea sank the South Korean corvette Cheonan, revealed a new uranium-enrichment facility, and shelled an island along the inter-Korean frontier. Pyongyang’s ongoing development of its nuclear weapons and missile programs continues to pose a major security threat to Tokyo. North Korea has thus far conducted a nuclear test in 2006, 2009, and 2013. A fourth test will reportedly provide the reclusive regime sufficient data to design a nuclear warhead small enough to fit atop a ballistic missile.
Since the 1990s, North Korea has test-launched a series of ballistic missiles, with varying degrees of success. In December 2012, Pyongyang placed a satellite into orbit following a failed bid eight months earlier. Widely seen as a disguise for a missile test, the successful space launch demonstrated North Korea’s advances in long-range rocketry and its potential ability to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles. After a nearly five-year hiatus, the country resumed testing of its medium-range Nodong ballistic missile, splashing two into the Sea of Japan in March 2014. With an estimated range of at least 1,000 kilometers, the Nodong can reach large parts of Japan. As the NDPG asserts, “North Korea’s nuclear and missile development, coupled with its provocative rhetoric and behavior, such as suggesting a missile attack on Japan, pose a serious and imminent threat to Japan’s security.”15
The Dynamic Joint Defense Force
Chinese naval and air activities in and around the East China Sea and the employment of paramilitary maritime units near the Senkakus pose particularly taxing challenges for Japan. These peacetime tactics have enabled Beijing to apply constant pressure on Tokyo. China has thus far kept its frequent encounters with the SDF and Japanese Coast Guard at a low simmer, avoiding escalation yet ensuring that the standoff remains in play.
Short of capitulation, Japan has had no choice but to oblige in the cat-and-mouse game, lest it concede to China’s jurisdictional claims or to its larger strategic aims in maritime Asia. And because Beijing has carefully calibrated its displays of force, Tokyo must respond judiciously to Chinese provocations. As China grows more powerful, this twilight phenomenon-featuring nervy close encounters falling well short of armed conflict-is likely to become a new “normal.” Japan thus finds itself in a protracted contest of wills with no end in sight.
As the NSS observes, “The Asia-Pacific region has become more prone to so-called ‘gray zone’ situations, situations that are neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territorial sovereignty and interests. There is a risk that these ‘gray zone’ situations could further develop into grave situations.”16 An incident at sea or a midair collision could trigger Sino-Japanese interactions that quickly spin out of control. In January 2013, a Chinese frigate locked its fire-control radar on a Japanese destroyer, a threatening gesture that typically precedes weapons release. Chinese fighters’ dangerously close intercepts of Japanese surveillance aircraft in May and June 2014 lend credibility to fears that frequent military encounters could lead to accidents and even spiraling escalation.
The NDPG further notes, “Amid the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, the SDF, in addition to its regular activities, needs to respond to various situations, including ‘gray zone’ situations which require SDF commitment. The frequency of such situations and the duration of responses are both increasing.”17 Tokyo clearly recognizes that China’s aggression is not a passing phenomenon; rather, it will likely intensify in the coming years. As such, the NDPG asserts, “Japan will swiftly and seamlessly respond to situations including gray zone situations, and will establish the necessary posture to continuously address a protracted situation.”18
To cope with the ambiguities and complex demands of gray-zone contingencies, the NDPG pledges to “build a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, which emphasizes both soft and hard aspects of readiness, sustainability, resiliency and connectivity, reinforced by advanced technology and capability for C3I, with a consideration to establish a wide range of infrastructure to support the SDF’s operation.”19 Such a force, according to the MTDP, “will provide an effective defense which enables the SDF to conduct a diverse range of activities based on joint operations seamlessly and dynamically, adapting to situations as they demand, while prioritizing particularly important functions and capabilities through optimal resource allocation.”20 Despite the impenetrable jargon typical of defense reports, these stated objectives provide a roadmap to the SDF’s modernization programs and future force structure.
The Dynamic Joint Defense Force concept is the product of a steady evolution in Japanese strategic thought. Notably, the 2010 NDPG formally jettisoned the Basic Defense Force Concept, a Cold War legacy premised on strong yet relatively immobile defenses designed to repel assault and predicated on a largely passive deterrence posture. Instead, according to the 2010 NDPG, a dynamic defense force would take the place of static defense, and agility would be the watchword of the new force. Such forces could swiftly deploy to remote islands for a variety of contingencies, meeting challenges as they arose. To develop a dynamic defense force, the SDF would concurrently rejuvenate aerial, surface, and underwater surveillance operations.
The dynamic joint defense force thus carries forward many of the key tenets developed in 2010. In addition to mobility and readiness, the 2013 NDPG emphasizes the close coordination among naval, air, and ground forces. The inherently amphibious character of the Japanese-held islands in the East China Sea demands such integration of capabilities. At the same time, the 2013 NDPG calls on the SDF to establish an effective intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) architecture that would blanket the East China Sea with a variety of sensors to better monitor China’s naval and air activities. All three services would benefit enormously from such an enhanced ability to keep track of Chinese forces. To meet the ambitions of the dynamic joint defense force concept, the SDF has embarked on a series of military modernization programs.
Force Modernization Trends
Japan boasts one of the most modern and professional militaries in the world. During the Cold War, the SDF complemented-and filled the gaps of-the US military presence in the Western Pacific. Japan’s armed forces shielded the home islands while the major forward bases along the Japanese archipelago allowed the United States to project power across Asia and beyond. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force’s (MSDF’s) surface, undersea, and air units bottled up Soviet naval forces in the Sea of Japan. The maritime service also kept open the sea lanes and secured the maritime approaches to Japan, which were critical to the nation’s economic well-being.
The ASDF’s modern fighters ensured that Japan could defend the airspace over and near the country. The nation’s Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) bristled with tanks and artillery to defend against a full-scale Soviet invasion of the homeland, particularly against Hokkaido Island. The SDF was-and remains-largely a defensive force designed to maintain the nation’s territorial integrity, possessing limited offensive power projection capabilities. Japan’s current force structure and posture are thus legacies of this superpower rivalry.
As a quintessential maritime nation, it is not surprising that Japan counts the MSDF as its leading service. Over the past decade, Japanese naval power has evolved in both quantitative and qualitative terms. In 2010, Tokyo announced its plan to increase its world-class submarine fleet from 16 to 22 boats, representing a nearly 40 percent jump in size. The decision was all the more remarkable because the number of boats had stayed fixed at 16 since 1976.
Leading this growth is the cutting-edge Sōryū-class diesel-electric submarine. The largest of its kind in the world, the Sōryū is superior to its predecessor by virtually every index of performance. It is the first Japanese boat fitted with air-independent propulsion, a fuel-cell technology that permits submarines to operate underwater for extended periods while quieting their noise signature. In short, the MSDF leads the region in conventional submarine warfare, constituting the benchmark against which other Asian navies will be compared over the next decade.
Notably, Japan has been able to invest in its undersea prowess without imposing undue burdens on its fiscal position. The MSDF has traditionally decommissioned its submarines unusually early, introducing more advanced boats to replace older ones that could have stayed in active service for at least another decade. To support the current buildup, the maritime service began keeping its existing boats at sea longer, allowing for a steady growth in fleet size without substantially increasing acquisition costs. Japan will likely meet its 22-boat target before the end of the decade.
The MSDF’s surface fleet, comprised of nearly 50 major surface combatants, has also undergone a makeover. In 2009, the maritime service commissioned the first of two Hyūga-class helicopter carriers with a full load displacement of 19,000 tons. Capable of embarking as many as 11 helicopters, the carrier is a powerful antisubmarine warfare (ASW) platform.
In 2013, Japan launched the first of two Izumo-class ASW helicopter carriers that displace 27,000 tons at full load and carry up to 14 helicopters. Measuring nearly 250 meters in length, the Izumo will enter service in 2015 as the largest warship the Japanese have built since World War II. It promises to substantially boost Japan’s ability to conduct and sustain ASW operations alongside the Hyūga-class carriers.
Additionally, two more Aegis-equipped surface combatants will join the four Kongō-class and two Atago-class guided missile destroyers to enhance Japan’s missile defense capabilities at sea. In 2012, the first of four Akizuki-class guided missile destroyers was commissioned to provide antiair, antisurface, and antisubmarine cover for the helicopter carriers and Aegis-equipped destroyers. For the MSDF’s air fleet, the P-1s-the next-generation maritime patrol aircraft-will eventually replace the aging P-3Cs as Japan’s main shored-based, fixed-wing ASW unit.
The ASDF fields a mix of fourth- and third-generation fighters, including nearly 200 F-15s, 90 F-2s (a variant of the American F-16), and 60 F-4s. A modest number of KC-767 aerial refueling tankers, E-767 Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft, and E-2C airborne early-warning aircraft provide support to Japan’s air superiority and multirole combat aircraft. A fleet of C-130 and C-1 transports furnishes limited strategic lift to Japanese forces.
The most prominent and expensive modernization program for the air service is that of the fifth-generation F-35 fighters. Because of the prohibitive per-unit cost of the aircraft, which has risen further with Japan’s participation in the local production of the fighters’ parts, the ASDF currently plans to acquire only 42 F-35s.
Japan is also developing its own stealth fighter, the Advanced Technology Demonstrator-X, to replace the F-2s. The C-2 transport, the successor to the C-1, promises to substantially improve the range and capacity of the ASDF’s lift. Japan’s air service will acquire new airborne early-warning aircraft, aerial refueling tankers, and transports to augment the ASDF’s ability to patrol the airspace around the Japanese islands. Japan will also invest in UAVs-a joint asset available to the three services-to enhance its ISR capabilities. The leading contender to enter service with the ASDF is the high-altitude, long-endurance Global Hawk.
The GSDF is undergoing the most dramatic restructuring and reorganization of recent years. Reflecting Tokyo’s judgment that the risk of a homeland invasion is negligible, about 700 main battle tanks and 600 artillery pieces will be reduced to 300 and 300, respectively, over a 10-year period. Tank and artillery units will also be removed from Honshu Island and consolidated on Hokkaido and Kyushu Islands. (See table 1.)
To enhance responsiveness and mobility, the GSDF will form two rapid-deployment divisions and two rapid-deployment brigades. Most notably, the ground service will create a new marine brigade capable of conducting amphibious operations to retake remote islands seized by enemy forces. Japan will procure the AAV-7 amphibious assault vehicles and V-22 tiltrotor aircraft that would provide Japanese marines with organic lift capability to project forces ashore.
It is worth noting that these modernization efforts will likely strengthen the SDF’s capacity to project only limited power in the coming years. Notwithstanding breathless commentary surrounding the unveiling of the Izumo-class helicopter carrier, the MSDF is many steps and years away from acquiring a fixed-wing carrier-strike force. Long-range bombers or intercontinental ballistic missiles are conspicuously missing from the ASDF’s inventory, and the GSDF can only conduct limited expeditionary operations for territorial defense.
The SDF is still very much the shield that counts on the American spear to fulfill the full range of missions in Japan’s defense. This is consistent with Tokyo’s current constitutional interpretation prohibiting the possession of weaponry capable of prosecuting offensive operations. Any attempt to depart from this defensive orientation will not escape Japan’s democratic processes, involving painstaking negotiations and debates. Fears of creeping Japanese militarism are thus unwarranted.
Defending the Southwest Islands
As successive policy documents make clear, Tokyo will strengthen its defense posture along the Ryūkyū Islands in the southwest, the geographic epicenter of the Sino-Japanese rivalry. By beefing up defenses along the Ryūkyūs, Japan might be able to exploit a permanent geographic advantage. The island chain gives the SDF the option of closing off Chinese access to the high seas-much as Japan’s Home Islands formed a physical barrier that kept the Soviet Navy bottled up in the Sea of Japan-and provide a form of strategic leverage. Indeed, given Beijing’s deeply embedded fears of being denied access to the global commons, a powerful blocking force along the Southwest Islands could bolster Japan’s deterrence posture.21
The MTDP directs the GSDF to establish a new coastal reco |
