| 来源类型 | Report |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| Too much energy? Asia at 2030 | |
| Dan Blumenthal; Derek Scissors; Andreas Goldthau; Michael Mazza; James A. Slutz; Sara Vakhshouri | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-02-25 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Editor’s note: The next president is in for a rough welcome to the Oval Office given the list of immediate crises and slow-burning policy challenges, both foreign and domestic. What should Washington do? Why should the average American care? We’ve set out to clearly define US strategic interests and provide actionable policy solutions to help the new administration build a 2017 agenda that strengthens American leadership abroad while bolstering prosperity at home. What to Do: Policy Recommendations for 2017 is an ongoing project from AEI. Click here for access to the complete series, which addresses a wide range of issues from rebuilding America’s military to higher education reform to helping people find work. Key Findings Over the next 15 years, the US shale revolution and an end to the Chinese energy demand shock will, as compared to the last 15 years, be the two most important factors shaping global energy markets. The US political-economic system is proving resilient once again. The United States possesses natural resources, well-defined property rights, an open and competitive industrial structure, and deep capital markets—the best possible combination for innovation in energy. These factors catalyzed the ongoing US shale revolution. The American geostrategic position has also improved. While the US has enduring interests in the Persian Gulf—including countering terror groups and Iranian nuclear ambitions—it no longer needs the kind of enmeshed relationships it has had with major oil-producing states. Ridding itself of oil import dependency would free the US to pursue its interests in the Middle East without regard to offending dictatorships. Continued general interest in global oil-price stability will necessitate continued US involvement in the Middle East, but the US will have significantly more flexibility in responding to challenges there than it has in recent decades. China possesses natural resources but lacks the economic structure to properly exploit them. The state owns all oil and gas on Chinese land, meaning there are no incentives for entrepreneurs to explore. Competition in the energy sector is barred, Chinese capital markets are dysfunctional, and any innovation that does occur is not legally protected. Without fundamental economic reform, Chinese growth will stagnate; without energy sector reform, China’s energy industry will remain inefficient and intensely dependent on imports. Genuine Chinese market reform would include enhanced property rights, industrial competition, and a partly privatized financial system, but these outcomes remain unlikely given the limited economic reform President Xi Jinping has been willing to implement thus far. While Chinese demand growth is diminishing, China’s import share continues to rise. China’s reliance on energy from the Middle East now far outstrips US reliance on Middle East energy. Beijing may become ensnared in supply arrangements, with all the consequent foreign policy distortions that Washington has suffered. China’s geopolitical position will be tested. China may choose to create a formal alliance with a leading producer such as Russia (or Iraq), and Moscow may be getting desperate enough to meet Beijing’s energy terms. Since both countries have revisionist political dreams, a genuine Sino-Russian alignment would pose a new set of geopolitical problems for the US. Russia will remain one of the world’s top energy producers and exporters, but its energy future will hinge on several factors outside of Moscow’s control, including Western energy sanctions and European regulations. Should Europe shift away from dependence on Russian energy, the Kremlin will feel more pressure to court China. Elsewhere, Saudi Arabia will maintain its status as the top oil producer over the next 15 years. Iran and Iraq are the potential game changers in the Middle East. If either country can overcome its political challenges—a big “if”—a significant amount of additional oil could be turned out on the global market. Read the one page summary. Introduction Access to affordable energy resources has long been an arbiter of economic growth and driver of geopolitical machinations. Examples from the 19th and 20th centuries abound. In the United States, the growth of oil production and, eventually, the Texas Oil Boom undergirded the Second Industrial Revolution and contributed to greater growth in East Coast oil-exporting cities. Across the Pacific, starting in the late 1800s, Japan’s resource limitations contributed to setting it on an imperial path. Some observers see China as facing the same limitations today. Most notably, through much of the 20th and into the 21st century, concerns about the free flow of oil drove the United States, the Soviet Union, and others to competition in the Middle East. For the past three decades, concerns about energy security have focused primarily on the Middle East, which has faced unceasing threats to regional stability and is home to some of the world’s largest oil-exporting countries. The United States’ role in maintaining stability in the region has been generally welcomed but has also been very costly. At the same time, high oil prices came to be accepted as a matter of course, based on expectations of continued high demand and comparatively constrained supply.Access to affordable energy resources has long been an arbiter of economic growth and driver of geopolitical machinations. Examples from the 19th and 20th centuries abound. In the United States, the growth of oil production and, eventually, the Texas Oil Boom undergirded the Second Industrial Revolution and contributed to greater growth in East Coast oil-exporting cities. Across the Pacific, starting in the late 1800s, Japan’s resource limitations contributed to setting it on an imperial path. Some observers see China as facing the same limitations today. Most notably, through much of the 20th and into the 21st century, concerns about the free flow of oil drove the United States, the Soviet Union, and others to competition in the Middle East. But those expectations may not be borne out. In the latter half of 2014, crude oil prices plummeted, dropping some 40 percent between June and the end of the year. A supply glut, brought about in part by increased American energy production, and weak global demand saw oil priced below $60 per barrel, a five-year low. This crude oil shock has been a boon for consumers, the transport industry, and manufacturers, while hurting the bottom line of the world’s traditional energy producing countries, notably Russia and those in the Middle East. “Shocks” are, by nature, transient. Prices may not remain low beyond the short term. Even so, plunging oil prices do point to questions about the global energy outlook over the long term, for uncertainties surround a number of issues bound to affect the energy security of the United States and its partners as well as the well-being of traditional energy producers. These uncertainties include Future oil and gas production in the United States, the Middle East, the Russian Federation, and China; Future energy demand in the world’s largest economies—notably in East Asia, the European Union, and the United States; Domestic energy policies in the United States, China, and high-volatility producers like Iraq; and Geopolitical factors, such as Iran and Russia sanctions. Perhaps most noteworthy is the shale revolution, which is turning the United States into a major producer of both oil and natural gas seemingly overnight. In Asia, China’s thirst for energy may ease as its economic growth slows appreciably. Continuing tensions on the European periphery are raising questions about Russia’s future supply of energy to members of the European Union, while political instability around the Persian Gulf clouds the future of Iraq and Iran, major potential energy suppliers. This report strives to shed light on these uncertainties with the aim of providing realistic scenarios for the global energy outlook to 2030. That time horizon is near enough to allow for reasonable confidence in demand and supply projections but sufficiently distant for geopolitical implications to play out. A 15-year time horizon also minimizes the potential for multiple unexpected and extremely hard-to-predict developments. A comprehensive description of the energy situation would require multiple volumes. In this report, by taking a holistic approach, even though it cannot be exhaustive, we aim to identify the driving factors of American energy strategy. A better understanding of how the energy market will evolve in the coming years will enable Washington and its partners to better tailor not only their economic and energy policies but also their foreign and defense policies. To accomplish that goal, the report is divided into three sections: four country and regional energy outlooks (North America, China, the Middle East, and Russia); a sketch of global scenarios; and an analysis of geopolitical implications. The energy outlooks for the United States and China are most determinative. Both countries could drive global net energy demand, and they are the world’s central geopolitical actors. The Middle East, European Union, and Russia matter, but just how important they are will depend to a great degree on American and Chinese behavior. Each of these first four essays is organized along similar lines. First, the author describes the present contours of the energy environment for the country or region at hand. Then, the author discusses the primary factors affecting that country’s net energy demand. Finally, the author considers a number of scenarios for energy moving forward. First, James Slutz discusses the biggest change in the global energy environment in the 21st century thus far: the new US energy outlook in the shale oil and gas era. He notes that “the reversal of America’s energy fortunes has taken place within an unprecedentedly short period of time.” Only five years after shale oil and gas were recognized as important sources of supply, the United States in 2013 became the largest combined petroleum and natural gas producer in the world. Looking forward, Slutz sees increasing natural gas production, demand, and exports on the one hand, and slowing demand for oil along with increased oil production on the other. Next, Derek Scissors addresses China’s energy outlook. Because of its immense need for imported energy, China will significantly affect the global energy market in the coming years. China will be the world’s largest importer of energy, coal, and oil out to 2030. The natural resource endowment, current macroeconomic trends, possible market reforms, and domestic and international politics will all affect how Chinese net demand develops in the coming years. Evaluating these, Scissors lays out four possible scenarios for the evolution of China’s energy sector. The four scenarios illustrate the uncertainty in precisely how China will shape global energy outcomes going forward. Nonetheless, the most likely outcome is that growth in Chinese net energy demand will slow considerably. Sara Vakhshouri next discusses the Middle East energy outlook. Saudi Arabia will remain a major energy producer over our timeframe, while Iran and Iraq are potential game changers in the region. Both are blessed with significant resource endowments but also beset by challenges to their capacities to produce and export energy. Iran faces sanctions on its exports and limited access to foreign capital, making it difficult for the country to upgrade its production. Iraq, meanwhile, has lost control of large swaths of territory to Islamic State militants and now faces a lengthy rebuilding process, at best. Energy-sector development is also limited by ongoing disputes between Baghdad and the Kurdish regional government. If either Iran or Iraq can overcome its challenges—a big “if”—a significant amount of oil could be turned out on the global market. The final regional outlook looks at the future development of Russia’s energy sector. Andreas Goldthau argues “Russia will remain one of the world’s top energy producers and exporters, but energy sector developments crucially hinge on several factors it cannot influence: Western energy sanctions, international market developments, EU market regulation, and European decarbonization policies.” These factors are likely to suppress the export markets for Russian oil or gas or both. The promise of East Asian markets for Russian energy remains notional but could be a boon should Russia’s “Eastern Strategy” bear fruit. Having examined the major countries and regions likely to affect net demand, the report next distills regional scenarios into global ones. Scissors lays out global scenarios that consider success or failure for American shale, major shifts in Russian and Middle Eastern energy exports, Chinese economic malaise, global macroeconomic performance, and the potential globalization of the shale revolution. Scenarios are ranked in order of probability, with the most likely scenario seeing American net energy demand moving to zero while global macroeconomic activity remains restrained. These global scenarios set the stage for the report’s concluding chapter on geopolitical implications. Dan Blumenthal argues that developments primarily in China and the United States, and to a lesser extent in Europe and the Middle East, could lead to new challenges to the US-led liberal international order and will affect America’s ability to defend that order. That order, Blumenthal argues, is open to all countries and benefits those that participate. Aside from the United States, China has perhaps been the order’s greatest beneficiary. Deng Xiaoping’s market reforms in the 1970s enabled China, for the first time, to take advantage of it. As Blumenthal writes, “China is now a major economic player and benefits from US global primacy,” with Washington providing “the international security that China is not yet able to ensure on its own.” Energy security has been a central pillar in maintaining the liberal order. Stable supplies of oil, in particular, have supported the expansion of prosperity across the globe and reduced incentives for interstate conflict. The United States has ensured that security by championing a global market for oil, preventing hostile forces from dominating the Persian Gulf and its energy resources, and guaranteeing security of global sea lines. Yet even as China has enjoyed the fruits of these US-provided public goods, Chinese leaders do not always see the liberal order in such a positive light and appear intent on revising it to their own liking. The People’s Republic, moreover, increasingly has the wherewithal not only to challenge that order but also to go toe-to-toe with the United States in certain areas. Russia and Iran do not project to present the same sort of global challenge as does China, though they are capable of causing local disruptions to peace and stability and apparently aim to dominate their own regions. As a result of these challenges, global energy security is increasingly at risk. At the same time, the global energy order is changing. Over the past two decades, Chinese economic growth has presented a major demand shock to the system, and it is now the world’s largest energy importer. As China has grown wealthier, moreover, it has become more intent on providing for its own energy security rather than relying on public goods historically provided by the United States. At the same time, the United States is poised to become a net exporter of oil and gas. Shifts in energy dynamics are likely to affect how the United States interacts with its allies; how the United States and China interact with each other; and how the United States and China each engage with the Middle East, Russia, and other traditional energy suppliers. Will the United States continue to keep the Persian Gulf out of the hands of hostile powers? How much will it care about stability in the region? How will China’s perceptions of its interests in the Middle East change? Will Beijing consider a direct role in ensuring stability there? What are the prospects for Sino-Russian economic and security ties as Euro-Russian ties fray? Nearly every country around the globe can be expected to reexamine energy policies in the coming years as the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries’ domination of the market fades. Because energy is so important to economic well-being and national security, governments will reassess their economic, foreign, and security policies as well. A fundamental realignment of national security strategies, diplomatic ties, and energy relationships is in the offing. This report aims to illuminate the contours of that realignment and provide insight to policymakers tackling a new energy world. Read the full report. |
| 主题 | Asia |
| 标签 | Chinese economy ; energy ; Shale revolution ; supply and demand ; US-China relations ; what to do policy recommendations on energy |
| URL | https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/much-energy-asia-2030/ |
| 来源智库 | American Enterprise Institute (United States) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/206088 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dan Blumenthal,Derek Scissors,Andreas Goldthau,et al. Too much energy? Asia at 2030. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| Too-Much-Energy.pdf（3924KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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