| 来源类型 | Report |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| Inputs, outcomes, quality assurance: A closer look at state oversight of higher education | |
| Andrew P. Kelly; Kevin J. James; Rooney Columbus | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-08-13 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Key Points States rely on a variety of entities to authorize higher education institutions, from existing state agencies and boards to distinct boards or commissions created specifically for the role. State authorizers have varying requirements for postsecondary schools regarding inputs (faculty qualifications, facilities and equipment, and academic programs) and consumer protections (refund policies, surety bonds, student-protection funds, and complaint procedures). States also vary greatly in the authorization timeline and fees. Most states require providers to report on outcome measures, such as graduation rates and job-placement rates; however, few states renew authorizations based on those outcomes. A risk-based approach, focusing on cases that pose the most risk to consumers, could be a better way for states to authorize postsecondary institutions. Authorizers could set up independent oversight boards, require new entrants to provide basic documentation, and use consumer protections to weed out poorly structured or fraudulent institutions. Executive Summary Amid growing concerns about the quality and cost of American higher education, policymakers are searching for reforms that can both increase the supply of affordable and effective postsecondary options and maintain consumer protection. Much of the focus has tended toward the federal student aid programs and policies that govern access to those programs. Though states play an important role in authorizing postsecondary institutions to operate in their state, observers have paid comparatively less attention to how they carry out that responsibility. This paper aims to present lessons for regulatory reform by examining how states organize their authorization process. The intent is not to summarize every aspect of each state’s authorization policy, as states differ tremendously in how they structure their approval pathways for institutions. Instead, the goal is both to draw out broad patterns across states and, where useful, to identify specific examples of states that have taken a unique approach—for better or worse—to the regulatory process. We examined different dimensions of state statute and regulation and combined that information with insights from various experts who navigate these processes every day. This paper explores: Since board members and staff can have significant influence over the implementation of a policy, we looked at the people who oversee state authorization processes. States rely on a variety of entities to carry out this role, from existing state agencies or boards to separate boards created specifically for this purpose. We reviewed the common features of state authorization processes that govern new applicants, first coding “input” requirements—faculty qualification, facilities and equipment, and academic programs—that authorizers usually require of institutions. We also looked at various state boards’ timelines, fees, and required consumer-protection mechanisms, such as refund policies, surety bonds, student-protection funds, and complaint procedures. We examined state renewal processes with an eye toward the extent to which states measure performance outcomes and base renewal decisions on those outcomes—graduation rates, job-placement rates, wage data, default rates, and so on. Overall, most states require providers to report on student outcomes. However, interviewees suggested that few states actually renew authorizations on the basis of those outcomes. The paper concludes by recommending a better way for states to authorize postsecondary institutions: a risk-based approach, in which state authorizers would focus their resources on cases that pose the most risk to consumers. Authorizers could set up oversight boards independent of the political process and the existing higher education system in the state, require new entrants to provide basic documentation to establish a minimum level of seriousness, and have a well-designed set of consumer protections to weed out poorly structured or fraudulent institutions. In particular, states could require organizations to put up private capital as insurance against failure, which would also help to separate serious providers from diploma mills. Once an authorized institution begins to enroll students, regulators should be on the lookout for alarms—outcome measures that might trigger a more in-depth investigation of a potentially troubled institution. Because some of these data are not readily available, states should take steps to invest in the necessary infrastructure, such as connecting wage information from unemployment insurance databases to postsecondary-enrollment information. State regulators could then use those data to renew organizations that have proven successful and to weed out those that were not. Reciprocity agreements could also help reduce the burden on authorizers and institutions. Introduction Long considered the best in the world, American higher education is at an important inflection point. Rising tuition prices and lackluster student outcomes have led to a national debate about the quality of existing colleges and the need for more innovation in the sector. These discussions have typically focused on federal rules governing access to student financial aid—in particular, the federal government’s reliance on third-party accreditation as the main gatekeeper for public resources. Higher education observers have paid less attention to how state governments approach their responsibility to authorize or license postsecondary institutions that operate in their state. To be eligible for federal aid dollars, an institution must be formally approved by the state in which it is operating. Federal law says little about what this state authorization process must entail, and states vary widely in what they require of existing and new institutions.[1] To be sure, the last several years have seen a large uptick in policymaker interest regarding state authorization policies, largely thanks to new regulations from the Department of Education and to coordinated investigations and lawsuits by Democratic state attorneys general.[2] After taking office, the Obama administration unveiled a slate of “program integrity” regulations; one of those regulations required that institutions obtain explicit authorization from each state in which they are operating. This change was intended to prod state regulators to look more closely at institutions authorized in another state that offer programs to their residents—primarily online—without the state’s explicit approval.[3] The rule was eventually thrown out by the courts, but evidence suggests that it did spur state regulators to keep an eye on cross-border providers.[4] Not surprisingly, many institutions opposed the administration’s state authorization requirements, arguing that complying with 50 separate state-regulatory processes is unreasonably burdensome.[5] A set of states have responded with a budding effort to establish reciprocity agreements that would help alleviate some of these compliance burdens for existing online providers.[6] Despite this flurry of activity and criticism, researchers have paid less attention to what lessons we might draw about how to—and how not to—regulate higher education from the actual content of state regulations. State statutes and regulations determine who authorizes postsecondary institutions, what criteria authorizers must use to judge those institutions, and how authorized providers should be monitored and held accountable for their performance. Despite this crucial role, we know less than we should about how states vary in their approach to authorizing new providers and reauthorizing existing ones and about what we might learn from different approaches.[7] It is an opportune time to ask these questions. Like federal reformers, state regulators who wish to promote postsecondary innovation and quality face a basic tension: How do you balance efforts to increase flexibility and lower barriers to entry with the need to protect consumers and taxpayers? At the federal level, discussions of how to create space for innovative approaches tend to agree on the problem (accreditation and federal regulation), but they often run aground when it comes to questions about what should replace these pieces of the current system. Wholesale change at the federal level entails considerable risk, so the ability to experiment and learn from different approaches is key to informing these policy debates. States provide one potential source of information. They play a key role in the existing system, and some reformers have called for devolving even more power to the states.[8] Whether states are currently well-equipped to do this job is an important question, as are questions about how one might improve states’ role. In other words, reformers would be wise to look at states as laboratories of democracy that can provide useful lessons about how to reform quality assurance in higher education. In that spirit, this policy brief asks a series of formative questions on state authorization. Are state oversight policies flexible enough to allow new, innovative models into the market, or are they bureaucratic and compliance driven, making it more difficult for new ideas to gain approval? Do regulatory policies and approval processes focus on inputs—measures of an organization’s physical and human resources—or on the outcomes they produce? How much do states vary in terms of the fees they charge and the length of the licensure process? And what do states require of institutions in terms of consumer protections, such as mandatory refunds, trial periods, and other safeguards? To shed light on these topics, we analyzed state policies directly and conducted interviews with various stakeholders, both within and outside of institutions, who have to navigate these processes. The intent is not to describe each state’s policies in detail nor to do a systematic empirical analysis of state regulation, but instead to highlight broad themes across states and to describe instances where particular states’ policies stand out. To be clear, we make no effort to assess the “effectiveness” of different state regulatory regimes, a concept that is difficult to define, let alone measure. Instead, we examine state policies in reference to our prior beliefs that an ideal regulatory policy should strike a balance between openness to new models and the need to protect consumers. We recognize that different observers would likely strike different balances between these two concepts and encourage other analysts to conduct further research on this important topic. Read the full report. Notes |
| 主题 | Higher Education |
| 标签 | Center on Higher Education Reform ; Higher education ; Quality assurance in higher education |
| URL | https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/inputs-outcomes-quality-assurance-a-closer-look-at-state-oversight-of-higher-education/ |
| 来源智库 | American Enterprise Institute (United States) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/206155 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrew P. Kelly,Kevin J. James,Rooney Columbus. Inputs, outcomes, quality assurance: A closer look at state oversight of higher education. 2015. |
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| Inputs-Outcomes-Qual（340KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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