| 摘要 | The federal government relies on what is known as the regulatory “triad” to determine institutional eligibility for federal student aid. Colleges that wish to participate in Title IV programs must meet the following criteria: They must be certified by the Department of Education; accredited by a private, voluntary accreditation agency that is recognized by the secretary of education; and authorized to operate in the state where they are physically located.
The triad is designed to set minimum standards for eligibility, and although there is some overlap, each player fulfills a particular role. The Department of Education is supposed to ensure that the institution is financially sound and has the capability to administer the Title IV programs in which it participates. The states are largely supposed to focus on consumer protection, providing adequate means for consumers to register complaints and sue under applicable state laws. And the accreditors are supposed to focus on ensuring that the institution provides an education of sufficient academic quality to lead to student learning. At the same time, consumers’ ability to “vote with their feet” via portable vouchers (in the form of Pell Grants and low-interest student loans) is supposed to create market pressure that encourages institutions to focus on the value of the education they provide.
In theory, one virtue of this approach is that it keeps federal regulators out of core academic and governance questions. Over the years, however, the federal government has imposed a number of requirements directly on institutions wishing to participate in federal financial-aid programs. These requirements are intended to weed out institutions that fail to meet certain standards designed to assess, through various proxy measures, an institution’s quality and financial health. In addition, federal policymakers have placed increasing demands on accreditation agencies. In the 1950s, for example, accreditation agencies had to meet five basic criteria to gain recognition from the Commissioner of the Office of Education in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. These days, federal requirements on accreditation agencies fill nine pages of the Higher Education Act, and the federal application for recognition as an accrediting agency is nearly 90 pages long.
The federal government has even sought to dictate standards for state oversight of institutions. What was originally a requirement that institutions meet state authorization criteria (to the extent that states had such criteria) has evolved into minimum standards for state authorization that institutions must meet to remain eligible for Title IV. Indeed, while the federal government cannot force states to change their authorization processes, the federal government threatens each institution in a state with loss of Title IV eligibility if a state’s process doesn’t meet federal guidelines.
Notwithstanding the efforts of these regulatory bodies and the increasing degree of oversight of institutions, the results for students are worse than ever. Students are paying more for an education and are less likely to graduate. Employers routinely report that a college degree is not a reliable signal of a person’s readiness for the demands of a job. Worse, with the rising cost of education and rising student-loan volume, the rates of student-loan delinquency and default have reached alarming levels — which puts both students and taxpayers at risk.
The federal government can do better for students and taxpayers. This section examines the status quo in federal accountability policy and outlines potential reforms that could better align the incentives of colleges, students, and taxpayers.
To view the full chapter, visit: https://nationalaffairs.com/storage/app/uploads/public/doclib/HigherEd_Ch3_James.pdf |
