| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Toughening TANF | |
| Douglas J. Besharov; Peter Germanis | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-04-21 |
| 出处 | Welfare Academy |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The full report is available from the Welfare Academy. Executive Summary In the last week of March, the Senate finally started consideration of a bill to reauthorize the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Program, but disagreements prevented conclusive action. The bill may be revived in the next two weeks or later in the current session. If the bill passes the Senate, still lying ahead would be a conference committee process followed by passage in both houses. In contemplation of this process, we prepared a report analyzing the participation requirements in the House and Senate bills to reauthorize TANF and likely state responses to them. Titled “Toughening TANF: How Much? And How Attainable?” the report also contains our own “Common Ground” recommendations that seek to bridge the differences between the two bills. Our findings are also reflected in an op-ed that appeared in the New York Times on March 6. To estimate the size of the new participation requirements that each bill would place on states, we created a “Participation Rate Estimator,” essentially a spreadsheet that models the impacts of the various policy choices imbedded in both bills. We find that, after the application of the steps outlined in the report: Under H.R. 4 (as a result of the caseload reduction credits, full-family sanction, first-month exclusion, child-under-one exclusion, job search as a three-month activity, other three-month activities, and separate state programs) only about four states would not meet H.R. 4’s participation requirements. (The states would be Georgia, Maryland, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania, and, collectively, they would fall about 1,340 recipients short of the required level of participation.) Under S. XXX (as a result of the employment credit, proportional credit for hours of participation, post-sanction exclusion, first-month exclusion, child-under-one exclusion, job search as a direct work activity and as a three-month activity, other three-month activities, and separate state programs) all states would meet S. XXX’s participation requirements. We refer to the Senate reauthorization bill as “S. XXX.” Its formal name is the “Personal Responsibility and Individual Development for Everyone (PRIDE) Act.” It was reported out of the Finance Committee on September 10, 2003. As of this writing, it has been reported as a substitute for H.R. 4 and does not have a bill number, so we refer to it as S. XXX. Our estimator is a static model, in which we examine the characteristics of the caseload to determine the percentage affected by both bills. Nevertheless, we think that it accurately describes the most likely path of state implementation. As our analysis illustrates, even without the addition of either bill’s provisions, TANF’s participation requirements are complex, difficult to understand, and easily circumvented. Both bills would accentuate these problems, S. XXX substantially more than H.R. 4. The complexity of TANF’s participation requirements stems largely from the politics of how the original law described participation requirements. The drafters wanted to show they were serious about reform, so they set a high putative requirement (eventually 50 percent). But they compromised on the real requirements through a slew of exclusions and exemptions that substantially watered down the 50 percent requirement (even before the impact of the caseload reduction credit). Both H.R. 4 and S. XXX take the same approach. They assert a required participation rate of 70 percent, presumably to show that they are raising participation requirements from current law. And then, like current TANF, they create one exclusion, exception, and credit after another that sharply reduce the formal increase in participation requirements. How else to interpret S. XXX’s employment credit which essentially lowers the required participation rate by 20 percentage points, back down to current TANF’s 50 percent—without states having to do anything new or additional? The same is true for H.R. 4’s putative requirement that all single mothers participate for forty hours a week. It is now clear that participation will be defined so broadly that nearly any activity will count for the hours beyond the basic twenty-four-hour requirement. These seemingly high participation requirements became an easy target for criticism: a 70 percent participation rate would be unattainable and forty hours of participation would be difficult to achieve and could be a heavy burden on some families. They also created an exaggerated impression of how much more child care would be needed, thereby strengthening the arguments of those pushing for additional federal child care aid–even though the key actors understood that the actual requirements were much lower. We recommend developing a common ground between H.R. 4 and S. XXX that would simplify administration processes while making participation requirements more realistic, more enforceable, and more closely focused on activities that encourage work and build human capital. Our Common Ground proposal would establish a middle road in participation requirements between the two bills–with one exception, we would impose a real and enforceable requirement that at least 10 percent of the adult caseload be in a work experience or education and training activity. None of the credits and exclusions embedded in current law and either bill are needed to give states an incentive to reduce caseloads, and neither are needed to reward state success in reducing their caseloads. (H.R. 4’s superachiever credit has no apparent programmatic justification.) The additional block grant funds that are freed up as a consequence of the caseload declines should be sufficient on both accounts. Here are our Common Ground recommendations: Drop all participation rate credits, including H.R. 4’s caseload reduction credit (or at least prevent its application to caseload declines due to separate state programs) and superachiever credit and S. XXX’s employment credit–because they are too generous and might easily be gamed, and, instead, rely on the incentives built into the block grant to encourage states to reduce caseloads. (Given the elimination of the additional hours requirement recommended below, S. XXX’s proportional credit should also be dropped.) Drop the exclusions for cases in the first month of assistance and with a child under age one–because they add unnecessary administrative complexity and, instead, rely on job search at application to achieve the same goal. Set the required number of hours of participation at twenty-four hours for single mothers with a child under age six and thirty-two hours for all other families (including one-parent families with no children under age six and two-parent families). Drop the requirement of additional hours of participation in direct or nondirect work activities–because it is not needed in all cases and will lead to sham activities. (Given the elimination of the additional hours requirement recommended above, S. XXX’s proportional credit should also be eliminated. Drop H.R. 4’s requirement of full-family sanctions on the ground that it could be easily avoided–and, instead, rely on the fact that sanctioned cases still count against participation requirements. (Keep S. XXX’s post-sanction exemption because it encourages continued state attention on such families.) Drop the various complicated three-month-activity rules in both bills and create one simple provision that allows the counting of nondirect work activities in both bills for up to six months in any twelve-month period (and drop S. XXX’s “additional” three-month provision)–to simplify administration and allow programs sufficient time to provide their services. Set the required participation rate at 50 percent of the adult caseload. Establish a disability exclusion (capped at 15 percent of the adult caseload)–to accommodate the need to exempt the disabled from a true 50 percent participation requirement. Broaden the definition of direct work activities to include education and training activities as well as all TANF’s “core” activities and all the direct work activities in H.R. 4 and S. XXX–to give states maximum flexibility in experimenting with different activities. Establish a separate minimum participation rate for work experience, on-the-job training, and other designated forms of education and training of 10 percent of the adult caseload–to add a needed focus on activities that build human capital. Because of the porousness of the borders between TANF activities, especially since the legislation does not define them, the specific activities counted toward this requirement should be subject to regulation, but might include work experience, on-the-job training, subsidized employment, mandatory community service, [1] community or public service jobs, supported work, vocational educational training, classroom occupational training, job skills training, education related to employment, education for teen heads of household, remedial education, English as a Second Language, secondary education, and postsecondary education. (Some education activities could be combined with work experience, and, in fact, there might be a mandate to that effect.)[2] Count job search at application for up to six weeks without any special limitations–because the limitations in current TANF, H.R. 4, and S. XXX could be easily avoided and good policy would be for everyone who applies for assistance to go through some form of job search assessment. What about added costs for administration and child care? How much would spending have to increase to cover the added costs for administration and child care? Remember, we believe that almost all states can meet H.R. 4’s and S. XXX’s participation requirements without expanding services or spending because of the broad definitions of countable activities. But if we are incorrect–or if states choose to expand their programming–then annual costs could rise as much as $1.6 billion by 2008 (in 2002 dollars). Adopting a modified version of CBO scoring, [3] here are the actual ranges: For H.R. 4, additional costs for administration of sites, etc., could range from $0 to $836 million, additional costs for child care could range from $0 to $772 million, and total additional costs could range from $0 to $1.608 billion. For S. XXX, additional costs for administration of sites, etc., could range from $0 to $249 million, additional costs for child care could range from $0 to $230 million, and total additional costs could range from $0 to $479 million. For Common Ground, additional costs for administration of sites, etc., could range from $252 million to $461 million, additional costs for child care could range from $232 million to $426 million, and total additional costs could range from $484 million to $887 billion. The lower-bound estimates assume that states could place recipients in “additional job search,” “additional three- or six-month activities,” and “additional needed direct work participation” at no additional cost because participation could be in a broad range of activities, including unsupervised and self-reported activities that involve no additional cost. (Even “additional needed direct work participation” could be in broad community service activities.) The upper-bound estimate assumes that participation in these activities, as well as “additional work experience, and education and training (10% of adult caseload)” would involve real costs for each additional participant. It is this wide range of possible costs that has complicated the argument about whether both bills’ higher participation requirements are an unfunded mandate. On one hand, analysts like the CBO (and us) think states can avoid all new expenses if they wish to do so. On the other hand are those who either think that the states cannot avoid additional costs or are willing to make that argument to gain more funding for the states. In any event, existing funds under both TANF and the CCDF would be sufficient to cover expansions of these magnitudes, albeit at the cost of other state activities now supported by block grant funds. (The latter is a strong argument, as described below.) But what if there were a decision to reimburse (or reward) the states for the increased costs of expanding participation? How would the amount of reimbursement be set? Put simply, there is no way to know in advance what the states would do. And, in any event, would it not vary widely from state to state? Hence, the choice is either to rely on the political process to pick an amount or to establish a formula that rewards or reimburses states for real expansions in participation. That is what we suggest. Reimburse states for the added costs of administration and child care that result from increased participation by means of a predetermined formula that is tied to the additional amount of participation. Some will argue that further increases in child care funding are needed for nonTANF families or at least for families that have left TANF for work. There may or may not be a need for more federal child care assistance for such families, but, either way, the argument should not be in the guise of the need to meet additional needs caused by higher required participation rates. The basic argument put forward by those seeking additional child care funding is that CCDF funding should be increased to reflect inflation. Sharon Parrott and her colleagues at CLASP, for example, argue that, “the level of child care assistance in the pending TANF reauthorization bills is well below the levels needed simply to keep child care services for low-income working families from shrinking in coming years.” [4] It is arguable, however, that the CCDF should be adjusted for inflation. First, federal child care aid to the states has increased mightily in the last decade, and there is good evidence that the states do not want to spend at the pace of past increases. Between 1997 and 2002, federal funding available through the CCDF increased nearly 120 percent (about $2.6 billion in 2002 dollars), from about $2.2 billion to about $4.8 billion. About $940 million of CCDF funds remained unobligated as of the end of fiscal year 2002, and another $2.2 billion had been “committed” but not yet spent. Other major programs that provide child care services have also seen their funding increased far faster than inflation. Between 1997 and 2002, child care spending on just five programs–Head Start, Title I (for preschool children), the 21st Century Community Learning Centers Program, the Social Services Block Grant (for child care), and the Child and Adult Care Food Program–increased nearly 50 percent (by more than $3.2 billion in 2002 dollars), from $6.870 billion to $10.109 billion. Second, the states have enjoyed a financial windfall from the TANF block grant, and again it appears that they do not want to spend all the money available on child care. Between 1997 and 2002, the states enjoyed a $59 billion cash windfall (in 2002 dollars) from the decline in the TANF caseload and the concomitant reduction in spending on assistance and administration.[5] In 2002, alone, the windfall was $13.4 billion. About $2.7 billion of these TANF funds remained unobligated as of the end of fiscal year 2002, and another $3.1 billion had been “committed” but not yet spent. Although these funds go to many programs, child care probably receives the most. However, because there are essentially no limits to how states may use these finds, many billions have been used to “substitute” for preexisting state spending. Putting aside these considerations, how much would the CCDF have to be increased to reflect projected inflation rates? Some advocates, such as those at CLASP, cite a CBO estimate [6] that an additional $4.5 billion in child care funding would be needed over five years just to offset “the effects of inflation on child care funding and thereby avert a reduction in child care services or child care slots, even if there were no increase in TANF work requirements.”[7] Such statements incorrectly leave the impression that federal spending should be increased by this amount just to offset the effects of inflation. The CBO estimate includes state expenditures under the CCDF, which are inappropriate for determining how much additional federal funding is necessary. According to the CBO, between 2004 and 2008, federal CCDF funds will represent just 69 percent of total CCDF expenditures. The CBO estimate also includes state TANF expenditures on child care and state transfers of TANF funds to the CCDF. According to the CBO, between 2004 and 2008, federal CCDF funds will represent just 43 percent of total CCDF and TANF funding for child care. TANF funds alone represent 38 percent of the total funding assumed in the CBO’s baseline projection. Although TANF funds are one element of child care funding, they come from a separate funding source, one from which states regularly draw on for a wide variety of purposes, including child care. The funding deemed necessary is expressed in “current” dollars, which reflects the effects of inflation in future years. In 2002 dollars, the $4.5 billion increase shrinks to about $4.1 billion. Taking these considerations into account–and starting in 2002, the historic high point of CCDF funding–the inflation-adjusted 2008 figure for the CCDF would be $550 million, and a total of $1.808 billion for the period from 2004 to 2008 (both in 2002 dollars). We make no estimate of an inflation-adjusted figure for the TANF block grant because the states have diverted such a large amount of money from it to other, nonwelfare purposes. The entire report may be found at www.welfareacademy.org/pubs/welfare/toughening_tanf.pdf. Notes 1. Community service activities could be included in the 10 percent but only if their definition were narrowed to include only those activities that provide a benefit to the community and to exclude self-improvement and child rearing activities. 2. In New York City, for example, after an initial period when the city required participation in its work experience program only, the city decided to combine work experience with education and training activities. See Douglas J. Besharov and Peter Germanis, Work Experience in New York City: Successful Implementation, Uncertain Impact, and Lessons for TANF’s Participation Requirements (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, March 21, 2003). 3. U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office, “Potential Cost to States of Meeting Proposed Work Requirements: Based on Senate Finance mark-up documents and clarifications by staff,” unpublished cost estimate, September 10, 2003. To estimate the additional costs for administration of sites, etc., we multiply the CBO’s estimated 2008 cost of $3,440 per “work program” slot (in 2002 dollars) by the number of additional recipients that would be required to satisfy the participation requirements. To estimate the additional costs for child care, we use CBO’s assumptions that 85 percent of the adults that would be required to participate have a child under age thirteen (the age cutoff for CCDF eligibility) and that these families, on average, have 1.68 children. This results in an estimate of the maximum number of additional children requiring child care. Of course, not all families eligible for child care will elect to receive a subsidy. Like the CBO, we assume a 50 percent take-up rate to determine the number of children that would require a subsidy. We multiply the resulting number of children by the average cost of a CCDF-subsidized child care slot–$4,450 per child (in 2002 dollars), based on the average cost per child under the CCDF in 2001. 4. Sharon Parrott, Jennifer Mezey, Mark Greenberg, and Shawn Fremstad, Administration Is Misstating Amount of Child Care Funding in Pending TANF Reauthorization Bills (Washington, D.C.: Center for Law and Social Policy, December 15, 2003), p. 4, available from: http://www.clasp.org/DMS/Documents/1071588118.09/CC_funds.pdf, accessed February 17, 2004. 5. Authors’ calculations based on U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, “U.S. Caseloads Information,” various years, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, February 6, 2004), available from: http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/news/stats/newstat2.shtml, accessed February 19, 2004; and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, Office of Planning, Research, and Evaluation, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Program: Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, various years). This estimate is derived by multiplying each year’s caseload decline by the average annual benefit for families receiving cash assistance (about $4,800 per family in 2002 dollars) and associated administrative costs (about $500 per family in 2002 dollars). The windfall for each year is then summed to derive the cumulative savings over the 1997-2002 period. 6. Congressional Budget Office, “Preliminary Staff Estimate: Child Care Base Line,” unpublished table provided by Donna Wong to Peter Germanis. February 1, 2004. See also Sharon Parrott, Jennifer Mezey, Mark Greenberg, and Shawn Fremstad, Administration is Misstating Amount of Child Care Funding in Pending TANF Reauthorization Bills (Washington, DC: Center for Law and Social Policy, December 15, 2003), available from: http://www.clasp.org/DMS/Documents/1071588118.09/CC_funds.pdf, accessed February 17, 2004. 7. Sharon Parrott, Jennifer Mezey, Mark Greenberg, and Shawn Fremstad, Administration Is Misstating Amount of Child Care Funding in Pending TANF Reauthorization Bills (Washington, DC: Center for Law and Social Policy, December 15, 2003), p. 3, available from: http://www.clasp.org/DMS/Documents/1071588118.09/CC_funds.pdf, accessed February 17, 2004. Douglas J. Besharov is the Joseph J. and Violet Jacobs Scholar at AEI. |
| 主题 | Poverty Studies |
| 标签 | social welfare ; TANF |
| URL | https://www.aei.org/research-products/working-paper/toughening-tanf/ |
| 来源智库 | American Enterprise Institute (United States) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/206804 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Douglas J. Besharov,Peter Germanis. Toughening TANF. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| toughening_tanf.pdf（525KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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