| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Conflicts of Interest, Low-Quality Ratings, and Meaningful Reform of Credit and Corporate Governance Ratings | |
| Charles W. Calomiris; Joseph R. Mason | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-04-14 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Corporate governance ratings have become an important component of proxy voting and shareholder control. Corporate governance ratings, however, are different from other ratings in that they measure relatively intangible components of corporate performance and are not easily modeled. Furthermore, existing empirial work has not been able to identify robust linkages between corporate governance ratings and value creation within firms; there is little evidence that corporate governance ratings create significant shareholder value or increase the quality of corporate governance practices. We develop a new interpretation of corporate governance ratings that sees ratings as a means of expanding or redistributing the aggregate economic rents that accrue to incentive-conflicted management, institutional investors, and rating agencies, and we argue that this could explain the popularity of corporate governance ratings among institutional investors and managers. If important conflicts of interest lie between institutional investors and their clients, the ultimate investors, then institutional investors may demand meaningless ratings as a means of increasing their rents and avoiding accountability. Because of the market power that can be exercised within the existing manager-rating agency-institutional investor alliances fuelled by those rents, competitive pressures alone will not be sufficient to overturn these bad equilibria. Hence, without appropriate regulatory interventions, the perverse incentives that encourage rent-seeking via low-quality corporate governance ratings will persist. Click here to read the full paper as an Adobe Acrobat PDF. Charles W. Calomiris is a visiting scholar at AEI. Joseph R. Mason is the Hermann Moyse, Jr./Louisiana Bankers Association Endowed Professor of Banking at Louisiana State University and Senior Fellow at The Wharton School. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 标签 | calomiris ; corporations ; governance ; interest rates |
| URL | https://www.aei.org/research-products/working-paper/conflicts-of-interest-low-quality-ratings-and-meaningful-reform-of-credit-and-corporate-governance-ratings/ |
| 来源智库 | American Enterprise Institute (United States) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/207058 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Charles W. Calomiris,Joseph R. Mason. Conflicts of Interest, Low-Quality Ratings, and Meaningful Reform of Credit and Corporate Governance Ratings. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| conflictsofinterestl（149KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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