全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Strategic voting in proportional representation systems

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	论文
	Strategic voting in proportional representation systems
	Stan Veuger; Tim Ganser
发表日期	2014-02-25
出版年	2014
语种	英语
摘要	Abstract: We propose a model of voter decision-making in proportional representation systems: ultra-rational strategic voters construct expectations of coalitions and policy outcomes based on expected seat distributions and vote to maximize their expected utility from the implemented policy. We examine the predictions of our model using data from the Netherlands and successfully predict the voting behavior of significant numbers of voters. Nevertheless, other factors matter more than our strategic prediction. Three main take-aways follow: (1) At least to some extent, voters seem to take complex coalition considerations into account. (2) There is a need for large-scale quantitative studies about voter decision-making in proportional representation systems. (3) Narrowly defined strategic voting might matter less in proportional representation systems than in plurality systems. Strategic voting in proportional representation systems
主题	Economics
标签	voting
URL	https://www.aei.org/research-products/working-paper/strategic-voting-in-proportional-representation-systems/
来源智库	American Enterprise Institute (United States)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/207300
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Stan Veuger,Tim Ganser. Strategic voting in proportional representation systems. 2014.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
-veuger-strategic-vo（440KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览