| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Governmental systems and economic volatility in democracies | |
| Weifeng Zhong; Chen Cheng; Christopher Li | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-05-14 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Abstract Economic volatility varies substantially across democracies. We study how the difference between federal and unitary systems of government can contribute to these variations. We show empirically that a higher degree of federalism is associated with less volatility in both economic growth and fiscal policy. Motivated by these stylized facts, we develop a macroeconomic model of policy-making at the central and district levels. Policy at the central level is uncertain due to uncertainty about the identity of the winning coalition in a legislature of district representatives, while policy at the district level is more stable due to homogeneity within districts. We show that, in equilibrium, the decentralization of policy-making powers can mitigate overall policy uncertainty. This implies less volatility in fiscal policy and, hence, less volatility in economic growth, compared to those in a more unitary system. Read the full PDF here. |
| 主题 | Economics |
| 标签 | federalism ; Fiscal policy |
| URL | https://www.aei.org/research-products/working-paper/governmental-system-and-economic-volatility-under-democracy/ |
| 来源智库 | American Enterprise Institute (United States) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/207384 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Weifeng Zhong,Chen Cheng,Christopher Li. Governmental systems and economic volatility in democracies. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| clz_federalism_final（479KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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