| 来源类型 | Book |
| 规范类型 | 其他 |
| Forming a Government under the Constitution | |
| Herbert Stein; John Charles Daly | |
| 发表日期 | 1984-12-04 |
| 出版者 | American Enterprise Institute |
| 出版年 | 1984 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Editor’s Note: This AEI public policy forum explored how our government organizes itself after a presidential election. The panel discussed questions such as: Does the separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches guarantee stalemate? How seriously has the erosion of presidential authority over the past decade impaired the president’s ability to govern effectively? Can the United States function as a twentieth century superpower within the structure of our Constitution? John Charles Daly moderated the event with Richard Bolling, Stuart Eizenstat, David R. Gergen, and Herbert Stein sitting on the panel. Introductory Remarks This public policy forum, one of a series presented by the American Enterprise Institute, is concerned with how our government organizes itself following a presidential election and the ways in which the Constitution of the United States shapes the necessary powers the president and the Congress use. Our subject: Forming a Government under the Constitution. Our Constitution, written in 1787, provides that once a newly elected or reelected president takes the oath of office, swearing to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States,” he shall “from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.” Further, “He shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States.” Note that these constitutional provisions refer to both the president and the Congress, thereby emphasizing one of the primary characteristics of our governmental system, the separation of the legislative and the executive powers. The president, for his part, sets forth his program and nominates department heads, but only the Congress, by rules of its own making, legislates and controls the purse strings. Also, the Senate, under our Constitution, must confirm the president’s cabinet and other major appointees. Both the president and the Congress must contend with the limitations of the separation of powers. Congress must labor to achieve a two-thirds majority in each house to overcome a presidential veto, while, as noted, the president has the exclusive right to make appointments, though the Senate may continually reject them. The president must also work his will against the clock because the Twenty-second Amendment stipulates that he may serve no more than two terms in office. The pressing question that has emerged after almost two centuries of living with these procedures and limitations is, Do the requirements of the Constitution that form the contours of the relationship between president and Congress aid or hinder the formation of effective government after an election? Many critics of our system contend that our constitutional structure is no longer suitable for establishing and carrying out the consistent policies expected of a superpower in the twentieth century, especially when the Congress is dominated in whole or in part by a political party different from that of the president. For instance, Lloyd N.Cutler, counsel to President Jimmy Carter, wrote in 1980, “The separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches, whatever its merits in 1793, has become a structure that almost guarantees stalemate today….We elect one presidential candidate over another on the basis of our judgment of the overall program he presents, his ability to carry it out, and his capacity to adapt his program to new developments as they arise.” But, says Mr.Cutler, because we do not “form a Government” as in parliamentary democracies, it has become almost impossible in America for a president to carry out the major part of his program. As a result, he wrote, “We cannot fairly hold the president account able for the success or failure of his overall program, because he lacks the constitutional power to put that program into effect.” To correct this alleged deficiency in our government, some critics call for a single six-year term for the president, which, they argue, would provide him with the time he needs to fulfill his promises without having to concentrate on reelection. It also has been proposed that candidates for president, vice-president, and Congress run as a team in all election districts and that the team serve a six-year term. Or, we might establish procedures for the president or the Congress to call for new elections for the remainder of a current term in the event of a stalemate between the branches. Of course, such drastic changes would require constitutional amendments, but there are also less Draconian proposals that would require no constitutional amendment at all. We are interested to know how these critiques of our constitutional structure and proposed remedies may bear on what a newly elected or reelected president must do in the first few weeks and months of his presidency and on how the Congress looks ahead to the legislative process following an election.What can a president early in his administration do to help him avoid stalemate with the Congress? How may the Congress organize itself to work effectively with the executive branch? To examine these and other questions, we have a distinguished panel. Mr. Stuart Eizenstat is currently with the law firm of Powell, Goldstein, Frazer and Murphy. From 1977 to 1981, he was assistant to the president for domestic affairs and policy and executive director of the White House domestic policy staff under President Jimmy Carter. The Honorable Richard Bolling is former Democratic congressman from the fifth district of Missouri. Mr. Bolling served for thirty-four years in the Congress, became chairman of the powerful House Rules Committee in 1979, and is the author of two books, entitled House out of Order and Power in the House, that were influential in the movement to reform House procedures. He is currently a visiting fellow at AEI. Dr. Herbert Stein is a senior fellow at AEI. He is a former member and chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under presidents Nixon and Ford and is the author most recently of “Presidential Economics: The Making of Economic Policy from Roosevelt to Reagan and Beyond.” He is also the editor of the AEI Economist. Until January 1984, Mr. David Gergen was director of communications in the Reagan White House. He currently writes a syndicated newspaper column for the Los Angeles Times and is a visiting fellow at AEI. To begin, let me ask the same question of each of you. We often hear about the initial honeymoon the president and the Congress go on just after a presidential election. But it ordinarily does not last very long, and people complain that urgent problems are not being solved. Are the expectations we have of our government too high, or has the capacity of our governmental system simply not kept pace with what the government of a superpower must do in the world of the twentieth century? Download the PDF |
| 主题 | Politics and Public Opinion |
| 标签 | AEI Archive ; AEI Forums ; big government ; founding fathers ; US Constitution |
| URL | https://www.aei.org/research-products/book/forming-a-government-under-the-constitution/ |
| 来源智库 | American Enterprise Institute (United States) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/207952 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Herbert Stein,John Charles Daly. Forming a Government under the Constitution. 1984. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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