| 来源类型 | Article |
| 规范类型 | 评论 |
| ON CARTER’S ANTI-INFLATION POLICY | |
| Alan Greenspan; alfred-e-khan; Marvin H. Kosters; rudolph-oswald | |
| 发表日期 | 1979-02-05 |
| 出版年 | 1979 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | John Charles Daly, moderator of the forum and former chief of ABC News: For nearly a decade and a half, the United States has been struggling with an inflationary economy at home, while keeping a wary eye on the often dramatic struggles with inflation going on abroad. There is the sense that, as with the common cold, we are not sure where inflation came from or what we can do about it. At the beginning of 1978, President Carter initiated a voluntary program under which government, business, and labor, inspired by persuasion and publicity, would cooperate in an anti-inflation effort. But the results were disappointing. So, on October 24, 1978, the President issued an urgent call to battle. First, he promised to cut the budget deficit, restrain the federal payroll, delay further tax cuts, remove needless regulations, and encourage more competition. Second, he asked labor and business generally to limit wage increases to 7 percent and price increases to 5% percent. And third, he proposed, in order to encourage labor cooperation, a real wage insurance plan under which workers who observed the program’s wage standards would be eligible for tax rebates if the inflation rate should exceed 7 percent. These, then—if the Congress approves the necessary legislation—are the principal weapons in our arsenal against inflation. Dr. Kahn, recently President Carter said that “with more than a thousand different kinds of decisions to be made, there will be some flexibility.” Do you and the President anticipate any major modifications in the program? Alfred E. Kahn, adviser to the President on inflation: One could not legitimately characterize the two modifications we have in mind as major. The first would be a response to the almost unanimous criticism by business and labor that our treatment of fringe benefits—and in particular of the catch-up costs of maintaining existing levels of benefits—is simply too stringent. We are thus contemplating a number of possible ways of introducing a modicum of flexibility in this area. The second modification would be a response to an obvious point made by labor—and one I made in testimony back in 1971—that a standard permitting both the pass-on of uncontrollable costs and a fixed percentage margin in effect permits additional profits to be earned on additional costs. We are trying to devise ways of preventing this.* Mr. Daly: Dr. Greenspan, how does President Carter’s program compare with President Ford’s WIN program? Alan Greenspan, president, Townsend-Greenspan and Company: If I can divide President Ford’s WIN program into two parts—one, a call for severe restriction on federal spending and thus on the budget deficit, and the other, something of a vague freeze—I would say the two programs are quite similar, with similar problems. In my view, all that is desirable—and, in fact, all that is necessary—to restrain inflation comes in the first part of both programs, that is, in the restraint on federal spending and indirectly on government’s credit-creating capacities. The second part of the programs—the guidelines—is counterproductive. Indeed the guidelines, rather than being anti-inflationary, will ultimately add to inflation. They were a wholly inappropriate response to inflation under WIN, and are again today. Mr. Daly: Dr. Oswald, would you summarize labor’s objections to the President’s program? Rudolph Oswald, director of research, AFL-CIO: Organized labor objects that the wage controls are not voluntary, but mandatory. There is an enforcement mechanism for wages because every employer will be willing to enforce the wage guideline of 7 percent. On the other hand, contrary to what you said in your introduction, there is not a 5% percent guideline on prices: the only price guideline mentioned is 9½ percent. Moreover, the program provides for a half percent deceleration from the rate of price increase that took place in 1976–77—which says that those who raised prices the most in those years can do so again, and those who were most socially responsible can do less now. That hardly seems equitable. Moreover, there is not really a mechanism for controlling prices: there is no manpower to do it, the consumer does not know what an appropriate price increase is, and no other source of income is controlled except wages. It is for this reason that the labor movement has asked for mandatory controls, established by legislation, effectively enforced and applying to all segments of the economy, not just to wage-earners. Mr. Daly: Dr. Kosters, drawing on your experience at the Cost of Living Council, do you think the program will work? Marvin H. Kosters, director, Center for the Study of Government Regulation, AEI: There are two ways of addressing that question. The first is to ask, Is the program likely to break down?—that is, might there be a wage or price increase that seems so much out of line with the standards that the whole program is discredited? That of course can happen in any program. In the program I was involved in from 1971 to 1974, we said cases like that were “the last cows in the barn,” and they had to be let out on equal terms with the cows already out. But one can say that only so long before the explanation wears thin. Nevertheless, there are good reasons for above-average increases. It is insufficiently appreciated that any average of wage increases, or of price increases, involves a great deal of variation—with some below and some above the average. And a large wage increase or a large price increase can make a program appear to fail. The second way to address the question is to ask, Is the rate of inflation likely to be lower after the program than it was before? By virtue of the standards themselves, that is quite unlikely. All the experience I know of in Europe and the United States is negative, and I see no reason for expecting this program to fare any better. Mr. Daly: The man who was chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers from 1971 to 1974, Herbert Stein, has written that two lessons from the last decade of struggle with inflation are relevant today: “One, do not think we can flirt with controls and not get them. And, two, do not think that the ineffectiveness of controls, which has roots deep in the American economic and political system, can be overcome by sufficiently enthusiastic operators.” How say you to that, Dr. Kahn? Dr. Kahn: The notion that any kind of controls or incomes policy can only do harm seems to me to spring from an assumption that the wage increase which, for example, the Teamsters settle for is somehow God-given or competitive-market-determined in the same way the free price of natural gas would be if gas were uncontrolled. But there is an enormous difference between these two. If we hold the price of natural gas below its marginal cost, we will have shortages. But does anyone on this panel believe that if we can induce the Teamsters (by one device or another) to reduce their wage settlement from 11 percent to, say, 7 percent we will have a shortage of Teamsters? Is there anyone here who believes this is a competitive market which by University-of-Chicago/God-given standards should not be interfered with? That view, I submit, would be an absurdity. … I do not believe it is right to speak of many of these prices and wages as though they were determined in a competitive market in such a way that to interfere would produce enormous distortions in the economy. —Alfred E. Kahn I am not suggesting these weapons are the total answer. I am not, as you know, an enthusiastic supporter of the guidelines. I have been quoted correctly as referring to them as “those stinking wage-price guidelines.” On the other hand, I do not believe it is right to speak of many of these prices and wages as though they were determined in a competitive market in such a way that to interfere would produce enormous distortions in the economy. Moreover, the notion that all of the European experience is negative is, I submit, a piece of folklore. The British experience does suggest that it is possible for an incomes policy to induce certain restraint—if only because both sides are equally frustrated. It is not accidental that every Western democratic capitalist country has attempted some kind of incomes policy. Conclusion: This incomes policy is not the part of the program that turns me on, and it will not do any good in the absence of monetary and fiscal restraints. And I would emphasize that we intend to mount a comprehensive attack on structural defects in the economy and on government interventions that inflate costs and prevent competition. Dr. Oswald: But this is really a controls program put into effect on the wage side without any legal basis, which is not the way such matters should be handled. There should be an appropriate body with sufficient manpower to hear cases. There should be a legal basis for punishing those who do not conform—not just vague threats without legal basis, or attempts to use laws for purposes other than those for which they were designed. If we are going to have controls or guidelines then we should do it right, by law, and equitably. Dr. Kahn: When a lawyer tells me I am not following due process, I tend to hold onto my wallet. When an economist tells me the same thing, I hold onto my checkbook too. Now I am not an expert on the law, but our lawyers tell us it is perfectly reasonable for the government to use its regulatory authority to prevent the passing on of inordinate wage or cost increases. Dr. Greenspan: I would like to go back to some fundamental questions that Dr. Kahn raised. I agree that the Teamsters do not strike one as a union characterized by extreme competition, but I would not therefore conclude that the solution to the problem is guidelines. There are obviously far more effective and long-run solutions—such as deregulating the truckers—which, working through the market mechanism, would have a surprising impact on the Teamsters themselves. The question whether the European experience is valid is an extremely difficult one. I tend to agree with Dr. Kosters but grant that it is extraordinarily hard to read some of the evidence. Certainly the hypothesis that guidelines work is extremely difficult—I personally believe, impossible—to prove, though it is also difficult to prove the opposite. The reason democratic societies attempt controls when confronted with inflation is that the approach is perceived to create short-term political benefits—and in certain instances it does. President Nixon’s freeze in August 1971 did in fact slow the rate of inflation. But the problem is that while there are short-term benefits, there are invariably longer-term costs. One of the difficulties in societies like ours is that politicians tend to overemphasize short-term benefits without fully comprehending the long-term costs. A major problem with controls—mandatory or voluntary—is that they give the illusion of success while creating difficulties far greater than we can imagine. One of the more recent examples—in this case from the Nixon years—lies in energy price regulation and the difficulties that have emerged with unleaded gasoline. Controls tend to create huge bureaucracies, which for the most part shuffle paper and cannot be demonstrated to have significant impact on the overall price or wage level. In the longer run, because they thwart productivity, because they generate imbalances in the system, they tend to produce rather than fight inflation. Dr. Kosters: We should recognize here that wage and price controls, whether voluntary or mandatory, are only one of the many policies that are being carried out. This, of course, is what makes it difficult to assess the impact of any given program at any time. Take, for example, the British case. It is true that inflation came down while the policy was in force, but it is also true that there was a good deal of fiscal belt-tightening already going on when the policy was put in force. The fact that other policies are being carried out at the same time as wage and price controls creates one of the main dangers of such a program. Back in 1971 and 1972 it was often said that the controls then in force helped to make possible a more vigorous expansion than we could otherwise have had. And today, it is often said that we need to make a choice between voluntary controls (or, if they are not successful, perhaps mandatory controls) and recession. When one is talking about that kind of choice, one is talking about more stimulus to the economy with the controls in force than would otherwise be considered prudent. That seems like a formula for more inflation rather than less, from everything we know. … more stimulus to the economy with the controls in force than would otherwise be considered prudent. … seems like a formula for more inflation rather than less. … —Marvin H. Kosters Dr. Kahn: There is no question that when the mandatory controls were imposed in August 1971 in anticipation of an election fifteen months ahead—and, of course, I am not impugning the motives of the Republicans any more than those of the Democrats, who would have done the same thing if they had been in power— Mr. Daly: Nor suggesting that history will repeat itself? Dr. Kahn: Precisely. The imposition of controls at that time was obviously part of a deliberate attempt to inflate the economy, and for obvious reasons. We were making unsatisfactory progress in reducing unemployment and it was thought that, if controls were imposed, we could have massive monetary expansion and budgetary looseness. But that is clearly not the same thing as imposing far looser, far less massive, less bureaucratically enforced controls—with a bureaucracy not of 6,500 people but of only 100—and doing so in the context of a determination to reduce federal spending and thus the size of the deficit, to increase interest rates, and to reduce the rate of growth in the money supply. I concede that our guidelines still are, to some extent, restrictions and controls. But we are talking now about controls in a context where macroeconomic restraint is being followed. The guidelines simply represent an unwillingness on the part of the government (and I think the country) to rely exclusively on a jamming on of the monetary and fiscal brakes. The distortions are far less likely to be serious than they were in 1971–73—though I would not welcome permanent controls with any more enthusiasm than Dr. Greenspan does. Dr. Kosters: It is important to recognize that from our current perspective, it looks as though there was a deliberate attempt to overstimulate the economy back in 1971 and 1972, and as though it was widely recognized at the time that the economy was being overstimulated. I don’t think that was the case. If we look at what was said then, we will find a broad consensus among economists that it was important to stimulate the economy, and not dangerous. I am not referring to late 1972 but to 1971, when the controls were imposed. Whether we turn out to be in similar difficulty a year from now will depend largely on what happens to monetary and fiscal policy in the meantime, just as it did then. Dr. Oswald: But it is important to look at the difference between 1971 and now. In 1971, the inflation rate was a little over 4 percent; now it is over 9½ percent. In 1971, food prices were relatively stable; now they are going up at a 12½ percent rate—and they are a major factor in the consumer price index. In 1971, energy costs had not yet been pushed sky-high by the OPEC cartel; now they too are going up rapidly and are expected to continue to do so for the next few years. Moreover, medical care costs were rising rapidly in 1971 and they still are. Finally, interest rates have been going up substantially, which has been pushing up the cost of housing. Monetary and fiscal policy will not address the problems of food price increases, will not directly address sectoral problems. To say that cosmetic wage-price guidelines, along with a strong monetary and fiscal program, will take care of our inflation is to neglect the pressures in different segments of the economy, pressures that are pushing up the price level much more rapidly than was the case in 1971. Dr. Greenspan: What basically concerns me, Dr. Oswald, is that President Carter’s program will beget yours. The reason I say this is that I think it is unrealistic to presume that we can have a stable, unchanging guidelines program. We are already beginning to see the tendency of the Council on Wage and Price Stability staff to make the mistake of answering the questions being put to them. What that does is to create an ever-increasing body of decisions, or quasi-judicial regulations. One decision creates another and, before we know it, we will have—maybe not 6,500 bureaucrats, but certainly many more than 100. Moreover, a program of guidelines or standards must of necessity be politically comprehensible, but even a skillfully crafted effort can at best scarcely pick up more than 95 percent of the possible types of wage and price decisions being made. If we try to bring the last 5 percent under the guidelines, we will get an extraordinarily burgeoning system which will be made mandatory because it will have all the characteristics of mandatory controls except the authorizing legislation. In fact, I think the present approach is already beginning to unwind. As time passes, we will be inexorably pushed towards more and more regulation. Ultimately, I fear, we will get what Dr. Oswald wants. And what he wants will not be good for the country. Dr. Kahn: On the question of energy prices and food prices, I agree that the solution is not mandatory price control or any kind of price control. To the extent that prices would be set below some sort of equilibrium point, we would simply be concealing from consumers what the real marginal costs of those supplies are—and that way lies disaster. The part of the program that I find attractive is—and, again, I recognize the difference between promise and performance—that we are attempting to look systematically at those sectors that have been preponderantly responsible for the increase in the cost of living. We are attempting to identify the restrictions on competition, the insanities of methods of organization (such as the way we pay for medical care), the interferences with the free market (such as we have in agricultural policy or trucking regulation), the building codes and land use restrictions and inadequate taxes on land held out of use. There are millions of things that can be done. But the thing that should not be done is to try to use rigid controls to hold down the price of oil when the incremental cost to the U.S. economy is $14 a barrel. Dr. Kosters: Dr. Kahn has indicated it is important to let the market work its way with oil. On the other hand, he has indicated he thinks there would not be a shortage of Teamsters if their wage increases were held down somewhat. Now that, it seems to me, poses a problem for Dr. Oswald. A case can be made for saying that there will be a lot of business firms with an incentive to enforce the 7 percent wage guideline, whereas it will be difficult to determine just how much compliance there is with a voluntary price guideline (which is an enormously complicated thing to audit or even to compute). Thus, if one feared the possibility that the wage guidelines might bite harder than the price guidelines, would he not favor a reduction in the recent increases in aggregate demand so as to avoid the prospect of wages being held down, while prices floated upward in response to fairly buoyant demand? Dr. Oswald: That assumes our recent price increases have been purely the result of excess demand, and no one is saying that today. There may be one or two small sectors in the economy where there is excess demand—cement, for example—but, by and large, we have continuing high unemployment, nearly 6 percent, and a large amount of unused industrial capacity. Demand is not excessive compared to what we can produce. Therefore, a reduction in aggregate demand will not ensure reductions in prices, and it might compound the problem. We might have a continuation of very high inflation at the same time that monetary and fiscal policy are pushing the economy towards recession. Mr. Daly: Dr. Kahn, how will Congress respond to the request for enabling legislation for real wage insurance? Dr. Kahn: That plan was formulated before I came on the scene, but I am informed there were numerous soundings with the Congress and that the response was generally favorable. There have, of course, been some criticisms. I find real wage insurance a very attractive and imaginative idea. The general notion is that workers who settle for wage increases within the 7 percent standard—making an act of faith that they will not suffer from a failure of others to follow—will be insulated against an increase in the cost of living beyond 7 percent by receiving a tax rebate for the difference between the 7 percent and the increase in the cost of living. This is like the tax incentive plans that are designed to cause people to behave in a socially responsible way in areas not subject to perfect competition. Dr. Oswald: Even after that description, I am still not sure what real wage insurance is. But I like the response of the person at the Council on Wage and Price Stability who, in essence, said, “Don’t bet on it, because it has to go to Congress.” The plan has also been described by the worker who said, “What have I gained by taking the money from one pocket and putting it into another?” In other words, he pays for it in taxes and gets it back in taxes. Dr. Kahn: If he gets a wage increase above 7 percent, he pays a tax on the increment as well. I do not see any inequity in making the real wage insurance subject to taxes—though it has not yet been decided to do that. Mr. Daly: Might Congress consider the plan seriously if a limit were put on the amount of the tax rebate? Dr. Kahn: Obviously, the fiscal exposure is worrisome. However, we have this simple litany: the more people that sign up, the greater the budgetary exposure, but also the less the likelihood of having to pay, because so many will have settled at 7 percent. If that works out, the fiscal exposure is reduced, and vice versa. Dr. Kosters: Superficially, real wage insurance has a nice ring to it. But the more one looks at it, the worse it appears. One reason is that wage increases occur every year in a wide variety of sizes. In 1977, for example, first-year wage increases for major unions averaged about 8 percent, but about 30 percent of the workers getting increases under those agreements got increases of less than 7 percent and about 20 percent got increases of more than 9 percent. The 30 percent would benefit from real wage insurance, but those who received more than 7 percent would have little interest in a program that allowed them only to keep up with inflation, because they could probably do better in their own bargaining. So the program would have haphazard distributional consequences. The program would also be extremely difficult to carry out because of the kind of information that would be needed. What we now report on our income tax returns is, in general, earnings. But, to make the appropriate calculation here, we would need the wage and the time spent at work, so that we could assess wage rate changes. We would also need all the fringe benefits and other forms of nonmoney income—assuming this were included in the standard. If it was not, then of course there would be an incentive to move away from wages toward fringes. Resolutions to all these complex problems would have to be spelled out in sufficient detail so that IRS auditors could look at the situation the way they now look at individual income tax returns. Dr. Kahn: The Treasury experts assure us there would be no significant difficulty in employers’ reporting on W-2 forms what has happened, ex post, to average hourly pay (including fringe benefits) from third quarter to third quarter, let’s say, after removing overtime. On new contracts, it would be necessary to have some sort of a certification by the Council on Wage and Price Stability. But I had understood that Dr. Kosters, for example, was for years in the business of certifying whether a settlement fell within certain guidelines. This is not a debating point. I am only suggesting he may be exaggerating the difficulties. Dr. Greenspan: I think the Treasury experts are oversimplifying. What they are basically saying is that the system would use an average earnings figure. The difficulty is that it would be hard to know whether one was looking at a promotion or a wage increase. And there would be problems of part-time workers and of bonus workers. This has all the earmarks of a tremendously complex program, and what we are seeing is only the tip of an iceberg. I suspect that when the congressional committees hold hearings, these complexities will baffle them. … the [wage] control mechanism of the program reaches down through the smallest employer … to every last employee, while on the price side, there is nothing. —Rudolph Oswald Dr. Oswald: I just want to add that the control mechanism of the program reaches down through the smallest employer (even those with only one or two employees) to every last employee, while on the price side, there is nothing. Mr. Daly: Dr. Kahn, will you describe how you think the new Regulatory Council is going to work? Dr. Kahn: The Regulatory Council is, of course, the organization of the regulators and, frankly, I am uncertain to what extent one can count on the regulators to reform themselves. The council may play an important role in reconciling conflicting agency approaches. But, from my standpoint, the important body is the Regulatory Analysis Review Group, which is a separate group trying to apply economic standards of cost effectiveness and cost-benefit analysis to major regulations. How effective this scrutiny is will ultimately depend upon the amount of force the President is willing to apply. Mr. Daly: In recent years, we have heard a great deal about monetary policy as a principal and most effective weapon against inflation. Should monetary policy have greater weight than other policies? Dr. Greenspan: What we know is that excessive monetary growth is invariably accompanied by inflation, and vice versa. Where we have difficulty, often, is in defining which is cause and which is effect. In my view, one of the major forces creating our present inflation has been the extraordinary credit expansion of recent years. This has induced major problems for the Federal Reserve Board, requiring it either to accommodate a sharp rise in interest rates or to supply credit to the system—which, essentially, expands money supply in an inflationary way. What the board has done of late—and it does this, I suspect, all the time, irrespective of the rhetoric—has been to compromise. Money supply is critical, but I would not focus on it as something to be turned on and off, because it, too, is critically determined by other things. Before we can get a grip on money supply growth and, hence, on inflation, we must reduce the economy’s aggregate credit requirements—federal borrowing requirements (which come from the budget deficit and from off-budget financing) and private-sector credit requirements (which the federal government indirectly imposes on the private sector by mandating safety and environmental standards that businesses cannot meet without borrowing). Also many federal grant programs induce state and local governments to borrow. Finally, the most important thing at this stage is the tremendous expansion in the mortgage market, which has occurred largely as a result of government subsidy, direct and indirect. Unless we can come to grips with these things, the Federal Reserve will not be able to restrain the growth in money supply to noninflationary dimensions without an explosive increase in interest rates. Dr. Kahn: The administration is obviously concerned about the rapidity with which the money supply is increasing and the apparently omnivorous demand for credit, fueled by many of the policies Dr. Greenspan has mentioned. What I have difficulty understanding is why, then, we do not see—as Dr. Oswald points out—evidences of really severe demand pull. Dr. Greenspan: The reasons are that, along with this expansion in money supply, we have extremely high degrees of risk and uncertainty within the system, which are inhibiting plant and equipment expenditures, inventory accumulation, and a variety of other things historically associated with an expansion in money supply. If we had lower risk premiums, if we had lower degrees of uncertainty, if we had a more stable environment in which to function, we would be confronted with a major demand-pull situation. Dr. Oswald: To amplify a bit what Dr. Greenspan said, I think some of the money is being used for corporate mergers, for expanding the new gambling activities in New Jersey and other places—for things that are not productive. What we have may be more a shifting of money than a demand for goods and services. And I am not at all sure that traditional Federal Reserve Board actions reach some of the credit creation that has taken place through the stock markets, through options markets, through futures markets, through all sorts of new means of creating credit. I am also not sure that we are really addressing these problems, except for raising interest rates—which is, moreover, harmful to many people. Dr. Kosters: I am surprised at the view that there is no evidence of demand pull. The rate of inflation this year—about 9½ percent compared to 6 or 7 last year—is itself some evidence of demand pull. Recall that prices went up before wages. According to industrial production capacity utilization indexes, the economy is in a situation roughly similar to that in late 1972. Dr. Kahn: That is simply a tautology. What we are trying to explain is why prices go up in an economy with 6 percent unemployment and industrial capacity utilization of something like 85 percent. Another way of saying it is that nobody denies we could stop inflation in its tracks if we were willing to cut the rate of growth in the money supply and tighten federal spending. But that would cause—as far as we can tell—serious unemployment. It is this stagflation dilemma we are trying to explain. Mr. Daly: Now that we have laid a very broad base on the Carter administration’s wage and price program, it is time to move to questions and answers. Lawrence Rosenberg, National Science Foundation: My question is primarily for Professor Kahn. Many of the suggested solutions to inflation are of a longer-term structural nature, particularly the suggestions for making markets more efficient and competitive. Do you see any possibilities for shorter-range targets? Dr. Kahn: The targets will be very short-range. Within the course of a year, I expect definite movement toward deregulation of trucking and more thorough deregulation of the railroads. There will also be active discussions of the extent to which we can have more competition in maritime shipping. In the area of farm policy, while no one should expect a millennium, certainly we can move toward less restrictive ways of maintaining farm income. In the trade area, the President just vetoed cotton textiles protective legislation and the beef quota bill. We are also interested in state regulation of insurance. Do you know that in the states with open filing—which means a greater possibility of price competition—rates for liability and property insurance are markedly lower than in other states? In other words, I expect to produce short-term results in those areas where the government subsidizes, protects, and limits competition. … I expect to produce short-term results in those areas where the government subsidizes, protects, and limits competition. —Alfred E. Kahn Dr. Oswald: But this is not really a change from what government has always tried to do in the way of affecting the economy. Moreover, I see no reason to anticipate results from these types of efforts in the next twelve months. Dr. Kahn: I am not promising miracles, but we had an airline regulation system for forty years, and we changed it this year. Perhaps people will learn that deregulation is not s |
| 主题 | Uncategorized |
| URL | https://www.aei.org/articles/on-carters-anti-inflation-policy/ |
| 来源智库 | American Enterprise Institute (United States) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/235203 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alan Greenspan,alfred-e-khan,Marvin H. Kosters,等. ON CARTER’S ANTI-INFLATION POLICY. 1979. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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