| 摘要 | War this year in Iraq may not yet be inevitable but it looks increasingly likely. If it is to be avoided, the coming week is crucial. If war is at hand, the next few days could decide whether the US-led invasion goes ahead with the formal blessing of the United Nations, or whether Washington and a small group of allies go in alone. Today, UN Security Council members receive evaluations from the chief weapons inspectors of the extent of Iraqi co-operation with their efforts over the past two months to uncover Baghdad’s weapons of mass destruction programmes. Tomorrow, President George W. Bush will expand on his views on war in his annual State of the Union address to Congress. On the following day, the Security Council begins its formal discussions on the inspectors’ reports. On Thursday, Tony Blair, unsettled by opposition from the British public and within his party to his backing for the US stance on Iraq, flies to Camp David. There, the US’s strongest ally is expected to counsel Mr Bush to postpone military action to give the inspectors more time. With France and Germany openly expressing doubts about war and with international opposition to a conflict apparently on the increase, the fault-lines in the debate over Iraq are clear. The rare and dramatic show of unity displayed in the Security Council in November – which resulted in unanimous passage of a resolution giving Iraq a last chance to disarm and threatening it with “serious consequences” if it did not comply – seem a distant memory. Yet the re-emergence of differences was foreseeable. Unanimity over resolution 1441 was achieved only through the use of ambiguous language, and arguments about it will come to the fore again in this week’s UN talks. The resolution declares: “False statements or omissions in the declaration submitted by Iraq . . . and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and co-operate fully in the implementation of, this resolution constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations.” Such a “material breach” would provide the legal justification for war with Iraq. Behind the looming Security Council battle over semantics lie deeper long-standing differences that remained unsettled in November. The US, backed by a more reluctant Britain, considers Saddam Hussein an unacceptable threat that must be removed. The US has already described Iraq’s 12,000-page weapons declaration in December as so unsatisfactory that by itself it constitutes a material breach of the resolution. But much of the rest of the world remains both unconvinced that Baghdad poses an immediate danger and persuaded that inspections, backed by the threat of force, are sufficient to check Mr Hussein’s ambitions. France, Russia and China – the other three veto-wielding members of the Security Council – and Germany, a non-permanent member, will emphasise the co-operation Iraq has provided and the the lack of evidence of any nuclear threat. “No doubt there will be a big fight,” says Gary Samore, senior fellow for non-proliferation at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. “Both sides will be able to point to elements of the reports to support their position.” The eventual outcome of that fight will have profound consequences beyond Iraq and even the Middle East. The debate will shape the future transatlantic alliance, now suffering its worst post-cold war crisis, and even relations within the European Union, which is in deep disarray over Iraq. The enormous political sensitivity of their work is not lost on the authors of the two inspectors’ reports: Hans Blix of Unmovic and Mohamed ElBaradei of the International Atomic Energy Agency. But much of what they will say is already known. The inspectors have found little new: a dozen empty chemical warheads and some documents relating to a past nuclear programme. While the White House calls the finds troubling, it has not claimed they constitute a “smoking gun” providing incontrovertible evidence that Iraq is still pursuing its weapons programmes. In the case of Unmovic, which tracks Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles programmes, Mr Blix will say there has been no overt Iraqi obstruction of the inspectors. But, in sections likely to be seized on by the US, he will also describe what he has called a lack of “pro-active” co-operation from Iraq. He is expected to report that Iraq has failed to come up with enough evidence to provide confidence that known weapons programmes have been eliminated. For example, despite repeated requests, Iraq has still not provided proof of the destruction of materials used in a host of programmes, including anthrax and mobile facilities to make biological agents, unaccounted for when former inspectors left the country in 1998. The report from Mr ElBaradei is likely to paint a somewhat more positive picture, if only because fewer questions about nuclear programmes remained unanswered in 1998. It will stress that inspectors have checked allegations that a nuclear weapons programme has been restarted but, as yet, found no such evidence. Robert Einhorn, a senior arms control official in the Clinton administration, expects governments to home in on two parts of the reports. The first will be how the two men characterise Iraqi co-operation with the inspectors. The second will be whether and how the inspectors ask for more time to complete their task. Both men have already said they need more months to complete their work. Any request for much more time will exasperate the Bush administration, which argues that inspectors stand little chance of finding evidence in the face of an aggressive effort by Baghdad to hide it. “The whole issue is about burden of proof,” says Walter Slocombe, a former US undersecretary of defence. “If it’s up to the UN to provide the proof, it’s like the Eliot Ness school of arms control where you send bands of G-Men around trying to catch people drinking.” The Bush administration argues that, after 12 years of Iraqi non- compliance with UN resolutions, the burden of proof should lie with Baghdad. To this, critics ask how Mr Hussein could prove a negative. Last week, the White House came up with an answer: follow the example of South Africa, Ukraine and Kazakhstan when they abandoned nuclear weapons. “The true measure of co-operation is to answer questions without being asked. In each of these examples, weapons programmes were disclosed fully and voluntarily,” the White House said. Yet, many sceptics still think the focus should be on whether Mr Hussein is even “armed”, arguing that many US and British accusations against Iraq have stood up poorly to scrutiny. Glen Rangwala, an analyst at the University of Cambridge, has assembled an exhaustive list of evidence and counter-evidence on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, culled from newspapers, official speeches, websites and government dossiers. He cites many examples where US and British claims have not been borne out by subsequent inspections. For example, last September 7, Mr Bush cited satellite photos of rebuilding activity at al Furat and Tuwaitha nuclear facilities as evidence of a new nuclear programme. The sites were visited repeatedly by Unmovic and IAEA, which concluded on December 20 that “the former Tuwaitha nuclear complex . . . nowconducts civilian research in the non-nuclear field”. On January 9, Mr ElBaradei told the Security Council: “No evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear-related activities has been detected.” Washington argues that the last thing the Iraqi leader will do is leave evidence at any identified sites. Western intelligence officials say weapons of mass destruction are being hidden among conventional weapons, where they do not raise suspicion. Moreover, Iraq’s biological programme has been severely shrunk, and is reckoned to be hidden entirely in hard-to-find trucks with inner compartments. The officials also say components for weapons of mass destruction have been hidden underground, under metal sheets then covered with tarmac, so they are not picked up by radar or metal detectors. Even Colin Powell, US secretary of state and the Bush administration’s strongest voice in favour of winning UN backing for its Iraq strategy, hardened his position on inspections last week. “The question isn’t how much longer do you need for inspections to work. Inspections will not work,” he said. Mr Powell’s tough words also reflect his frustration at Jacques Chirac of France and Gerhard Schroder of Germany. At the very least, their anti-war rhetoric of the past week is seen in Washington as taking pressure off Mr Hussein. Some of Mr Powell’s colleagues say French and German comments have also played into the hands of Washington’s hawks who argue that the US should invade Iraq alone with whoever else supports it. That “coalition of the willing” would be small, perhaps with only Britain and Australia providing troops and Qatar and Kuwait logistical backing. Radek Sikorski, former deputy foreign minister of Poland and director of the conservative New Atlantic Initiative in Washington, says US public diplomacy in Europe has been inadequate. “The battle for hearts and minds in Europe could have been won. It is late but it can still be done.” However he expresses concern about the effect on the transatlantic alliance of the divisions over Iraq: “It is no use having victory in Iraq but losing Europe.” But Europe is deeply divided. Finland, Austria and Sweden back the German line, European diplomats say, but Spain, Italy and the Netherlands are close to the British position. These differences could have been resolved by earlier action, some European officials argue. “The real problem of the EU is that we never spoke out forcefully or early enough over Iraq,” says one European ambassador. “We should have said from the outset that we support any diplomatic attempt to be backed by the threat of the use of military force. And we should have insisted on going for a second UN resolution to authorise, if needed, the use of force. That should have been our line from day one. But Germany in particular messed up our policy in a big way.” Although some foreign officials say Mr Schroder may have left himself enough space to abstain over any UN resolution, Germany has no Security Council veto. Mr Chirac, whose government has veto power, has left himself more room for manoeuvre – and has ruled out only an immediate resort to war. The French president’s comments have increased doubts among British and American officials over his ultimate course of action. But some of them say there remains a reasonable prospect of agreement over a UN resolution that would give the inspectors a few more weeks to complete their task. In the view of some analysts, such a resolution will depend as much on Russia as on France. Neither is likely to want to pay on its own the price for blocking a resolution, but may be willing to stand behind the other. It will also depend on the willingness of Mr Powell’s harder-line colleagues to agree to a new deadline – which they view as likely to induce yet another display of brinkmanship from the Iraqi leader. As James Steinberg, former deputy national security adviser in the Clinton administration, says, public opinion in the US favours UN backing for war. “The big challenge for this administration is whether to give more time, and how much. If I were in their position I would create a deadline and be prepared to give another six weeks.” A British diplomat suggests a second UN resolution could give Mr Hussein three more weeks. or the moment, a delay may suit all sides because neither the US military nor its main ally, the British, are ready to begin a ground campaign. Despite deployment orders calling for a massive build-up of troops – Donald Rumsfeld, US defence secretary, has signed three in the past month, totalling 67,000 soldiers – only one heavy army division, the 3rd infantry, is even near full deployment in Kuwait. Most military analysts expect at least four full divisions, comprising about 17,000 troops each, will be needed to fulfil the Pentagon’s invasion plan. The entire US army contingent – with its full complement of hard-to-move 70-ton Abrams battle tanks – is likely to take up to another month to arrive in Kuwait, making it unlikely any ground campaign could start before the end of February. Military action of any kind is, in any case, unlikely to be launched before mid-February, when the hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca, ends. An attack on Iraq before that date risks provoking mass protests in Saudi Arabia. While US commanders insist their forces can fight in hot weather – they train in the California desert and night-vision gear gives them an advantage after the sun goes down – most analysts doubt the administration would want to delay the launch of a war beyond early March. War is not yet inevitable. It is still just possible that Mr Hussein might decide to give up his weapons programmes or some of them: though he may, say some analysts, be discouraged from doing so by the fear that he will be targeted anyway because of Washington’s “regime change” policy. Mr Rumsfeld suggested another way out a week ago. He said the US would be willing to provide Iraq’s senior leadership with an amnesty, in the hope of encouraging either a coup or Mr Hussein’s exile. However, Arab officials say neither eventuality is likely, at least before the military campaign is under way. “The issue of exile is speculative. It’s part of the psychological warfare,” says a senior Egyptian official. “If you know the nature of this man, he is not the kind to go into exile.” The divided Security Council and hardening international opposition to war may suggest to Mr Hussein that he can buy time and avert military action. But on Thursday, Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian president, warned him that the US troop build-up was not for show. “He might think it is a bluff . . . and then all of a sudden they start strikes,” he said. Some voices are urging Mr Bush to keep the military pressure on Mr Hussein but not to commit to invasion. The intrusive inspections, backed by military force, would, they say, deter the further development of Iraqi regime weapons programmes while any overt obstruction of the inspectors would be the cue for invasion. Loren Thompson of Washington’s Lexington Institute has estimated it costs Dollars 1bn a week to keep 150,000 US troops in the Gulf. The financial cost of war, according to the Congressional Research Service, could be between Dollars 40bn and Dollars 200bn. And the economic costs would be even higher: the loss of Iraqi supplies, combined with Venezuela’s oil strike, could lead to an oil price spike even if the US activates sales from its 600m barrel strategic reserve. “There is an economic and human cost to this deployment that is a tiny fraction of the cost in both dimensions that would be incurred by a war,” says a new report from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Nonetheless, in the days leading up to his speech tomorrow night, Mr Bush has shown growing impatience and little inclination to become a 21st century version of the Grand Old Duke of York, who according to the nursery rhyme marched his men to the top of the hill only to march them down again. Moreover, even if he and a small group of allies go to war without UN backing, officials in both the US and Britain are convinced that they would be vindicated retrospectively when the extent of Iraq’s weapons arsenals are exposed. “There is,” says a western intelligence official, “complete conviction that that arsenal is there.” Reporting by Roula Khalaf and Mark Huband in London; Guy Dinmore, Peter Spiegel and Carola Hoyos in Washington; Judy Dempsey in Brussels; and Charles Clover in Kuwait City |
