| 摘要 | The ongoing construction of a Russian dam far out into the Kerch Strait, aiming to change its geography and the maritime border to Ukraine’s detriment (see IASPS Policy Briefings, no. 29, October 23), yesterday confirmed Ukraine’s fears on two counts. The dam construction seemed set to reach the existing maritime border and the Ukrainian-owned and -inhabited Tuzla islet; and a Russian vessel actually crossed that border, provoking the first-ever naval incident between Russia and Ukraine since 1991. Russia seeks to wrest from Ukraine the control over Kerch Strait, which connects the Black and Azov seas while separating Ukraine’s Crimea from Russia’s North Caucasus.
At mid-day on October 21, a Russian tugboat trespassed the Ukrainian border line–which is marked by large and highly visible yellow buoys–for the declared purpose of “verifying” the Ukrainian buoys’ location. The tugboat bumped into a Ukrainian coastal guard cutter, but was then in turn bumped, stopped and boarded after a second Ukrainian cutter arrived. The Ukrainian boarding party searched the Russian vessel “under the gun;” but had to desist, and the Ukrainian cutters to withdraw, when Russian gunboats arrived at the scene, according to the Russian account of the incident. According to the Ukrainian account, the coastal guard handed over the trespassing Russian tugboat and crew to the Russian coastal guard, after ascertaining that the crew had been photographing and filming the border installations and obstacles that Ukraine is feverishly erecting on its Tuzla islet against a posssible Russian intrusion. (Interfax, October 22).
The Russian dam now reaches 3.5 kilometers out into the Kerch Strait, within 100 meters from the Ukrainian maritime border, and another 150 meters from Tuzla. Ukraine fears that the dam will connect Tuzla to the Russian mainland, thereby wresting the islet from Ukraine. Even if construction stops short of linking up with the island, the Russian dam seems intended to move the median line in the Strait enough to claim control of the deep navigation channel, which since 1991 is Ukrainian-owned.
Russia’s Ministry for Emergency Situations, a military institution, is in charge of the construction work, which began on September 29. That month, Russian President Vladimir Putin had approved a “Plan for Interagency Cooperation to Carry Out Diplomatic and Military Tasks in the Azov-Black Sea Region.” It envisages measures to control, and install military infrastructure on, certain locations on coasts and islands. (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 23).
Ukraine cannot and does not propose to interfere with the dam construction on the Russian side of the maritime border, even though the construction can change the maritime border dramatically in Russia’s favor and jeopardize Ukraine’s legal title to the deep navigation channel. Ukraine has, however, repeatedly announced its detemination to stop the Russian dam construction at the maritime border, before it links up with Tuzla.
To ward this off, Ukraine has deployed 14 coastal guard cutters in the area, and is currently conducting an air force exercise–described as long-planned, and involving 17 fighter aircraft–in the area of the Kerch peninsula. Ukraine has in recent days reinforced its border guard unit and observation posts on Tuzla, and is erecting hedgehog obstacles against heavy vehicles on the island. Ukrainian officials have reported the arrival of two Russian corvettes in the area. (ICTV, Kyiv, October 20).
Russian construction operations have accelerated in recent days, proceeding night and day and irrespective of weather conditions. As the dam construction approaches the islet with every passing day, senior Ukrainian officials from the president and the prime minister down have been saying that they are determined to stop its advance, but only by means of physical obstacles, not by shooting; and are appealing to Russia to also abjure the use of force.
By now, Russian officials apparently feel that the advance of construction has strengthened their hand significantly. Thus they have begun openly questioning the legitimacy of the Ukrainian border and possession of Tuzla. On October 21, Russia’s Ambassador to Ukraine, Viktor Chernomyrdin–speaking to journalists and parliamentary deputies in the Verkhovna Rada building–described the existing demarcation line in the Kerch Strait as outdated and requiring renegotiation. Although stating that the dam construction would stay within Russian territory, Chernomyrdin pointedly declined to answer whether he regards Tuzla as Ukrainian or as Russian territory. (Ukrainian TV Channel One, October 21).
Also on October 21, a statement by the command of Russia’s Northern Caucasus Border Guard Directorate (whose area of responsibility includes Kerch) claimed that any delimitation lines declared by Ukraine in the Kerch Strait, the Azov Sea or the Black Sea are deemed unilateral, and can not be recognized. (STB, October 21). The statement was implicitly referring–as did Chernomyrdin–to the situation that exists since 1991.
On October 22, Dmitry Rogozin–chairman of the Russian Duma’s international affairs committee, and a close political ally of Putin–declared that “Ukraine has unlawfully seized Tuzla” [in 1991] and now “raises a hullaballoo over it.” Rogozin defined Tuzla as a part of the Russian mainland. (Interfax, October 22).
Putin has not said a word on the situation since the September 29 start of the dam construction. The Russian president–and other top officials–have ignored the Ukrainian leaders’ requests for information. Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma was reduced to wondering aloud during a press conference: “I look at Russia’s map and I ask: doesn’t it have enough land ?” (Interfax, October 17).
Kuchma has cut short an official visit to Latin American countries, returning to Kyiv on October 22 to deal with the emergency. Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych has cancelled his prescheduled October 22-25 visits to Estonia and Latvia. On October 22, Yanukovych telephoned Russia’s Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov and offered to fly to Moscow for talks immediately.
The Russian government, however–or at least its dominant faction, acting with Putin’s approval–seems in no hurry to hold talks. On October 22, Foreign Affairs Minister Igor Ivanov publicly reproached Ukraine for “stirring up tensions.” Ivanov simply restated the position he had taken with his Ukrainian counterpart, Kostyantin Hryshchenko, in Moscow on October 6 — namely, that talks on the status of the Kerch Strait and Azov Sea would be held on October 30. (Itar-Tass, RIA, October 22). By that date, Russia may well have created the planned fait accompli, and may be able to force Ukraine to accept de facto changes in the Kerch Strait’s geography and legal status in Russia’s favor. |
