| 摘要 | At its upcoming summit in Istanbul, NATO can announce its vision with respect to that great strategic prize which is the South Caucasus. The alliance’s just-completed enlargement to the western Black Sea, and the planned enlargement of the European Union in that direction, are turning the South Caucasus into a direct neighbor to the institutional West.
The region forms the hub of an evolving geostrategic and geo-economic system that stretches from NATO Europe to Central Asia and Afghanistan. It provides unique westward access for Caspian energy to the Euro-Atlantic community, as well for antiterrorism coalitions into the Greater Middle East. All this has drawn the South Caucasus de facto into the perimeter of Euro-Atlantic strategic interests. While remaining a permanent neighbor of Russia, the South Caucasus has in effect become a Euro-Atlantic borderland.
This American-spearheaded development seems so recent that its full implications have not yet been worked through, particularly in Western Europe. American policy continues to bear the brunt of overall Western interests in the South Caucasus in terms of security assistance, state-consolidation efforts, and promotion of energy projects.
Although Europe has a more direct stake in this region’s security and energy sector development, European efforts are meager by comparison to those of the U.S. Such disproportion was never justifiable, and must be rectified by European allies at this time when U.S. resources are overextended globally. NATO is now groping for a regional strategy, while the EU is beginning to reconsider its attitude of splendid isolation toward this key region. Both organizations can capitalize on the wide overlap in their membership in order to advance their common interests here.
It is Georgia and Azerbaijan which perform those key functions in terms of strategic access to energy sources and operational theaters. By dint of geography and their political choice, these two countries have assumed important Euro-Atlantic responsibilities. As active members of the antiterrorist coalition, Georgia and Azerbaijan have provided transit passage and small troop units for NATO- and U.S.-led operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq. In those respects, as well as politically and diplomatically, Tbilisi and Baku behave as de facto allies of the U.S. and NATO. Both countries have thereby accepted serious risks to their security. They can only function as a tandem or not at all: As Euro-Atlantic partners and NATO aspirants, and indeed as viable nation-states, Georgia and Azerbaijan stand or fall together.
Thus, it stands to reason that Georgia and Azerbaijan aspire to join NATO. They want to start out on the usual route of action plans for security sector reform and force interoperability. Both countries have been working closely with the U.S. and Turkey on these long-haul tasks. Georgia and Azerbaijan have graduated from the situation of pure consumers of security to that of net consumers and incipient providers of security, as active members of the antiterrorist coalition and irreplaceable geostrategic assets to the Euro-Atlantic community. While still years away from qualifying for NATO membership, these countries need effective security arrangements now. Before they can come into NATO, the alliance can come to the region with such arrangements.
NATO’s second enlargement round completed, now is the right time for it to map out its strategy for the South Caucasus. The first stage, to be ushered in by the alliance’s upcoming summit, must aim for anchoring the region to the Euro-Atlantic system in security terms and economically, and on that basis to advance the consolidation of the region’s nation-states. Successful anchoring can lead to the stage of integration, beginning with that of Georgia and Azerbaijan into NATO, and encouraging Armenia to exercise a Euro-Atlantic option as well. In the Western-oriented countries of Georgia and Azerbaijan, allied interests and national expectations and requirements are of a different order than those of the Russian-oriented Armenia. Nevertheless, opportunities for Armenia to choose otherwise in the future need to be opened at this time.
Georgia and Azerbaijan are poised to accelerate the development of niche capabilities enabling their participation in coalition operations. Certain military units can be earmarked for developing interoperability with NATO forces. U.S.-led train-and-equip programs must continue seamlessly in Georgia, and be initiated in Azerbaijan, focusing on internal security troops, border troops, and coastal-guard capabilities — for better protection of their maritime borders and economic zones in the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. The two countries need assistance to preserve air sovereignty through air situation data exchanges with NATO, and to accelerate the upgrading of civilian and military airports and seaports to NATO-compatible standards.
Such goals should find expression in formalized arrangements with Georgia and Azerbaijan, to be announced or at least mandated at the summit. If demonstrably successful, such security arrangements can appeal to Armenia and induce it to rebalance its policies.
NATO’s June summit also provides the right forum and timing for allied political recognition of Georgia’s and Azerbaijan’s aspirations to eventual membership — in the form of offering them a clear prospect of membership through Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs). These must be demanding enough to lead to Membership Action Plans (MAPs) by the time of NATO’s next summit (2006 or 2007). With their benchmarks, standards and timetables for progress, such plans hold built-in incentives to the aspiring countries, and amount to nondeclaratory political recognition by the alliance of these countries’ membership goals.
In Georgia and Azerbaijan, the Euro-Atlantic choice rests on a political and societal consensus. Internal challenges to that orientation stem basically from state weakness and local conflicts. Twin aspects of the Soviet legacy, those challenges can be remedied through security assistance and conflict-settlement under Euro-Atlantic aegis, paving the way for institution-building and closer economic links with Europe. As post-communist European experience shows, the prospect of NATO membership also is a major stimulus to reforming the state and improving institutional performance in civilian sectors.
This process can gradually be opened to Armenia on similar terms and in similar stages; but should in no way be delayed for Georgia and Azerbaijan if Armenia marks time, or if Russia objects to Armenia’s inclusion. The allies must hold out an attractive security option for Armenia as well. This would require American political leadership in promoting a resolution of the Karabakh conflict; for this, the U.S. alone possesses the necessary credibility with both Azerbaijan and Armenia.
In sum, anchoring the South Caucasus to the Euro-Atlantic system must begin by projecting security to this region. The costs and the draw on resources would only be a fraction of current U.S. and NATO efforts elsewhere: The social and political environment in this region is friendly and receptive; and the strategic payoff to the alliance would be of historic proportions. Although the U.S. has led this effort, its present global responsibilities mean that European allies must now significantly increase their contributions to anchoring and integrating the South Caucasus. NATO’s new members such as the Baltic states and Romania, familiar with this region and sharing their recent experience as NATO aspirants, are enthusiastic about contributing to this effort. |
