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The Unlikely Alliance
James R. Lilley
发表日期2004-08-30
出版年2004
语种英语
摘要Deng Xiaoping was born a hundred years ago into a semicolonized, backward and suppressed society. When he died in 1997, China was emerging as the powerhouse of Asia, uninhibited by foreign domination and seeking a key role in a world rent by clashing civilizations. After being purged by Mao Zedong during the Cultural Revolution as a capitalist roader and an archrevisionist, Deng rejoined the Chinese leadership in 1972-73 under the auspices of Premier Zhou Enlai. It was just at that time that the U.S. arrived permanently in Beijing with its Liaison Office, headed in 1974 by George Herbert Walker Bush. When these two men met, Deng–the short, tough revolutionary from Sichuan in central China–and Bush–the tall, ambitious and smart elitist from America’s Northeast–the chemistry was immediate. Deng saw Bush as an American who some day would lead his country, and Bush saw in Deng a major force in China’s future. It was not an intellectual appreciation but a visceral one. I was privileged to witness this unique relationship take form, as I was with Bush in Beijing in 1974-75. There was much to be done. Bush was still head of the U.S. Liaison Office in 1975 when Henry Kissinger brought the first proposal to the Chinese (which I drafted) for active cooperation against Soviet weapons of mass destruction using Chinese territory and personnel and U.S. technology and management. It worked. The bond between Bush and Deng bore fruit. When Bush left Beijing, Deng gave him an invitation from Mao to return to China at any time, go anywhere he wanted and bring whomever he wished. Deng then congratulated Bush on being promoted to head the CIA (where I worked at the time). In September 1977, Bush took Deng up on Mao’s offer and went to China for 16 days. In the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, he and Deng discussed the best way to use American technology to develop China’s offshore oil reserves, and Bush made a specific proposal for a “risk contract,” which meant the U.S. would share in the production of oil in China–a breakthrough and a move relevant to Deng’s economic reforms of November 1978. In February 1979, the two men (Bush was then a private citizen) discussed Taiwan frankly and constructively. Six years later, Bush asked Deng to introduce him to the next generation of Chinese leaders, and in 1989–by which time Bush was President–he risked savage denunciation in the U.S. in his attempts to sustain relations with China while still imposing strict sanctions after Tiananmen. Looking back at Deng, I am reminded of Harry Truman. Both lived in the shadow of great charismatic leaders–for Deng it was Chairman Mao, for Truman, Franklin Roosevelt. Both were from the heartland of their respective countries–Deng from Sichuan, Truman from Missouri–and both reflected in speech and character the nature of their homes. They were both devoted to their wives and children, and both fought bravely in war. With the Marshall Plan, NATO, the Bretton Woods international financial institutions, and aid to Greece and Turkey, Truman saved Europe from the Soviet Union and sowed the seeds that eventually brought down the Soviet Empire. Deng’s economic reform of 1978, coupled with his persistence and leadership, brought China out of the doldrums of the Cultural Revolution and a stifling communist economic policy and into the modern world. And Deng, like Truman, helped undo the Soviet Empire, by cooperating with the U.S. in defeating the U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan and in accurately monitoring Soviet weapons of mass destruction. Deng’s relationships, with Chinese and foreigners, were never tranquil. He could be sarcastic, acerbic and confrontational, but despite all that, he managed to come across as a wise visionary. He could be merciless in cracking down on what he perceived to be threats to the stability of China, and he accepted the communist orthodoxy in the unchallenged role of the Communist Party. Though leaders purged him from the party, he was determined to return to it and remake it in his vision. On balance, what Deng did helped China just as what Bush did in his term as President advanced America’s interest. These were two very different men who found common ground to the benefit of most of humanity. James Lilley, a former ambassador to China and a former chief U.S. representative in Taiwan, is a senior fellow at AEI and the co-author of China Hands: Nine Decades of Adventure, Espionage, and Diplomacy in Asia.
主题Foreign and Defense Policy ; Asia
标签Beijing ; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ; China ; death ; George H. W. Bush ; Henry Kissinger ; leadership ; Mao Zedong ; pacific ; Robert Bork ; Time magazine
URLhttps://www.aei.org/articles/the-unlikely-alliance/
来源智库American Enterprise Institute (United States)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/239973
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James R. Lilley. The Unlikely Alliance. 2004.
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