| 来源类型 | Article |
| 规范类型 | 评论 |
| Economic Implications of a Fundamental Shift in North Korean Security Policy | |
| Nicholas Eberstadt; Richard J. Ellings | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-07-31 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Introduction While many parts of the world have joined in the profound international integration that has occurred in the postwar era, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has maintained a distinctly–perhaps uniquely–bellicose and autarkic international posture since its founding in 1948. Pyongyang’s discordant approach to “international security” was most recently illustrated earlier this summer. As the United States was celebrating the Fourth of July, the DPRK launched seven missiles (including an inter-continental ballistic missile) into the Sea of Japan–a calculated and deliberately menacing violation of both international law and previous official commitments. Pyongyang then ostentatiously spurned Chinese emissaries sent to manage the incident, prompting Beijing to support–for the first time–the United Nations Security Council condemnation of, and sanctions against, North Korea’s missile program.[1] If anything, North Korea’s international behavior is perhaps more distant from evolving international security norms today than ever before. Contemporary North Korean security policy is marked by a hyper-militarization of society and economy under the banner of songun chongchi (military-first politics); hallmarks of the policy include maintenance and augmentation of chemical and biological weapon capabilities, ballistic missile development, relentless overt and covert nuclear weapons development programs, a confrontational approach to international diplomacy, and a stance toward unification that suggests the complete absorption of South Korea would be the only acceptable outcome. There is a grim logic at work here: Pyongyang routinely extracts resources from neighboring states and the international community through this careful, methodical recourse to “security crisis.” North Korea’s aggressive and predatory external bearing is an international dilemma that continues to defy easy resolution. Though the central issues in bold the ongoing North Korean drama are strategic and political, there is also an economic aspect to the problem: until Pyongyang develops viable alternative sources of state finance, the DPRK will continue to rely upon international military extortion to bankroll state survival. While having “exported” strategic insecurity, North Korea has at the same time also “imported” economic failure. Among the economies of East Asia, the DPRK economy alone has suffered prolonged economic retrogression since the end of the Cold War. For example, though reported world exports of merchandise more than tripled (in current US dollars) between 1990 and 2005, DPRK commercial merchandise exports are estimated to have dropped by about one-third.[2] Note that although an urbanized and literate society, North Korea has a level of per capita exports today that is roughly comparable to Haiti’s. In short, North Korea’s confrontational external posture has coincided with the deterioration of its economic self-sufficiency and a declining ability to finance state operations and state survival. Given this close association between the degree of radicalization of North Korea’s security policy and the performance of the country’s domestic economy, the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) organized a research project and international conference to examine the economic consequences of two radically different courses that North Korean security policy could follow. The first, more optimistic scenario is one where North Korea would undertake a “bold switchover” by resolving regional security concerns regarding DPRK international behavior and thus opening the way for the international community to anchor this new security environment with substantial economic benefits for North Korea. This scenario is examined in the first two sections of the paper: section one overviews what exactly such a switchover would entail, while section two considers what aid might be available through the international financial community if North Korea were to implement such a positive change to its security behavior. The next section examines the likely outcomes of a second–and much more pessimistic–scenario: a North Korean nuclear breakout, commencing with the detonation of a nuclear weapon. A final section offers some thoughts regarding the future of the North Korean question. The starting point for this bold switchover conceptualization was the realization that, despite the DPRK’s poor economic record, North Korea’s economic situation is far from hopeless. North Korea’s dismal economic performance must be understood as the consequence of Pyongyang’s interpretation of “socialism with Korean characteristics,” a policy in which hyper-militarization of the economy figures centrally. From a political standpoint, it is therefore possible to imagine a deal that meets the minimum basic demands of all sides–i.e., one that resolves North Korean military threats but allows for continued Communist rule in the DPRK. As a way out of the current impasse, North Korea might be induced to adopt a combination of “ordinary” Stalinist economic policy and “defense sufficiency.” What Is a Bold Switchover? In this thought experiment about a North Korean “bold switchover”[3]–a phrase that echoes the language that Pyongyang has used in a call for a redirected U.S. policy toward the DPRK–we have made two assumptions: (1) that the DPRK remains an independent socialist polity that is committed both to central economic planning and dictatorship of the proletariat and to a continuing partition of the Korean peninsula between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea (ROK)[4] and (2) that a DPRK bold switchover would amount to the adoption of a doctrine of “defense self-sufficiency.” Broadly speaking, such self-sufficiency would require that North Korea resolve regional security concerns regarding DPRK international behavior. For example, although North Korea could still maintain a significant (albeit not grotesque) conventional army, the DPRK would need to relinquish all nuclear ambitions. Additionally, Pyongyang would make concrete efforts to satisfy its neighbors’ concerns about North Korea’s biological, chemical, and ballistic programs; substantially demobilize conventional DPRK military forces; resolve the existing obstacles blocking the improvement of DPRK-Japanese relations; and work toward a position of genuine “co-existence” with South Korea, a move that would entail recognizing the legitimacy of the ROK as well as South Korea’s right both to exist and to conduct its own defensive security policies–including defensive security alliances such as that between the ROK and the United States. If the DPRK were to pursue a bold switchover in security posture, the opportunities both for economic transformation and for material advance would be immediate and significant. Both the DPRK leadership and the international community would have strong incentives to anchor a new security environment with substantial economic benefits for the North Korean people and significantly augmented resources for the DPRK state. Such a bold switchover in security policies and practices would enhance the productive potential, trade performance, and financial stability of the North Korean state. To begin, an enormous amount of manpower and capital resources could be reallocated from military purposes to civilian enterprises. Given the massive scale of this possible redirection, a significant supply-side stimulus would result. Furthermore, such a reallocation would generate pressures to relax perverse policies and practices currently shackling the DPRK economy. Naturally, a period of time would have to elapse before the switchover would elicit economic benefits. In economic and political terms, that period would constitute both the time of maximum vulnerability for the domestic economy and the time of maximum pressure on the government. These pressures could be mitigated, however, by new inflows of external aid. Two distinct types of funding would be available from the international community: political aid and development aid. The former would be contingent upon a credible change in DPRK security policy, whereas the latter would be conditioned upon changes and reforms in North Korean economic policy. Following a genuine security switchover, which governments would provide aid to Pyongyang, and how much would they be willing to give? We offer some very rough benchmarks below.[5] In terms of political aid, South Korea could be anticipated to approve an additional $2 billion or more per year, while Japan might give as much as $1 billion per year over ten years–the type of package that was reportedly under consideration in 2000, the last time the prospect of normalization talks between Japan and North Korea was seriously broached. With a new and credible leadership in Pyongyang, even the United States might offer a few hundred million dollars per year. Development aid, on the other hand, would depend upon North Korea’s willingness to meet a variety of conditions. Aid from multilateral lenders such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank is contingent upon gaining membership into those organizations, which require that an applicant first become a member of the International Monetary Fund. Though these institutions would have to examine the credibility of the particular programs and projects proposed, North Korea could possibly secure hundreds of millions of dollars or more per year in development aid. Thus, in the initial years, Pyongyang could plausibly expect an annual aid inflow in the range of $4 billion or more. Even if some of these resources merely replaced current illicit North Korean earnings (e.g., counterfeiting, drug trafficking, and ballistic missile sales), the DPRK could still increase overall import levels by perhaps $ billion per year (or double current estimated levels).[6] These illustrative numbers imply that shortages of economic resources would not be the limiting constraint under such a future regime. On the contrary, the North Korean economy could expect to enjoy a higher level of imports–on both an absolute and a per capita basis–than ever before. If Pyongyang were to embark upon the path of “reform socialism” first trod by China and Vietnam, greater inflows of aid–to say nothing of private-sector investment–could be expected. Even if the DPRK leadership did not wish to embark upon such a path, however, North Korea’s economy would still be in a better position to grow and develop than at any time since the 1960s. Scenario One: What If a Bold Switchover? In this special roundtable Bradley Babson, a former World Bank official, outlines in detail the likely process and requirements that the DPRK would face in an application for membership in the World Bank and other international financial institutions (IFI). The DPRK government has thus far only been interested in international political agreements that provide an immediate, significant, and unrestricted influx of resources from abroad (e.g., bilateral foreign aid flows, the Kumgang Mountain tourism deal, or perhaps even the so-called inspection fee for the 1999 visit by U.S. officials to the suspect Kumchang-ri site).[7] By contrast, preparations to join the IFIs would entail significant obligations for the DPRK and offer little in the way of immediate “payout.” Financial disclosure–not a North Korean strong suit–would be de rigueur, as would vastly increased foreign access to DPRK officialdom. Foreign officials would evaluate the North Korean government according to criteria foreign to DPRK decisionmakers, including the quality of the legal system, environmental consequences of policies and projects, and implications for poverty reduction. Babson observes that, following formal membership, IFI lending would likely not commence without careful (and intrusive) project preparation efforts–a process in which lending institutions would insist both upon access to relevant DPRK counterparts and on responsiveness from these counterparts. Loan surveillance and monitoring would be routine in order to ensure that funds were being used solely for the purposes contracted. Although Babson does not say so explicitly, his essay highlights the need for radical changes in DPRK governmental norms and practices if Pyongyang is to qualify for regular IFI lending. Even if North Korea qualifies, the scale of IFI transfers might not be immense. Babson estimates that, under current conditions, the DPRK might be a candidate for lending from IDA-14 (the World Bank’s most highly concessional window) in the amount of $25 to $250 million per year. Additional funds from other IFIs may also be available for the DPRK, as well as through such arrangements as the “special trust fund,” in which donors are permitted to commit funds dedicated to a special and accepted purpose. Scenario Two: What If a Further-Radicalized Security Policy? What if, instead of taking a major step to reduce tensions–and realize aforementioned economic benefits–North Korea decides to take the much more provocative step of testing a nuclear device? This is the question that Marcus Noland, an analyst at the Institute for International Economics, addressed at the NBR conference. Noland writes that South Korea, Japan, and China are all vulnerable to the “contagion effects” that would be triggered by an extension of already familiar adverse DPRK security behavior. Noland’s assessment suggests that South Korea, Japan, and China are also vulnerable to “business panics” precipitated by North Korean brinkmanship and aggression. Noland warns, however, that China’s vulnerability could be much greater if Beijing were to align with Pyongyang in the aftermath of a DPRK action so egregious as to invite broad international economic sanctions. Noland cautioned that deeper and more extensive assessments would be necessary in order to calculate a more precise estimate of the possible impact of DPRK “shocks” on ROK, Japanese, and Chinese trade, investment, output, and employment. After examining analogous security shocks in other global hotspots, however, Noland speculates that even a “scary” North Korean gambit might carry only temporary and manageable economic ramifications for the Northeast Asian economic neighborhood. Given that further exploration is necessary to quantify the sort of potential economic effects that Noland describes, this essay invites follow-on research. Noland’s outline, however, also points to troubling and immediate policy questions. If the Northeast Asian neighborhood could–at least from an economic standpoint–weather a North Korean nuclear test, then that might also mean that Pyongyang might factor in the region’s economic resilience to any ultimate decision to ratchet up the nuclear drama. Looking toward the Future A great deal of additional work regarding the possible economic ramifications of a radical shift in North Korean security policy can be profitably undertaken, both by country-specific research teams and through international coordination. From a policy research perspective, however, foreign aid budgets alone clearly do not provide an accurate measure of the “cost” of North Korean behavior. For North Korea’s neighbors, these costs must also be measured in foregone development opportunities. The toll is likely to be consequential–especially for North Korea’s treaty ally, China. Conventionally framed academic expositions concerning suboptimal arrangements in political economy and public choice tend to portray tension as usually occurring between the foregone economic opportunities of potential but “unvested” beneficiaries and the immediate interests of those stakeholders who profit from current inefficiencies. The proceedings of the NBR conference strongly suggested that none of North Korea’s neighbors face such dilemmas regarding DPRK security behavior; on the contrary, all of these neighboring countries have suffered either immediate costs or lost opportunities for adverse North Korean behavior (albeit of varying magnitudes) and all would benefit economically from an emendation of North Korean security behavior. Whether the current North Korean government might be willing–or even capable–of taking the economic interests of its neighbors into account is a critical question. In particular, the relationship between North Korea and China merits closer attention for two reasons. First, North Korea has given China cause to become more assertive. Pyongyang has engaged in behavior not only contrary to China’s economic interests but also embarrassing to China’s international stature. These activities include retrenchment of domestic economic reform efforts (initiated by Kim during the summer of 2005) and North Korea’s money laundering through Macau’s Banco Delta Asia. The reported arrest (for either an illegal real estate transaction or for money laundering) and subsequent release the next day of Kim Jong Il’s rumored confidant and chief of staff, Kang Sang-jun, at the outset of Kim’s January 10-18, 2006 visit to China may possibly be an indication of the seriousness with which China is viewing this type of North Korean behavior. Second, the conduct of Kim’s January 2006 visit suggests further changes may be in the works. During the trip Kim and his 300-member entourage toured vast areas of China and retraced Deng Xiaoping’s famous “southern tour” in an effort to “learn” more about Chinese reforms. There is evidence that many members of Kim’s entourage were associated with Chinese-North Korean joint ventures, enterprises which to date have not met with much financial success. On the last day of Kim’s China trip, in meetings in Beijing with all nine members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, the Dear Leader for the first time offered public and unqualified praise for the Chinese reform model–i.e., domestic reforms and opening to the outside world–and reiterated the DPRK’s commitment to full de-nuclearization. Is it possible that China has undertaken a more active role in encouraging North Korean reforms than has previously been the case? Regardless of how events continue to unfold in the coming months, this roundtable–and the research from which this roundtable draws upon–has clearly demonstrated that the degree to which the current North Korean government might modify DPRK security and economic policies will carry major ramifications for all those with a stake in Northeast Asian economic development and stability. Nicholas Eberstadt is the Henry Wendt Scholar in Political Economy at AEI. Richard J. Ellings is president and co-founder of the National Bureau of Asian Research. Notes |
| 主题 | Foreign and Defense Policy ; Asia |
| 标签 | dprk ; North Korea ; security ; Trade policy |
| URL | https://www.aei.org/articles/economic-implications-of-a-fundamental-shift-in-north-korean-security-policy/ |
| 来源智库 | American Enterprise Institute (United States) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/242563 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nicholas Eberstadt,Richard J. Ellings. Economic Implications of a Fundamental Shift in North Korean Security Policy. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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