| 来源类型 | Article |
| 规范类型 | 评论 |
| Toward an America-Free Korea | |
| Nicholas Eberstadt; Christopher J. Griffin; Aaron L. Friedberg | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-10-06 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The most important issue in this week’s Pyongyang summit between North Korea’s Kim Jong Il and South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun may be an item not formally on the agenda: namely, the future of the U.S.-South Korean military alliance. The question of American forces in Korea is begged, inescapably, by Thursday’s joint North-South Declaration, which proclaims that the two Koreas “need to end the current armistice regime and build a permanent peace regime”–and which further affirms the goal of “unification on their own initiative and according to the spirit of ‘by-the-Korean-people-themselves.'” What would the Korean Peninsula look like under such an arrangement? One feature would almost certainly be the end of the U.S. alliance with the Republic of Korea (ROK). Pyongyang has long maintained that it will not accept a permanent arrangement for the peninsula that permits the continued presence of “imperialist forces.” If Seoul wishes to contemplate a confederation with North Korea, it must also prepare for a world without the U.S.-ROK alliance. By many measures, to be sure, the alliance qualifies as a signal historical success. Since 1953, Washington’s military guarantee to Seoul has deterred another war on the Korean peninsula and helped assure stability throughout Northeast Asia. In the process, it also facilitated South Korea’s own remarkable political and economic development into a liberal democracy and one of the world’s affluent economies. But it is no secret that the U.S.-ROK alliance has been under growing strain for some time. In recent years, the military relationship has been beset by tensions that reflect fundamental differences over the perceived objectives of the alliance. Most critically, U.S. and South Korean policy makers seem now not to agree about the nature and urgency of the “North Korean threat,” or the appropriate responses to it. No longer supported by the same shared sense of purpose that characterized it in earlier decades, the alliance today appears to be heading into a more unhealthy and uncertain middle age. Despite this deterioration, there has been remarkably little serious thought given in either country to what the world would look like if the alliance ceased to exist, or what elements of it must be maintained for mutual Korean and American interests. Last month in Seoul, a conference of American and South Korean specialists spent two days attempting to puzzle through just what Korea, and the Northeast Asian region, would look like in the absence of a US-ROK alliance. Not surprisingly, there were questions on which the group did not approach consensus (most importantly, the future of North-South relations). Most striking, however were the many areas of broad agreement. Simply stated, the sense of the group was that a future without the U.S. alliance would amount, for South Korea, to an “unhedged bet.” Just how would Seoul face heightened risks in a post-alliance world? Let us count the ways: Military Readiness. There is no doubt that replacing the U.S. contribution to South Korea’s defense would be immensely expensive–to the extent that it could actually be replaced. American forces in South Korea are far more than “trip wires” and “trigger pullers.” They provide surveillance, intelligence, command and control, and missile-defense capabilities that Seoul simply does not possess, and would have to develop on its own, at very considerable expense, to maintain a credible deterrent posture. In times of crisis, South Korea would also lose access to the range of “flexible deterrent options” the two sides have developed to bring more U.S. forces into the region when necessary, as well as to the American nuclear umbrella. If war occurred, the U.S. might ultimately come to Seoul’s assistance, but only after delays that could cost many Korean soldiers and civilians their lives. Economic Performance. Dramatically higher defense expenditures would in the first place put a substantial additional burden on Seoul’s national budget. More generally, South Korea’s economic prospects would also likely suffer in a post alliance world. In the longer run, international (and domestic) investors would almost surely lose confidence in the country without the assurance the alliance provides against a recurrence of hostilities on the peninsula. To the extent that trade “follows the flag,” the country’s trade patterns would also shift–away from the U.S. and towards greater dependence upon China. While the U.S.-ROK alliance does not appear to be a major driver of bilateral economic relations, it does nonetheless provide incalculable but possibly non-trivial economic benefits. Would Washington be as willing to fight for a Free Trade Agreement with South Korea if Seoul was not a military ally–much less step in to help with the economic reconstruction of northern Korea if the Pyongyang regime collapsed in a post-alliance era? Alternative Security Alliances or Alignments. South Korea inhabits an historically dangerous neighborhood: In addition to North Korea, the other nearby countries are China, Russia and Japan. Without a U.S. military alliance, where would South Korea turn for a partnership to enhance regional security? Even a summary review emphasizes the obvious–all other candidates for a Northeast Asian alliance are far less attractive than the U.S. from South Korea’s standpoint. None of them could compensate fully for the loss of an American military guarantee, and many of them might require significantly greater sacrifices of sovereignty than does the current pact with Washington. Without a local ally, however, South Korea’s only other option would be armed neutrality–a modern day return to Korea’s dreaded fate in the past as “a shrimp among whales.” A Nuclear Crisis–in South Korea. If forced to pursue a wholly independent self-defense in a hostile security environment, Seoul would face overwhelming pressures to develop its own nuclear arsenal. Indeed, the rapidity with which participants at the conference, American and Korean, progressive and conservative, arrived at this conclusion was chilling–especially given the likely implications for regional stability, further nuclear proliferation and South Korea’s international standing. The “Humpty Dumpty” Problem. The participants at the conference discussed a whole variety of scenarios under which the alliance could come to an end: amicable or acrimonious; gradual or abrupt; carefully planned in advance or suddenly sundered in the midst of crisis. In none of these scenarios, however, was it possible to posit an easy way to piece the US-ROK military relationship back together again if, at some point in the future, Seoul decided to seek a renewed American security guarantee. It is difficult to forge a military alliance under the best of circumstances. Efforts at re-engagement, where each side would try to select only the items most attractive to its own interests, are most unlikely to reconstitute a robust and resilient relationship. An end to the U.S.-ROK alliance, we should emphasize, is by no means in the cards–for now. But the two countries do not have to wait for the negotiated end to inter-Korean hostilities, or a formal termination of the U.S.-ROK alliance, to reap a harvest of strategic risk. Some of those same dangers might also accrue well before an official end to the alliance, if the structure is allowed to weaken and to decline in credibility. Only by realizing what is actually at stake can we expect the two sides to take the steps necessary to sustain, and indeed strengthen, an alliance that remains very much in both nations’ interests. Nicholas Eberstadt is the Henry Wendt Scholar in Political Economy at AEI. Christopher Griffin is a research fellow at AEI. Aaron L. Friedberg is a professor at Princeton University. |
| 主题 | Foreign and Defense Policy ; Asia |
| 标签 | Aaron Friedberg ; Christopher Griffin ; Kim Jong Il ; North Korea ; nuclear ; security ; South Korea ; US military |
| URL | https://www.aei.org/articles/toward-an-america-free-korea/ |
| 来源智库 | American Enterprise Institute (United States) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/244684 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nicholas Eberstadt,Christopher J. Griffin,Aaron L. Friedberg. Toward an America-Free Korea. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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