| 摘要 | When OPEC ministers meet tomorrow in Saudi Arabia, they’ll have a lot on their minds. Although most people believe that oil prices over $90 per barrel are most harmful to Western economies, in the long run such sky-high prices actually pose a greater threat to the Gulf oil exporters themselves, and especially to Saudi Arabia, the largest producer. This may seem paradoxical. But as oil prices rise, Western countries will eventually seek out alternative energy supplies, thereby reducing demand. When oil demand declined in the early 1980s, due to Western conservation, it took only four years for Saudi Arabia to see most of its oil exports shrivel away. By the summer of 1985, the Saudis were exporting less than a third of their 1980 total.
So OPEC has a clear interest in making oil a lot cheaper. Reducing oil prices, however, is not a simple matter for OPEC ministers. Even OPEC can’t break the laws of supply and demand—and demand is now high while supply is low. China and India have ratcheted up their oil consumption from 1.885 million barrels per day (bpd) in 1985 to 7.232 million bpd in 2007. Over the same period, European oil consumption has jumped from 13.7 million bpd to 16.34 million bpd, and the U.S. consumption has increased from 15.7 million bpd to 20.7 million bpd. Meanwhile, the annual average world oil supply has dropped by 268,000 bpd since 2006.
One reason oil prices appear high to Americans is that prices are denominated in dollars. Since the dollar has lost much of its value, OPEC countries charge more just to keep the same real value. Whereas the price of oil has increased by 57 percent in the United States over the past year, it has only risen by 47 percent in the Eurozone.
OPEC countries can’t do anything about the gradual depreciation of the American dollar, which has its roots in decisions made by the Federal Reserve, Congress, and the executive branch about the fundamentals of the U.S. economy. Until the dollar stops falling—and some economists believe it will soon bottom out—the upward pressure on oil prices will continue, even with increased production.
For that matter, boosting production is not as easy as it sounds. Many people think that OPEC can simply open the spigots and churn out more oil. Much as the organization would love to do that, it cannot produce more than an extra half million barrels per day. OPEC is handicapped not by geology (there’s plenty of oil in the ground), but by unfortunate political realities.
The chief investment constraint is that the bulk of the oil-producing resources are in the hands of OPEC governments, rather than private firms, and the governments aren’t using their resources to bring more capacity online. Private companies want to help out by investing in OPEC countries, but OPEC has traditionally discouraged foreign investment by demanding less favorable terms of access, as well as higher royalties and taxes.
Furthermore, governments in such oil-exporting powers as Venezuela, Russia, Mexico, and Nigeria have punished profitable companies by restricting their revenues from investment. Even Canada, the largest source of U.S. oil imports, is raising taxes on producers. The provincial government in Alberta, where most Canadian oil is found, is increasing royalties by 20 percent.
A worldwide recession could reduce the demand for oil. The OPEC ministers are presumably aware of the damage this could do to their economies, which depend heavily on oil and have none of the diversification of more advanced economies. Rising oil prices cause gradual declines in demand over a long period of time, as the effects of technological changes works their way through the system. On the other hand, a fall in worldwide income can cut oil demand drastically right away. The 1997 Asian financial crisis constrained the growth of oil demand for about four years. In 1997 and 1998, Asian demand for oil was approximately 1 million bpd less than it otherwise would have been in the absence of a recession.
The Saudis would bear most of the brunt of a recession-induced downturn in oil demand because, having the most capacity to expand, they are the marginal producer. In the 1980s, Saudi Arabia lost the market for electricity generation and never got it back. At roughly the same time, the changes in U.S. transportation habits—as Americans shifted to more fuel-efficient cars—caused a permanent loss of revenue.
At this weekend’s OPEC meeting, the Saudis will do what is in their best interest, no matter what their official statements may say. They will argue for a hike in production, not because the current level of oil prices is dangerous to us, but because it’s dangerous to them. In the near term, costly oil means higher revenues for OPEC. But over the long haul, high oil prices could make OPEC’s most valuable asset become obsolete.
Diana Furchtgott-Roth, former chief economist at the U.S. Department of Labor, is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.
Image by Salah Malkawi/Getty Images. |
