| 摘要 | The F-22 Raptor and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter stand at the pinnacle of fighter aircraft technology, integrating low observability, fused sensor interfaces, cutting-edge networking and world-class avionics. There is something new under the sun, and it is being flown by the U.S. Air Force. But even as the U.S. is poised at the brink of seemingly interminable air superiority, the industrial base supporting its air power is surprisingly fragile.
The U.S. is producing fewer new fighter aircraft at any given time than it has in decades, drawing upon fewer production lines and facing a far more fragmented international market. Indeed, the global market for fighter aircraft presents an apparent paradox: Even as fifth-generation aircraft demonstrate their operational prowess, the world’s air forces are dominated by fourth-generation aircraft, and so are most countries’ procurement plans.
This paradox presents a particular dilemma in the Asia-Pacific region, where many air forces are undergoing a process of recapitalization and modernization as part of an ongoing arms race among the major powers there. As a part of this process, Washington’s allies and security partners in Asia must decide how to balance their fourth-generation aircraft with eventual plans to purchase fifth-generation fighters. The answer that these countries find for this challenge will determine the potency of U.S. air power in the region for decades to come.
The Fifth Element
If nothing else, the emergence of fifth-generation aircraft has inspired a semantic debate. Not just intellectual integrity, but also market pressures have inspired extensive feuding over the definition of fifth-generation aircraft and their significance. According to their advocates, the key to fifth-generation fighters is that they integrate a suite of capabilities that cannot be retrofitted onto legacy aircraft. But the greatest distinction is these aircrafts’ performance according to two key parameters: survivability and interoperability.
The sine qua non of a fighter aircraft’s usefulness is its ability to engage in combat and survive. The Raptor’s and Joint Strike Fighter’s defining strength in this regard is their low observability, a capability they achieve by stealthy design that integrates weapons, fuel and sensors inside the airframe. But the stealthy design of these aircraft is only part of a package that includes advanced electronically scanned array (AESA) radars to minimize detectable radiation emissions and to jam enemy radars and air-to-air missiles.
During the summer 2006 Northern Edge air exercises, the Raptors rang up a remarkable 124 “kills” without a loss. Survivability counts, and fifth-generation fighters have it in spades. Survivability especially counts in light of ever-more-sophisticated air defense systems. For example, China is deploying S300-PMU2 surface-to-air missile batteries with a 200-kilometer radius, as well as Luyang II guided missile destroyers, which reportedly have air warfare capabilities that rival those of Aegis-radar-equipped U.S. destroyers. In the opening stages of a conflict, the F-22 and F-35 are expected to act in tandem to destroy enemy air forces and air defenses, respectively. Surviving in hostile air space is the key to this mission, which will crack open an anti-access environment for operations by less-stealthy legacy aircraft.
The second key parameter that modern air forces seek is to maximize interoperability among their aircraft, a capability that has been nearly perfected by the U.S. since the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War: Fighters destroy the enemy, command-and-control aircraft provide target data, electronic warfare platforms disrupt hostile air defenses, and airborne refuelers keep the fleet aloft. But the evolving air defense threat also has placed this system of systems at risk, as new long-range air-to-air missiles are pushing enabling aircraft such as the E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System further away from the battlespace. Fifth-generation fighters have the potential to help plug this gap, as their sensors and networking allow them to share their battlespace awareness.
Of course, U.S. aircraft are not expected to be interoperable only with each other, but also with allied and coalition air forces. This capability is especially vital in Asia, where a conflict on the Korean Peninsula or the Taiwan Strait could force the U.S. and its allies to form an ad hoc coalition. The ability to share data, develop a common operational picture, and establish cooperative command and control would be essential to quickly achieving coalition objectives. The knowledge that the U.S. and its allies can quickly establish such coalitions is a steadfast deterrent to aggression in Asia, given the absence of formal multilateral alliances in the region.
The advantages of fifth-generation fighters thus appear overwhelming, as they bring a suite of capabilities that are central to any future war in the region. But a survey of Asian air forces reveals a hodgepodge of fourth-generation fighters–U.S. F-15s, F-16s and F/A-18s; Russian Sukhoi-27s, MiG-29s and their variants; French Mirages; and Chinese J-10s. Reflecting on the gradual and unsteady nature of aircraft procurement, there seldom is little evident logic to the composition of these air forces. Japan, for example, is the richest Asian nation, but its Air Self-Defense Force still flies F-4 Phantom fighters that it procured between 1971 and 1981.
As Asian countries make their procurement decisions, they face a market that has become more fractured since the Cold War. Over the past two decades, the U.S. defense industry has notably consolidated, with only Boeing and Lockheed Martin emerging as significant fighter aircraft producers, while the number of international competitors has increased, as the Russian Aircraft Corp. and Sukhoi have been joined by European manufacturers Dassault Aviation, Saab AB and Eurofighter, as well as China’s Chengdu Aircraft Industry Association. This proliferation of sellers is a sure sign that the baseline technology of fourth-generation aircraft is no longer cutting edge, but it also presents buyers with an array of choices.
Adding further confusion, many of the capabilities of these fourth-generation aircraft overlap with those of the fifth-generation. For example, the latest F/A-18E/F Super Hornets feature an APG-79 AESA radar that shares much of the functionality of the radar found in the F-22. Facing such an array of capabilities for sale, the challenge for the Asian powers is to determine how to manage the eventual integration of their air forces with fifth-generation fighters, either their own or those flown by the U.S.
Procurement Politics
The incentives to move toward a fifth-generation air force may be obvious, but the path to reach it is not so. The process of recapitalization and modernization is an inherently ponderous and unpredictable one. As countries buy new aircraft, they must assess the relative capabilities of their legacy platforms and possible replacements, persuade legislatures to fund new purchases, and conduct procurement competitions. Not surprisingly, the officials and politicians who have a say in this process must weigh an array of interests that do not always lead to an objectively optimal solution.
Taiwan provides a characteristic example of procurement decisions by Washington’s Asian allies. The government in Taipei has long juggled a multitude of factors in its arms purchases, including the need to amass the best available technology in its standoff against China, develop as many de facto ties with other nations as possible and indigenize all the defense technology it can in the face of ever uncertain access to the international arms market. As the result of its efforts to balance these three interests, Taiwan flies a not-always-interoperable fleet that combines U.S. F-16s, Dassault Mirage 2000s and its own Ching-Kuo Indigenous Defense Fighter. Even as Taiwan seeks to modernize its force today, the country still finds itself flying decrepit F-5 Tiger fighters, which have become best known in recent years for crashing during exercises.
The market for fighters in Asia is thus characterized by countries that must balance an array of competing interests and that are already flying an array of legacy platforms. The dilemma for these buyers is that they are not only deciding their makeup for the next 20 years, but also how their future air forces will interact with fifth-generation aircraft as they come into broader use. These countries have so far marked out three broad paths:
1. The express route. The most obvious course to attaining fifth-generation aircraft is to buy them today, much as the U.S. Air Force is doing. Unfortunately, the tyranny of reality blocks this option. The Obey Amendment to the 1998 defense appropriations act prohibits the sale of the F-22 to even the United States’ closest allies for fear that sensitive technologies will be leaked to potential foes. With the F-22 off the market, several of America’s allies who seek fifth-generation fighter technology have joined the JSF program, in which eight partner countries have contributed to the aircraft’s development in exchange for opportunities to subcontract aircraft components and expedited delivery once the aircraft goes into serial production late next decade.
The long lag before the introduction of the JSF into allied air forces presents a dilemma for countries that are making major procurement decisions. Japan is the most important example in this regard, as it repeatedly has expressed interest in purchasing the F-22, which it views as a vital tool for guaranteeing its ability to defend its air space against China and North Korea in the years to come. The question of F-22 sales are now a perennial question for Congress as it considers the relationship with Japan, and one that Tokyo is unlikely to give up on soon.
2. The stragegic detour. With fifth-generation aircraft unavailable for several more years, most countries in Asia must decide what fourth-generation fighters will best round out their inventories and provide them with future options. If executed wisely, these fourth-generation purchases will serve as a strategic detour, creating options in which these countries can either easily procure fifth-generation aircraft in the future, or at least deepen their capacity to operate with the U.S. and other militaries that are using these aircraft.
This strategic detour cuts to the heart of the challenge of integrating fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft, and also points to the advantage of procuring U.S. fighters. While the U.S. fields the F-22 and F-35, it will develop upgrades for such fourth-generation aircraft as the F-15, F-16 and F/A-18 to make sure they are still interoperable with its new platforms, and indeed, so that they may benefit from the enhanced data-sharing the F-22 and F-35 will allow. For a prospective buyer, this U.S. prerogative guarantees a continued stream of upgrades until at least 2025, when the Air Force plans to retire its last F-16, while the Navy is still procuring F/A-18s, providing an even longer period of upgrades. This advantage is simply not available on foreign aircraft, which will not be in a similar race to keep pace with the data links of their own fifth-generation fighters.
Australia’s recent decision to purchase a combination of 24 F/A-18F and EA-18G fighters is the pre-eminent example of a country that has decided to invest in a platform that will meet multiple goals: The aircraft will round out Australia’s legacy air force, which already includes 71 F/A-18A/Bs; provide advanced capabilities that will remain vital to air combat for decades to come; and provide seamless interoperability with Australia’s planned force of 100 JSFs.
Taiwan’s government’s ongoing effort to purchase 66 F-16C/D fighters recognizes an alternate construct of the strategic detour. As that country cannot foresee any purchases of the F-35 or other fifth-generation fighters well into the medium term, its priority is to develop additional capabilities that will allow the country’s air force to operate with the U.S. Because the latest F-16 features its own advanced AESA radar, they will be able to gather data while operating close to Chinese air space, which they can then transmit back to any U.S. forces that would be intervening on Taipei’s behalf in the event of a future cross-strait conflict.
3. The dead end. For countries looking to recapitalize their air forces, a third option is readily available: a repudiation of the future. If procurement officials decide that their priorities are to acquire a combination of the best available technologies, or at least access to coalition partners who are equipped with it, the advantages of buying American are quite straightforward. However, procurement officials must take in to account other interests. For example, many governments place a priority on the indigenization of aircraft manufacturing technology, offset arrangements that allow a country to develop its own aviation industry or greater autonomy from the U.S.
The most interesting example in this regard is India, which is running a bid for the purchase of 124 multirole combat aircraft. India’s procurement is valued at about $10 billion and has drawn submissions from all of the world’s leading aircraft manufacturers. India will have to weigh an array of factors, but the most important is whether the country believes it can afford to miss out on an opportunity to develop a strong defense industrial relationship with the U.S. at a time when U.S. companies are the only ones producing fifth-generation fighters. Although the purchase of a U.S. aircraft would not translate into immediate access to the F-35, it would guarantee that India will receive serious treatment when and if it decides to continue to buy American.
The contrasting option for India is to pursue a course that will provide greater options for technology transfer, such as the Saab Gripen, or even expanding the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft program, a somewhat primitive fourth-generation aircraft. Neither option will satisfy India’s requirements for an advanced fourth-generation fighter, nor will they leave India better poised to make the leap to fifth-generation aircraft in the future.
As America’s allies and security partners face their next set of fighter aircraft purchases, they face a difficult environment for doing so. The market is fragmented and various manufacturers can claim distinct advantages demonstrated by their aircraft, either in the realm of capabilities, affordability or ease of technology transfer. Despite this highly competitive market, the operational requirements imposed by the ever-changing threat environment will place a premium on fifth-generation technologies in the future, and the field will be dominated by the U.S. for many years to come.
The stakes of these procurement decisions for American interests could not be much greater. If our allies do not continue to acquire aircraft that are highly interoperable, it will be much more difficult to develop the type of ad hoc coalitions that are likely to characterize future conflicts, especially in the Asia Pacific. As U.S. manufacturers participate in future fighter procurement competitions, there are two broad concepts the U.S. should keep always in mind.
First, we must achieve greater joint interoperability with allies and security partners. This concept is important because there is no natural market for defense procurements, which are instead dictated by threat assessments, alliance requirements and, as often as not, advice and input from abroad. The U.S. should push top-tier allies such as Japan, Australia and South Korea to procure fifth-generation aircraft as quickly as possible, in part through taking all steps possible to expedite the production of the F-35, and also by lifting the Obey Amendment. These countries count among America’s most trusted allies, and it will only be through establishing comprehensive air superiority that the U.S. and its allies will maintain peace in Asia in this century.
Likewise, for Taiwan, it is inexcusable that the Bush administration has not accepted Taiwan’s letter of request to buy 66 F-16C/Ds. This purchase not only will replace antiquated F-5s, but also provide an infusion of orders into the U.S. defense industrial base. Although the refusal of Taiwan’s effort to purchase new aircraft was intended as a swipe against then-President Chen Shui-bian, it has served to undercut a healthy defense relationship with a longstanding ally.
For middle- and lower-tier allies or security partners, such as Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia, the U.S. should look to develop additional security cooperation that contributes to these countries’ relatively minimal capacity for security cooperation. For example, although neither the Philippines nor Indonesia is in a position to order large numbers of additional fighters in the foreseeable future, the U.S. should look to develop maritime patrol aircraft that can share data links with U.S. forces, expanding our capacity for providing a stabilizing presence in a long-contested area of the Asian littoral.
The second objective is to secure America’s defense industrial base. The U.S. Air Force is no longer procuring F-16s, and the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps program of record plans to purchase F/A-18s only through 2011. With the production line for F-22s also scheduled to close in 2011, the U.S. is poised to limit itself to a single fighter aircraft production line just a few years ahead.
Several obvious steps may be taken to preserve this defense-industrial base. Again, lifting the ban on exporting F-22s will likely create at least one additional customer for this revolutionary aircraft in Japan, which should help to sustain the fifth-generation defense-industrial base. Both the F-22 and F/A-18 are also likely to receive additional orders to recapitalize the U.S. fighter fleet, which has been exhausted prematurely by continuous operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and it is quite right that they should. Simply put: America and its allies must build their air forces over the coming decades in order to seize the opportunity for ever greater joint interoperability.
Christopher Griffin is a research fellow at AEI. |
