| 摘要 | On November 15, Southern Sudanese citizens began registering for the long-awaited right to cast their votes in a January 9 referendum on Southern independence. The capstone of a peace agreement brokered by the United States in 2005, this referendum ends two decades of bloody civil war between the North and South. With the Northern government frequently reneging on power and wealth-sharing agreements since the accord, frustrated Southerners are expected to vote for secession.
Unable to vote, the North may still try to prevent the oil-rich South from seceding by taking advantage of a clause in the 2009 Referendum Act (the legal framework for the crucial aspects of the referendum) that invalidates the poll results unless 60 percent of registered Southern voters cast their ballot on January 9.
Historically unwilling to share power or wealth, the North’s ruling National Congress Party (NCP) has used tactics such as intimidation, violence, and political manipulation to maintain its authority. In 2008, for instance, the NCP grossly understated the Southern Sudanese population to limit the seats the South could win in the National Assembly and to prevent it from achieving the 25 percent threshold needed to block legislation. More recently, the NCP prevented opposition candidates from campaigning, intimidated voters, and manipulated the election results in its favor to ensure that its leader, President Omar al-Bashir, would win the April 2010 elections.
This time, with all indicators pointing toward an overwhelming majority voting for independence, credibly rigging the referendum results will be extremely difficult for the NCP. But unclear eligibility requirements and the modest international attention to the registration process so far—less than 100 international observers were deployed to monitor more than 2,600 sites—leave the South’s achievement of the 60 percent quorum requirement vulnerable to political manipulation.
For instance, the NCP could manipulate voter turnout rate by inflating the number of registered voters—“ghost registrations”—particularly in the North and among Southerners living outside Sudan. Khartoum’s cronies could also throw off the stats by preventing registered Southerners from voting, using tactics of intimidation, instilling confusion, or hampering transport. This will especially impact the roughly 2 million Southerners living in the North and those living along the North-South border.
While this threat has received little attention outside Sudan, advocates of secession are taking possible political manipulation seriously. A spokesperson for the Southern People’s Liberation Movement warned, “There is a great risk in the North that they will rig it … so it would be good if Southerners there don’t register.” Warnings like these seem to be having an effect as voter registration in the North has been slow, with reports of empty registration centers and low interest.
Technically, the Referendum Act states that if Southern Sudan does not meet the 60 percent voter turnout requirement in January—whether due to natural constraints or Khartoum’s interference—the vote on secession must be repeated within 60 days. Such a delay, however, is unlikely to be accepted among eager Southerners, the majority of whom either do not know about the quorum requirement or will not accept it.
The potential for bloodshed is huge. As a September 2010 report by Democracy Reporting International warned, such a situation would cause a deep sense of resentment among Southerners and could lead to immediate instability and violence.
A resurgence of violent conflict between the North and South would be disastrous for the people of Sudan and neighboring countries. It would also present an acute policy challenge to the United States. As the central broker of the original 2005 peace agreement, the United States will be under considerable pressure to respond. And, with China backing oil interests in Khartoum, there is a serious chance that any renewed conflict could quickly become global. Not only does China purchase more than 50 percent of Sudan’s crude oil, it also owns almost half of Sudan’s largest petroleum company, located in Khartoum, and has spent billions on pipelines running from the Southern oil fields to processing plants in the North.
The Obama administration is taking the threat of escalated conflict seriously. Two weeks ago, the administration offered to expedite Sudan’s removal from the list of states that sponsor terrorism if the January referendum is conducted fairly. This includes both parties respecting the result and cooperating on post-referendum issues such as oil sharing and border demarcation. The problem, however, is that this offer does not address the more immediate trigger of renewed conflict or the potential manipulation of the registration data.
The Obama administration should pay closer attention to the ongoing registration process—which was just extended by another week, until December 8—and carefully scrutinize the total registration numbers to make sure they are not manipulated. Emily Putze is a research assistant at the American Enterprise Institute. Emilie Oftedal is an intern at AEI and a graduate student at the University of Oslo.
Image by Darren Wamboldt/Bergman Group. |
