| 摘要 | For years, America’s national security priorities have weighed disproportionately upon the shoulders of special operations forces. SOF are prized for their ability to discreetly accomplish a wide variety of missions while maintaining an unrelenting commitment to their craft and a quiet professional ethos. Their abilities, combined with the political expediency of relying upon them instead of conventional troops, have resulted in a relentless operational tempo since 9/11 and a continually increasing budget for U.S. Special Operations Command. Sixteen years later, the price of these continued deployments has started to show.
In a compelling recent piece, a veteran operator outlined the negative impact that near continuous overseas assignments have had on the psyche of special operators and their families. Suicide rates, for example, still remain high, although they have declined some. Drug and alcohol problems within the force are on the rise as operators attempt to cope. In the field, combat fatalities for operators have surpassed those of their conventional counterparts, despite SOF only comprising between 3 and 5 percent of the fighting force. Meanwhile, SOF are being deployed to an ever-increasing number of countries for a similarly increasing number of reasons. As their mission set has expanded, so have recruitment drives, inevitably raising questions about how to preserve the quality of America’s elite warrior class.
The Department of Defense has attempted to mitigate some of this pressure through the creation of the Preservation of the Force and Family Task Force. Created in 2013, the task force is an important element supporting SOF well-being, but amounts to a bandage on a wound that continues to worsen. In an effort to reduce the number of missions for which SOF hold primary responsibility, the Army established units composed of seasoned conventional soldiers, known as Security Force Assistance Brigades, to conduct some of the train, advise and assist missions typically performed by SOF. This is an important step for which I have advocated before, but as SOF roles continue to expand, the advent of a conventional cadre should be thought of as the beginning, not the end of the re-examination of how, when, where and – most importantly – why special operators are deployed.
As SOF have taken on a larger role in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, other tools of national power have atrophied. The State Department, for example, is currently undergoing a restructuring that renders any near-term expansion to its responsibilities unlikely. Though the issues facing SOF are arguably the most acute, other sections of the military are hardly in top shape: As my colleagues have written at length, the readiness crisis that extends throughout the U.S. military has decreased the larger force’s preparedness to reclaim some of the responsibilities currently overseen by SOF. The crisis facing SOF thus shouldn’t be viewed simply as an esoteric bit of defense policy – it should be seen for what it is: a crisis in how America conducts foreign policy more generally.
How should our decision-makers square the circle? In the short term, the U.S. government could rely on contractors, though this move would come with its own set of risks. The White House could reduce the scope of how America defines its interests, and it is currently trying to do this not just rhetorically but also, it appears, in its official National Security Strategy (due to be released next week). Yet the core American interests for which SOF currently take the lead – counterterrorism and counter-proliferation among them – will remain a priority for the foreseeable future. Absent a sudden change in the fundamental drivers of international political dynamics, the discretion and precision brought to bear by SOF is unlikely to decrease. But that doesn’t mean that SOF should shoulder the responsibility for tackling these challenges alone.
Perhaps it’s time, once again, to rethink the role of SOF in relation to the rest of government. After 16 years of non-stop deployments and service on the frontlines in every corner of the globe, SOF have learned some important lessons about warfare that should receive wider attention, namely the importance of political warfare, the value of deep and lasting relationships with stakeholders in foreign countries and the increasing convergence between cyber and other kinds of warfare. Their understanding of the zeitgeist of the international operating environment and experience advising and assisting foreign forces may have prepared them to train, advise and assist within their own government.
Right now, the primary unit in a SOF fighting organization is the Operational Detachment – Alpha, which consists of a small group of operators that act together as a team. For missions relevant to other parts of the military and government, such as military information support operations, foreign internal defense and humanitarian activities, to name a few, SOF could serve as leaders of similar, task-oriented units composed of relevant personnel from throughout the government. Not only would this promulgate SOF ideas and experiences to a larger audience, it would reduce the need for SOF to bear the full responsibility for these roles. Operator-only units should remain intact for direct action missions, but it’s probably time to rethink the frequency of those too. Largely aimed at counterterrorism operations, direct action missions alone do little to address the underlying ideology that drives extremism.
Any changes to how SOF are employed will be met with skepticism – both within SOF and in the larger national security bureaucracy. The types of conflicts that we face today, however – diffuse, persistent and interdisciplinary as they are – demand a wider understanding of the low-intensity activities where SOF have gained particular proficiency. Moreover, delegating some SOF responsibilities to other parts of the government will free operators to focus on new ways to address the continually evolving threat landscape – something that SOF alone are uniquely positioned to do.
Most importantly of all, reforming the roles and responsibilities of our special operations forces will more evenly distribute the burden of addressing our nation’s most pressing security challenges. It will support efforts to reduce pressure on SOF and their families and will also obviate the need to lower standards to increase SOF ranks. Sixteen years is a long time to go at full-speed. It’s time that we consider how to improve the sustainability of SOF operations; both SOF and American foreign policy will be better for it. |
