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来源类型 | Article |
规范类型 | 评论 |
Uncompensated care and the collapse of hospital payment regulation: An illustration of the Tinbergen Rule | |
Jeffrey Clemens; Benedic N. Ippolito | |
发表日期 | 2019-09-09 |
出版年 | 2019 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Abstract The primary objective of “all-payer” rate setting—regulatory regimes through which states set hospital payment rates for all insurers—was to control costs through consistent, centrally regulated payments. These regimes were often linked, however, to an ancillary goal of financing care for the uninsured. We show that the surcharge mechanism used to achieve this secondary objective decreased the stability of these payment regimes. This instability reflected a feedback loop from surcharge rates to insurance coverage and back to the quantities of uncompensated care in need of financing. Instability was exacerbated when Health Maintenance Organizations were exempted from surcharge collections, creating a regulatory arbitrage opportunity. Legal challenges connected to the incidence of uncompensated care surcharges contributed to the abandonment of all-payer rate regulation by several states. These developments illustrate the wisdom of the Tinbergen Rule, which recommends that independent policy objectives be met with independent policy instruments. Read the journal article here. Read the ungated article here. |
主题 | Health Care ; Economics ; Health Economics |
标签 | Health care costs |
URL | https://www.aei.org/articles/uncompensated-care-and-the-collapse-of-hospital-payment-regulation-an-illustration-of-the-tinbergen-rule/ |
来源智库 | American Enterprise Institute (United States) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/266301 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jeffrey Clemens,Benedic N. Ippolito. Uncompensated care and the collapse of hospital payment regulation: An illustration of the Tinbergen Rule. 2019. |
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