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来源类型 | Working papers |
规范类型 | 论文 |
Leader Punishment and Cooperation in Groups | |
Kosfeld, Michael; Rustagi, Devesh | |
发表日期 | 2011 |
出版者 | ETH Zürich |
出版年 | 2011 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We study whether differences in the propensity of actual leaders to enforce cooperation by punishing group members as a third party in a social dilemma game can explain the variation in the performance of these groups in managing their forest commons. The results show that leader punishment motives vary from pure self-regarding and egalitarian to efficiency concerns and even anti-social motives. We find a significant positive association between commons management outcomes, measured by the average number of young trees per hectare, and leaders who reveal a concern for equality and efficiency in the experiment. For anti-social leaders, the association is negative and significant. A detailed empirical analysis suggests that omitted variables and reverse causality are not driving these results, corroborating a causal interpretation of these associations. Our results highlight the importance of leaders in collective action, emphasizing the significant role of leaders’ other-regarding motives for cooperation outcomes. |
主题 | Leadership ; Other-regarding preferences ; Third-party punishment ; Anti-social punishment ; Conditional cooperation ; Common property resources |
URL | https://www.research-collection.ethz.ch/handle/20.500.11850/39818 |
来源智库 | Centre for Energy Policy and Economics (Switzerland) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/266566 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kosfeld, Michael,Rustagi, Devesh. Leader Punishment and Cooperation in Groups. 2011. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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