G2TT
来源类型Working papers
规范类型论文
Leader Punishment and Cooperation in Groups
Kosfeld, Michael; Rustagi, Devesh
发表日期2011
出版者ETH Zürich
出版年2011
语种英语
摘要We study whether differences in the propensity of actual leaders to enforce cooperation by punishing group members as a third party in a social dilemma game can explain the variation in the performance of these groups in managing their forest commons. The results show that leader punishment motives vary from pure self-regarding and egalitarian to efficiency concerns and even anti-social motives. We find a significant positive association between commons management outcomes, measured by the average number of young trees per hectare, and leaders who reveal a concern for equality and efficiency in the experiment. For anti-social leaders, the association is negative and significant. A detailed empirical analysis suggests that omitted variables and reverse causality are not driving these results, corroborating a causal interpretation of these associations. Our results highlight the importance of leaders in collective action, emphasizing the significant role of leaders’ other-regarding motives for cooperation outcomes.
主题Leadership ; Other-regarding preferences ; Third-party punishment ; Anti-social punishment ; Conditional cooperation ; Common property resources
URLhttps://www.research-collection.ethz.ch/handle/20.500.11850/39818
来源智库Centre for Energy Policy and Economics (Switzerland)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/266566
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Kosfeld, Michael,Rustagi, Devesh. Leader Punishment and Cooperation in Groups. 2011.
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