全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Optimal taxation of a monopolistic extractor: are subsidies necessary?

G2TT

来源类型	Working papers
规范类型	论文
DOI	10.3929/ethz-a-005666524
	Optimal taxation of a monopolistic extractor: are subsidies necessary?
	Daubanes, Julien
发表日期	2008-07
出版者	ETH Zurich, Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH)
出版年	2008
语种	英语
摘要	In a standard partial equilibrium model of resource depletion, this paper characterizes and examines the solution to the optimal taxation problem when extraction is monopolistic. The main result is that the family of subgame perfect efficiency-inducing tax/subsidy schemes may include some strict tax policies. This illustrates how the static trade-off between inducing efficiency and raising tax revenues in the presence of market power is relaxed under exhaustibility.
主题	Exhaustible resources ; Imperfect competition ; Optimal taxation
URL	https://www.research-collection.ethz.ch/handle/20.500.11850/339498
来源智库	Centre for Energy Policy and Economics (Switzerland)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/266660
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Daubanes, Julien. Optimal taxation of a monopolistic extractor: are subsidies necessary?. 2008.