| 来源类型 | Working papers |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| DOI | 10.3929/ethz-a-006660192 |
| Optimal monitoring of credit-based emissions trading under asymmetric information | |
| MacKenzie, Ian A.; Ohndorf, Markus | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-10 |
| 出版者 | ETH Zurich, Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Project-based emissions trading schemes, like the Clean Development Mechanism, are particularly prone to problems of asymmetric information between project parties and the regulator. In this paper, we extend the general framework on incomplete enforcement of policy instruments to reflect the particularities of credit-based mechanisms. The main focus of the analysis is to determine the regulator’s optimal spot-check frequency given plausible assumptions of incomplete enforcement under asymmetric information on reduction costs and heterogeneous verifiability of projects. We find that, depending on the actual abatement cost and penalty schemes, optimal monitoring for credit-based systems is often discontinuous and significantly differs from the one to be applied for cap-andtrade schemes or environmental taxes. We conclude that, in a real-world context, project admission should ultimately be based on the criterion of verifiability. |
| 主题 | Environmental regulation ; Audits and compliance ; Project-based emissions trading systems |
| URL | https://www.research-collection.ethz.ch/handle/20.500.11850/40237 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Energy Policy and Economics (Switzerland) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/266693 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | MacKenzie, Ian A.,Ohndorf, Markus. Optimal monitoring of credit-based emissions trading under asymmetric information. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| eth-4425-01.pdf（1849KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
| eth-4425-01.jpg（3KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA |  浏览 | ||
| 文件名： | eth-4425-01.jpg |
| 格式： | JPEG |
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