| 来源类型 | Working papers |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| DOI | 10.3929/ethz-a-006832410 |
| Restricted Coasean bargaining | |
| MacKenzie, Ian A.; Ohndorf, Markus | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-01 |
| 出版者 | ETH Zurich, Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We investigate the efficiency of Coasean bargaining when restrictions are placed on the set of feasible bargaining outcomes. When property rights are costly to (defend) appropriate, we find bargaining restrictions may be Pareto superior to unconstrained voluntary exchange. Under cost uncertainty over the externality, we show an efficient configuration of restrictions must balance the potential reduction in appropriation costs with the possibility of allocatively inefficient bargaining restrictions. For cases where the restrictions are contested, we show conditions for the continuing existence of welfare improvements. |
| 主题 | Coase theorem ; Bargaining restrictions ; Appropriation |
| URL | https://www.research-collection.ethz.ch/handle/20.500.11850/44829 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Energy Policy and Economics (Switzerland) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/266697 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | MacKenzie, Ian A.,Ohndorf, Markus. Restricted Coasean bargaining. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| eth-5013-01.pdf（1377KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
| eth-5013-01.jpg（3KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA |  浏览 | ||
| 文件名： | eth-5013-01.jpg |
| 格式： | JPEG |
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