| 来源类型 | Working papers |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Activists versus Captured Regulators | |
| Daubanes, Julien; Rochet, Jean-Charles | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-10 |
| 出版者 | CESifo |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze the consequences of activism in a regulated industry where the regulator has been captured by the industry. Unlike ordinary economic agents, activists are insensitive to monetary incentives. Moreover, they are less well informed than regulators and their actions generate dead-weight costs. Yet we find that activism may increase social welfare because it disciplines captured regulators and reduces the social cost of imperfect regulatory systems. |
| 主题 | Public regulation ; Regulatory capture ; Pro-industry bias ; Private politics ; Activism |
| URL | https://www.research-collection.ethz.ch/handle/20.500.11850/77991 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Energy Policy and Economics (Switzerland) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/266724 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daubanes, Julien,Rochet, Jean-Charles. Activists versus Captured Regulators. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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