| 来源类型 | Working papers
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| DOI | 10.3929/ethz-a-010797952
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| Adverse selection, commitment and exhaustible resource taxation |
| Ing, Julie
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| 发表日期 | 2016-12
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| 出版者 | ETH Zurich, Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH)
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| 出版年 | 2016
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | Governments design taxation schemes to capture resource rent. However, they usually propose contracts with limited duration and possess less information on the resources than the extractive firms do. This paper investigates how information asymmetry on costs andan inability to commit to long-term contracts affect tax revenue and the extraction path.This paper assumes that governments maximize the tax revenue contingent on the quantity extracted. This study gives several unconventional results. First, when information asymmetry exists, the inability to commit does not necessarily lower tax revenues. Second, under asymmetric information without commitment, an efficient firm may produce during the first period more or less than under symmetric information. Hence, the inability to commit has an ambiguous effect on optimal contract duration. Third, an increase in the discount factor may shift the extraction towards the first period which contradicts Hotelling’s rule. |
| 主题 | Resource taxation
; Asymmetric information
; Commitment
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| URL | https://www.research-collection.ethz.ch/handle/20.500.11850/123526
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| 来源智库 | Centre for Energy Policy and Economics (Switzerland)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/266772
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Ing, Julie. Adverse selection, commitment and exhaustible resource taxation. 2016.
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