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来源类型 | Report |
规范类型 | 报告 |
Transparency Issues with ACEA Agreement | |
Fred Wellington; Amanda Sauer; Philipp Mettler; Gabriela Grab Hartmann | |
发表日期 | 2005-03 |
出版年 | 2005 |
语种 | 英语 |
概述 | Executive SummaryThe ACEA Agreement is a voluntary agreement by the European automobile manufacturers association and the European Commission to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions rates of vehicles sold in the European Union to a fleet average of 140 grams of CO2 per kilometer (gCO2/km) by 2008. If the industry fails to meet the 2008 target, the Commission is expected to adopt formal regulations to reduce CO2 emissions from new passenger vehicles. Key findings Unfortunately for investors, two important aspects of the ACEA Agreement have not been disclosed to the public
We performed a basic cost analysis for two scenarios by which the industry could reach the 140 gCO2/km target in 2008. These two interpretations, including corporate average and uniform percent improvement approaches, capture the opposite extremes of how CO2 emissions reductions could be distributed throughout the industry. These approaches reflect the costs OEMs may face if they are serious about meeting the 2008 target, or will likely face under regulations should the industry fail to meet its commitment. OEMs face different ranges of possible cost exposures. BMW, PSA Peugeot Citröen, Fiat and DaimlerChrysler(DC) stand out as having the greatest variability in potential costs under the two scenarios analyzed. These scenarios could have very different implications for individual OEM’s capital expenditures. BMW and DC fair best under the uniform percent increase approach while fairing poorly in the corporate average approach. The opposite is true for Fiat and PSA. Without full disclosure of all relevant information about CO2 reduction strategies, investors in any of these OEMs could face unforeseen risk. Even without a formal mechanism within the ACEA Agreement, OEMs have committed to reaching the target as an industry and therefore should have a strategy to reduce the CO2 intensity of their fleet by 2008. However with the exception of BMW, neither these strategies, nor relevant data to support them, were disclosed in OEM’s 2003 annual reports. |
摘要 | The ACEA Agreement target in 2008 will entail costs for the industry that are likely to to distributed differently between the member companies. Yet these costs, along with their competitive implicatications, remain hidden from the public. |
主题 | Business |
标签 | emissions ; emissions inventories ; international climate policy ; low carbon |
区域 | Europe |
URL | https://www.wri.org/publication/transparency-issues-acea-agreement |
来源智库 | World Resources Institute (United States) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/27492 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Fred Wellington,Amanda Sauer,Philipp Mettler,et al. Transparency Issues with ACEA Agreement. 2005. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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