| 摘要 | ��
1. Research Purpose
This study starts from the point of view that the provisions of natural gas Sales and Purchase Agreement(SPA) imposes excessive economic risks on the part of the buyer. Natural gas SPA is typically signed over a long-term, for 20 years or longer, and often contains peculiar provisions such as take-or-pay(TOP) and destination clauses. For gas buyers like Korea, such contractual provisions are indeed thought to be unreasonable and inequitable, as they overly restrict the flexibility of gas imports.
Traditional perception on natural gas SPA, however, appears to be quite different from that of the buyer's. Typical view on TOP clause regards it an essential element for implementation of gas supply project, taking into account that the stable revenue stream it ensures helps raising fund for investment in gas production through project financing. Moreover, the commercial risks involved in natural gas SPA is often thought to be fairly divided between the contracting parties. Even in economics literature, it is difficult to come across the kind of view or work pointing out unfairness or inefficiency of the TOP contract. Rather, mainstream works seem to suggest positive roles or necessity of TOP clause.
In light of such reality, this work examines the effects of TOP contract and assesses risk-sharing between the contracting parties. It first shows that TOP clause entails inefficiency, by examining the effects of TOP clause on the determination of the contract price and import(delivered) quantity of the buyer. Then it discusses risks borne by each contracting party to revaluate the common assertion of risk-sharing between the buyer and the seller.
2. Major Findings
This report is structured as follows: After the introduction of this study in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 examines typical structure and provisions of a natural gas SPA, and discusses the methods of price-setting in liquefied natural gas(LNG) SPA. Chapter 3, after reviewing existing views and arguments regarding TOP clause, analyzes the inefficient effects of TOP clause on the contract price and import quantity. In Chapter 4, the appropriateness of risk-sharing between the buyer and the seller of gas SPA is discussed. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes with some discussions on future extensions.
3. Future Works
The model employed in this work is the first of its attempt to reflect the TOP clause and the make-up right. As such, it is rather coarse and can be refined in many ways. First, the time span of two-period can be expanded to show a more generalized intertemporal decision-making consideration. Second, including the carry-forward right in the model would allow an option to the buyer that can somewhat influence the TOP constraint. Through these extensions the analysis result can add more reality. Moreover, the discussions in the report of the appropriateness of risk-sharing between the buyer and the seller in a TOP contract could be formalized by a quantitative analysis.
65 pages., 41 refs., 5 figs, 1 tab. |
