| 摘要 | 1. Research Purpose
For the past two decades, the natural gas industry is increasingly the focus of attention of reformers in many countries. Following deregulation in the US and UK, similar reform have been made in other countries. It is frequently said that experiences of regulatory reform in these countries have provided a basis for some insight into our industry restructuring. Furthermore, it is also necessary to be aware of both its performance in countries that adopted effective competition policies and practical limitations when applied to our gas industry.
In view of the foregoing, this study closely examined the main contents of the effective competition policies of major countries for the gas industry dating back to the mid-1990s, their performances, and the various issues occurring during policy implementation and tried to draw suggestive conclusions in support of the progress of the gas industry's effective competition policy in the future.
To achieve the purpose of research, this study first looked into the background of introducing competition in the gas industry and the policy measures used in terms of market structure, conduct, and performance ditto as to how are several industrial environ- ments considered during policy making and implementation. The implementation of the competition policy, issues raised during policy execution, and countermeasures were also investigated.
2. Summary
Adopted by major countries in the 1990s, gas industry reform was based on some expectations of higher productivity, lower costs and prices, and better service, relative to previously regulated regimes, once the barriers to entry were eliminated. Nonetheless, there were also doubts on the outcomes of the competition policy, i.e., whether the policy could obtain the desired results in a short period. As such, competition authorities assess the market competitiveness using various methodologies in order to take if necessary corrective actions.
Though wide use of the existing method for assessing the abuse of market dominance by incumbents, it has a defect, i.e., it is unable to explain the behavior of market participants. Thus, the regulatory authorities of the countries that are currently promoting liberalization policies usually utilize dynamic monitoring methods that consolidate the multilateral aspects of the market.
As such, a review on the structural aspects including the issue on dominant incumbent in each sector within industry and problems of access to the essential facilities by the wholesale and retail sectors should be performed to figure out the progress of liberalization in the gas industries of major countries. Moreover, external factors including he diversity and scale of the market and nature of regulatory authorities should be considered together.
The US has very favorable conditions for liberalization, e.g., market size and diversity. Initiated to solve the supply surplus in the industry, the gas industry reform was completed as per Order 636 in 1992. Such order introduced competition into wholesale market through the unbundling of facilities and sale functions. A hub (market center) where domestic production infrastructure and many participants trade gas as well as capacity was established. The market center provides various services that used to be provided together with the bundled service by pipeline enterprises. The linkage between pipelines and various services for short-term imbalance are two key services. A well-developed market center translates into a pretty competitive US natural gas market.
Still, some experts expect the price instability caused by the shifts in demand and supply to result in the worsening market liquidity. The introduction of competition in the retail sector is also proceeding at a snail��s pace due to the minimal participation of consumers and enterprises.
In the UK, regulatory reform started with the regulatory authori- ties' investigation of the abuse of dominance by vertically integrat- ed incumbent. Its main contents include non-discriminative access to facilities, unbundling of facilities and sale, and release of gas to new players. Through such reform, the UK gas market has been transformed into a competitive market where all consumers can freely choose the supplier since 1998. Still, someone pointed out the somewhat large market shares of incumbents at the retail sector and possible increase in small consumer's price due to competition. Price volatility caused by domestic gas production decline and lack of facilities can also emerge as important issues. Nonetheless, facilities are being well expanded according to the market signals.
In Victoria, Australia where the industrial environments are different, gas industry restructuring is being promoted in preparation for public enterprises' privatization. The main contents of such restructuring include the unbundling of facilities and sale, well-designed gas release to new players, appointment of the public system operator to secure the impartiality of system operation, create wholesale market for transmission system operation, and come up with a reasonable capacity release. The Victoria case can be said to be a representative case wherein the competition system introduced in the gas industry is operating remarkably well and gas is supplied from one producer through a long-term contract.
In promoting internal gas market, EU demanded its member countries to change their respective gas industry into a competitive one in accordance with the Directive on gas market (Directive 1998/30/EC). In keeping with such Directive, Spain makes dominant incumbent provide certain gas to new players to enable them to secure market liquidity, sets the share limit on certain companies over facilities companies and promotes non-discrimina- tory access with transparent rules. Through its low gas reserves, Spain has institutionalized the competitive market earlier than other EU members through the well-design and implementation of competition policy based on a favorable LNG market situation as well as increasing demand by industrial and power sector.
Unlike Spain, dominant incumbent in Italy and France enjoying larger market shares, new players have difficulty participating in the market. Problems related to the introduction of competition in Italy and France include the existing long-term contracts that make new players' entry difficult and difficulty of newcomers in accessing facilities because the capacity of the importing facilities is connected to long-term contracts. Moreover, dominant incumbent deals only with management unbundling for sales and facilities thus making the entry of new players even harder. In addition, the low competitiveness enables consumers to buy gas from incumbent at a regulated price, thereby making the position of new participants tougher.
In Japan where gas companies operated vertically in monopoly service area, competition was introduced to lower gas prices since 1995. The government designed the large volume gas supplier system that gives large consumers the option to select gas supplier for large volume customers. With such system in place, gas demand increased abruptly in industrial sector and average selling unit price tended to drop as well in spite of the increase in import price. Still, some said that the benefits of cost reduction do not reach small consumers on whom regulations are imposed.
3. Research Results and Policy Suggestions
Based on the case study on major countries, industrial environ- ments will likely pose obstacles to introducing competition in the gas industry. The case study suggests that introducing competition requires designing deliberate pro-competition policy.
One of the obstacles to creating an effective competition is the issues of market power. In the case wherein the market has vertically integrated incumbent with a high market share through existing rigid long-term contracts, the strong commitment and fervor on the part of the regulatory authority and governments may be needed to introduce competition into the gas markets.
In other words, systematic support should be provided to help new participants secure the necessary gas and customers based on an effective gas release program. Incumbents should also be encouraged to make their sales information accessible to competitors and there is a need to develope awareness of the ability to switch suppliers and demand lower prices/improved services and the benefits of doing so. On the other hand, there should be effective unbundling between the transportation and supply functions to enable all shippers to receive the same treatment. In addition, proper incentive must be given to enable capacity increase through timely investment.
Facilitating the entry of new players first requires mandatory third party access on a non-discriminatory basis with transparent access rules. Second, the charges for transmission, storage, and LNG facilities should be regulated in the absence of competition. The market should also have an allocation procedure and a booking system to allow new entrants to secure capacity on an equal basis to the incumbents. Various measures to eliminate the inefficiency of facilities use can be a useful means of enabling new entrants to secure market share.
Aside from the structural conditions, there is a need to manage performance through monitoring at the stage competition starts in the market to maintain an effective competition. In the US and UK markets where have successfully introduced competition, its importance can be gleaned. Monitoring should include not only the price, demand, and supply of the wholesale market but the end consumer price's trend as well. |
