| 来源类型 | Research papers
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| Split Incentives in Building Energy Consumption |
| J. Y. Lee; C. H. Kim
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| 发表日期 | 2014-12-31
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| 出版年 | 2014
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | ABSTRACT
1. Research Purpose
The national policy for improving building energy efficiency has so far focused on increasing technical efficiency of building, whereas it lacks an integrative approach to make policies considering economic players�� activities and market structure. However, political attempt to resolve this problem is becoming more visible with a growing concern on market barriers and market failures which cause an energy efficiency gap.
One of the main market factors that decrease the energy efficiency of building is the principal-agent problem. Conflicts of interest between a principal and an agent arise, thereby coming into a disagreement on the common motivation to achieve energy efficiency and blocking the sharing of energy performance. This problem could make building owners reluctant to invest on energy efficiency and lead to the result that tenants stands all energy expenses. Conversely, energy could be over-consumed when they are not responsible for the expenses. Therefore, it is highly significant to analyze whether the principal-agent problem arises related with building energy efficiency, and if so, how much it prevails in reality.
This research conducts quantitative analysis on the effect of types of building ownership on energy efficiency problems. It is hard to verify the credibility of this kind of research because buildings show various and very complex energy usage patterns and there are not many reliable data available on them. But this research attempts to draw significant results by applying various methodologies.
2. Research Summary
Chapter 2 describes the importance of the analysis of market factors in studies of building energy efficiency. Particularly, it examines overall issues caused by the principal-agent problem and presents a literature review of previous studies.
Chapter 3 quantitatively analyzes the gap of energy efficiency between house owners and tenants by utilizing the Householding Energy Standing Survey. Firstly, the results from the first analysis model show that there exists a significant gap of energy usage efficiency between owners and renters in the case of using a gas boiler in detached houses. Secondly, the results from a degree-day adjusted final energy intensity model under heteroscedasticity prove that energy usage of house owners is higher than that of renters.
Chapter 4 analyzes energy efficiency gap between office buildings in the commercial sector. Firstly, the amount of the initial investment in heating for buildings was investigated depending on the types of ownership of a building, but the results indicate that there is no statistically significant difference. However, a final energy intensity model confirms that there exists a significant difference between private and corporative ownerships.
Chapter 5 examines the current status of the national policies for building energy efficiency and suggests desirable directions for future energy policy. In addition, it discusses the effectiveness of the policies that consider market factors by looking at the case of the United States.
3. Policy Suggestions
This research is expected to be provided as a reference for policy-making to solve the principal-agent problem. However, there still remain many agendas regarding the details of what types of regulations or incentives the government offers to the interested parties.
Particularly, it is vital to think out whether the phenomenon of asymmetric information actually happens. In other words, it might be impractical to assume that tenants do not know any information about energy efficiency of buildings when they sign the contract. If the assumption is wrong, the principal-agent problem will not arise. This opinion may be seen as conflicting with the results of this research. From the argument, we can conclude that although the incompleteness of the information is hard to be seen in reality, it can come into effect in the market given the factors such as a low level of energy costs and a short lease period. Therefore, policy makers should take these limitations into consideration and should also regulate building owners to effectively improve building energy efficiency.
It is hard to build a reliable model with respect to building energy issues due to a variety of technical and social factors to be considered. Future research is expected to obtain more concrete findings through integrative and multidimensional analysis. |
| URL | http://www.keei.re.kr/web_keei/en_publish.nsf/by_report_year/96BCDC1F53C0E5DB49257E11002680FE?OpenDocument
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| 来源智库 | Korea Energy Economics Institute (Republic of Korea)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/322855
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
J. Y. Lee,C. H. Kim. Split Incentives in Building Energy Consumption. 2014.
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