| 摘要 | Summary
One year since a diplomatic crisis split the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia have maintained neutral positions towards the feud. In light of deepening ties between the Maghreb and GCC states—and the pressure by some Gulf regimes on their allies to choose sides—the Maghreb’s neutrality has been particularly notable. The ability of Maghreb governments to stay out of the crossfire of the intra-GCC conflict demonstrates pragmatism and confidence as well as the limits of GCC influence in the Maghreb. The stakes were different for each Maghreb country in pursuing neutrality on the Gulf rift. At stake for Morocco were billions of dollars in aid and investment promised by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as well as diplomatic support for Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara, Rabat’s top foreign policy priority. For cash-strapped Tunisia, Gulf aid and investment are critical, but aligning with either side in the Gulf dispute would have jeopardized its single most important political achievement in the post-Ben Ali era—the political compromise between the Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes parties. Algeria’s financial independence and mistrust of external intervention has made it the least susceptible to GCC intervention and influence. Conflict-torn Libya is an outlier, and for the foreseeable future will continue to be an arena for GCC intervention and proxy struggles. Gulf Arab-Maghreb ties will continue to matter for both sides. The Maghreb will continue to be dependent on Gulf aid and investment, and the Gulf will look to maintain strategic ties with its Maghreb partners. But moving forward, those ties will be shaped more by pragmatism and self-interest than political or ideological cohesion.
Introduction
Rather than succumb to the pressure of declaring allegiance to one side or the other, however, Maghreb governments have navigated a neutral course while protecting their national interests
GCC Engagement in the Maghreb
For Maghreb governments and political actors, newfound attention from Gulf Arab states carried rewards and risks.
The stakes are different for each Maghreb country in pursuing neutrality on the Gulf rift.
Balancing Converging and Diverging Interests
Morocco’s Surprising Balance
Given the depth and importance of Morocco’s ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE in particular, its neutrality in the Qatar dispute was surprising.
Qatar’s potential to play a balancing role to Morocco’s dependence on Saudi Arabia and the UAE, especially as a source of investment and energy partner, gives Morocco an incentive to maintain neutrality in the Gulf feud.
10
11
12
13
14
15
All sides have to balance tensions and occasionally adopt tactical measures to compensate for strategic differences.
16
17
18
Tunisia’s Compromise
19
20
21
22
Aligning with either side in the Gulf dispute would have jeopardized Tunisia’s single most important political achievement in the post-Ben Ali era— the political compromise between Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes.
While political and social cleavages still run deep in Tunisia, external forces will find it difficult to exploit these differences to promote their own independent agendas as long as the political compromise built by Tunisia’s political leadership endures.
23
Algeria’s Steady Position
Algeria’s financial independence and mistrust of external intervention made it the least susceptible to GCC intervention and influence.
24
25
Investment has muted Algeria’s opposition to what it sees as external Gulf intervention in its neighborhood, primarily in Libya and the Sahel.
26
27
28
29
30
Libya Divided
31
Libya will need a moment of Gulf consensus similar to their brief alignment against Qaddafi in 2011 to help bridge Libya’s many fault lines and move actors toward political compromise.
Implications
By taking a neutral stand on the Gulf feud, Maghreb governments have displayed a growing confidence in their stability, and they have become more assertive in promoting their national interests.
Other Arab countries have not possessed the same leverage as Maghreb governments to chart a neutral position.
32
Looking Forward
For Gulf Arab regimes, the Maghreb’s strategic importance has not waned.
How Maghreb states manage greater GCC engagement in Africa in particular will become another important factor shaping bilateral relations.
Endnotes
1. Bahrain and Egypt joined the UAE and Saudi Arabia in breaking ties with Qatar. See Jon Gambrell, “Arab nations cut ties with Qatar in new Mideast crisis,” Associated Press, June 5, 2017, https://apnews.com/8257ce650e224188a1884e34eabb5e90. 2. Although Libyan factions pledged support for their patrons, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco have all maintained their neutrality. See Youssef Cherif, “Everyone is taking sides in the Qatar crisis. Here’s why these four North African states aren’t,” Washington Post, September 7, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/09/07/everyone-is-taking-sides-in-the-qatar-crisis-heres-why-these-four-north-african-states-arent/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6f73d0ce5053. 3. See Carolyn Barnett, “GCC-Maghreb Relations in a Changing Regional Order,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 14, 2013, https://www.csis.org/analysis/gcc-maghreb-relations-changing-regional-order. 4. Haim Malka, “Maghreb Rising: Competition and Realignment,” Rocky Harbors: Taking Stock of the Middle East in 2015, ed. Jon B. Alterman (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies and Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), https://www.csis.org/analysis/rocky-harbors. 5. Although Algeria has historically taken a more hawkish position on OPEC production levels than Gulf Arab producers, its interest in keeping oil prices stable has fostered greater cooperation in the last year since early 2017. The oil production agreement largely negotiated by Saudi Arabia and Russia became effective on January 1, 2017 and was extended through 2018. See Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, “OPEC 171st Meeting Concludes,” November 30, 2016, http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/press_room/3912.htm and Alex Lawler, Rania El Gamal, and Shadia Nasralla, “OPEC, Russia Agree Oil Cut Extension to End of 2018,” Reuters, December 1, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-opec-meeting/opec-russia-agree-oil-cut-extension-to-end-of-2018-idUSKBN1DU0WW. 6. The Islamic Development Bank, based in Saudi Arabia, has also been an important source of loans to Morocco. See Islamic Development Bank, “Where we work: Morocco,” https://www.isdb.org/country/morocco. 7. “Morocco Approves Military Agreement with Saudi Arabia,” Xinhua News Agency, March 25, 2016, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-03/25/c_135220903.htm, citing an article from the Moroccan newspaper Al-Massae. 8. In 2016 Qatari FDI in Morocco jumped to more than 1.15 billion MAD from 790 million MAD the previous year. See Ministry of Economy and Finance of the Kingdom of Morocco, “Balance of Payments: First nine months of 2016,” September 2016, http://www.oc.gov.ma/portal/sites/default/files/stat-echange-exterieur/Publications%20Statistiques/Brochure_BP_Septembre_2016_0.pdf. Cited in Intissar Fakir, “Caught in the Middle: As the Qatar Crisis Worsens, Morocco is Struggling to Remain Neutral,” Carnegie Middle East Center, July 10, 2017, http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/71469. 9. Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane made several official visits to Doha during his tenure. See “Morocco’s Govt. Head Holds Talks with Qatar’s PM in Doha,” Agence Marocaine de Presse, March 6, 2017, http://www.mapnews.ma/en/top-news/politics/moroccos-govt-head-holds-talks-qatars-pm-doha. 10. See “Qatar Petroleum Seeks International Projects in Cyprus, Morocco: CEO,” Reuters, February 6, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-qatar-petroleum/qatar-petroleum-seeks-international-projects-in-cyprus-morocco-ceo-idUSKBN15L16M. See also Indrajit Sen, “Qatar on Course to Win Morocco LNG Supply Deal,” Arabian Oil and Gas, July 18, 2016, http://www.arabianoilandgas.com/article-15934-qatar-on-course-to-win-morocco-lng-supply-deal/. 11. Qatar Petroleum has bought a 30 percent stake in Chevron’s deepwater offshore exploration license in Morocco. See Office National des Hydrocarbures et des Mines (ONHYM), “Qatar Petroleum and Chevron Announce Agreement for Exploration in Offshore Deepwater Blocks in Morocco,” February 7, 2016, http://www.onhym.com/en/releases/403-qatar-petroleum-and-chevron-announce-agreement-for-exploration-in-offshore-deepwater-blocks-in-morocco.html. 12. Mohammad Shoeb, “QIIB set to open two more branches this year,” The Peninsula, May 23, 2018, https://thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/23/05/2018/QIIB-set-to-open-two-more-branches-this-year. 13. Mohammed Ghobari and Mohammed Mukhashaf, “Moroccan F-16 jet from Saudi-led coalition in Yemen crashes,” Reuters, May 11, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security/moroccan-f-16-jet-from-saudi-led-coalition-in-yemen-crashes-idUSKBN0NW0SQ20150511?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews. 14. See “Morocco withdraws from the Arab Coalition Forces in Yemen,” Middle East Monitor, April 16, 2018, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180416-morocco-withdraws-from-the-arab-coalition-forces-in-yemen/. 15. “Morocco offers to mediate Qatar-GCC crisis,” Al Jazeera, June 11, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/morocco-offers-mediate-qatar-gcc-crisis-170611190417048.html. 16. Anthony Harwood, “Betraying Morocco, Saudis Back Trump for World Cup 2026,” The New Arab, May 8, 2018, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2018/5/9/betraying-morocco-saudis-back-trump-for-world-cup-2026. 17. See for example Intissar Fakir, “Caught in the Middle.” 18. “Morocco severs ties with Iran, accusing it of backing Polisario Front,” Reuters, May 1, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-morocco-iran/morocco-severs-ties-with-iran-accusing-it-of-backing-polisario-front-idUSKBN1I23VF. 19. Amiri Diwan of the State of Qatar, “HH The Amir Speech at the International Conference on Supporting the Economy and Investment in Tunisia,” November 29, 2016, https://www.diwan.gov.qa/briefing-room/speeches-and-remarks/2016/november/29/sp_tunisiaconference?sc_lang=en. 20. International Monetary Fund, “Tunisia IMF Country Report 17/203,” July 2017, 48, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2017/07/10/Tunisia-First-Review-Under-the-Extended-Fund-Facility-Request-for-Waivers-of-NonObservance-45061. 21. “Qatari investments in Tunisia reach $1bn,” Middle East Monitor, November 14, 2017, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20171114-qatari-investments-in-tunisia-reach-1bn/. 22. International Monetary Fund, “Tunisia IMF Country Report 17/203,” July 2017, 20, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2017/07/10/Tunisia-First-Review-Under-the-Extended-Fund-Facility-Request-for-Waivers-of-NonObservance-45061. 23. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Tunisia Signs $500 Million Loan Guarantee Agreement With The United States,” June 3, 2016, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0476.aspx. 24. Jacques Roussellier, “Disjointed Gulf-Maghreb Cooperation,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 18, 2018, http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/75301; Julia McQuaid, Alexander Thurston, Pamela Faber, David Knoll, and Jacob Stoil, “The Same, Yet Different: United States and Gulf State Interests in the Post-Arab Spring Maghreb,” CNA Analysis and Solutions, February 2017, 21, https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/DOP-2016-U-014233-1Rev.pdf. 25. “Dubai’s Dodsal wins deal for $1.1bn Algeria gas project,” Arabian Business, June 25, 2017, http://www.arabianbusiness.com/dubai-s-dodsal-wins-deal-for-1-1bn-algeria-gas-project-678227.html. 26. See David D. Kirkpatrick and Eric Schmitt, “Arab Nations Strike in Libya, Surprising U.S.,” New York Times, August 25, 2014,https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/26/world/africa/egypt-and-united-arab-emirates-said-to-have-secretly-carried-out-libya-airstrikes.html. 27. According to the UN Panel of Experts on Libya, Qatar shipped at least 40 tons of weapons via Tunisia to revolutionary factions in Libya. See United Nations Security Council, “Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Libya Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011),” June 01, 2017, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2017/466. 28. On Saudi activity in Mali, see Jack Watling and Paul Raymond, “The Struggle for Mali,” The Guardian, November 25, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/25/the-struggle-for-mali. 29. The G-5 Sahel Cross-Border Joint Force comprises approximately 5,000 troops from Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad. It is aimed at combatting common terrorist and criminal threats in the Sahel region. The force was launched in July 2017 with the backing of France and endorsed by the African Union and UN Security Council. See Jennifer Cooke and Boris Toucas, “Understanding the G5 Sahel Joint Force: Fighting Terror, Building Regional Security?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 15, 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-g5-sahel-joint-force-fighting-terror-building-regional-security. 30. UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, “UAE reaffirms commitment to support G5 Sahel Joint Force,” February 25, 2018, https://www.mofa.gov.ae/EN/MediaCenter/News/Pages/25-02-2018-UAE-Sahel-States.aspx and John Irish, “Saudi-backed military alliance to help G5 Sahel fight: minister,” Reuters, December 14, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-security-sahel-saudi/saudi-backed-military-alliance-to-help-g5-sahel-fight-minister-idUSKBN1E81IH. 31. In June 2017, the eastern-based House of Representatives, associated with Khalifa Haftar, officially cut ties with Qatar. “Libya’s eastern-based government cuts diplomatic ties with Qatar,” Reuters, June 5, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-libya-idUSKBN18W11M. 32. See International Crisis Group, “Somalia and the Gulf Crisis,” Report No. 260, June 5, 2018, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/260-somalia-and-gulf-crisis. |
