| 摘要 | Summary
Introduction
Water trends both illustrate and exacerbate tensions between citizens and governments at a time of heightened social protest and discontent in the region.
Dwindling Supply
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Rising Demand
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Maghreb governments are now confronted with the need to balance the competing priorities of protecting valuable water resources and promoting economic expansion and job creation.
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Balancing Economic Growth and Water Management
The fact that many of these sectors are either state-owned or closely held by ruling elites threatens to stoke public anger and drive a deeper wedge between citizens and the state.
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Almost 70 percent of treated water in Morocco is currently used on golf courses, which require vast amounts of water, compared to just 12 percent on agriculture and 16 percent on industry.
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Without a stable government in place...Libya’s water supply will continue to be hostage to political conflict.
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Water and Social Protest
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Given water’s fundamental importance and symbolism, any actions by state authorities or economic elites that violate water availability or quality could trigger public outrage and protest.
Unequal access to water between coastal and interior regions compounds perceptions of geographic inequality in terms of socioeconomic status and development.
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Other protests highlight popular mobilization against perceived elite interests, an issue that intersects with water debates and protests.
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Government Strategies and Policy Responses
Each government is addressing the problem in a different way.
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One opportunity for Morocco to make strides in efficiency lies in expanding wastewater treatment
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Tunisia’s post-revolutionary governments have been largely compelled to respond to acute water emergencies but more recently have started developing a longer-term vision for water development.
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Moving forward, every government in the Maghreb will be compelled to spend more resources on infrastructure, water transportation, and waste management, while also minimizing the negative impact of climate change, pollution, and increasing demand on their valuable water resources.
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Looking Forward
Now, governments must rethink water’s role in the contested relationship between citizens and the state, while the problems are still manageable.
Endnotes
1. Jon Alterman and Michael Dziuban, “Clear Gold: Water as a Strategic Resource in the Middle East,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 13, 2010, https://www.csis.org/analysis/clear-gold-water-strategic-resource-middle-east. 2. Article 31 of Morocco’s 2011 constitution stipulates that the state and public institutions work to mobilize all available resources for citizens to enjoy the right to equal access to water and to live in a healthy environment. See Ministry of Justice of the Kingdom of Morocco, “Constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco,” June 17, 2011, http://www.chambredesrepresentants.ma/sites/default/files/documents/constitution_marocaine_2011-ar.pdf. 3. Article 44 of Tunisia’s 2014 constitution states that “the right to water shall be guaranteed” and that “the conservation and rational use of water is a duty of the state and of society.” Article 45 includes that “the state guarantees the right to a healthy and balanced environment and the right to participate in the protection of the climate. The state shall provide the necessary means to eradicate pollution of the environment.” See “Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia,” Via Al Bawsala, January 26, 2014, https://majles.marsad.tn/uploads/documents/TnConstit_final_1.pdf. 4. The Middle East and North Africa is the most water scarce region in the world. See World Bank, Beyond Scarcity: Water Security in the Middle East and North Africa, World Bank MENA Development Series, 2018, xxv, http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/water/publication/beyond-scarcity-water-security-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa. 5. David J. Wrathall, Jamon Van Den Hoek, Alex Walters, and Alan Devenish, “Water stress and human migration: a global, georeferenced review of empirical research,” Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2018, 1, http://www.fao.org/3/I8867EN/i8867en.pdf. 6. Andrew Maddocks, Robert Samuel Young, and Paul Reig, “Ranking the World’s Most Water-Stressed Countries in 2040,” World Resources Institute, August 26, 2015, http://www.wri.org/blog/2015/08/ranking-world%E2%80%99s-most-water-stressed-countries-2040. 7. See Beyond Scarcity. 8. Rainwater is expected to decline by 10 percent in the region and demand for water is expected to rise by 60 percent by 2050. See Hafez Ghanem, “Agriculture and Rural Development for Inclusive Growth and Food Security in Morocco,” The Brookings Institution, Global Economy and Development, Working Paper 82, February 2015, 14, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Agriculture_WEB_Revised.pdf. 9. Illegal drilling into aquifers depletes additional water and damages supply. Withdrawals from Algeria’s Northwestern Sahara Aquifer are estimated at 2.5 billion cubic meters per year, while replenishment is estimated at around 1 billion cubic meters per year. See “Algeria: A Desert Nation Fighting to Maintain Water Supplies,” Stratfor Worldview, January 20, 2016, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/algeria-desert-nation-fighting-maintain-water-supplies. 10. Desalination production capacity has grown substantially in Algeria, from less than 50,000 cubic meters per day in 2002 to over 2 million cubic meters per day in 2015. See “Algeria: A Desert Nation.” In Morocco, desalination production in 2010 was only 30,000 cubic meters per day. But in July 2017, it was announced that Spanish company Abengoa would build the world’s largest desalination plant there, with a capacity of up to 450,000 cubic meters per day. See Chantel McGrath, “Renewable Desalination Market Analysis: Oceania, South Africa, Middle East & North Africa,” ProDes Project, April 2010, http://www.prodes-project.org/fileadmin/Files/Export_Market_Analysis.pdf and “Morocco to Build World’s Largest Desalination Plant,” North Africa Post, August 7, 2017, http://northafricapost.com/19201-morocco-build-world-largest-desalination-plant.html. Meanwhile, Tunisia just opened its first desalination plant in May 2018. See Maher Chaabane, “La station de dessalement d’eau de mer de Djerba entre en exploitation,” Webdo.tn, May 3, 2018, http://www.webdo.tn/2018/05/03/station-de-dessalement-deau-de-mer-de-djerba-entre-exploitation/. 11. For energy producers, desalination costs can be manageable, but for Morocco, which imports nearly 90 percent of its energy needs, this is a significant cost. See U.S. Department of Commerce, “Morocco – Energy,” Export.gov, October 25, 2017, https://www.export.gov/article?id=Morocco-Energy. 12. Improper brine disposal, a desalination byproduct, poses a hazard to marine ecosystems. Technology exists to mitigate the negative impact but is not always used. See Heather Cooley, Newsha Ajami, and Matthew Keberger, “Key Issues in Seawater Desalination in California: Marine Impacts,” Pacific Institute, December 2013, http://pacinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/desal-marine-imapcts-full-report.pdf. 13. In Morocco, water resources per capita hovered around 2,200 cubic meters in 1962, compared to 843 in 2014; Tunisia saw a decrease from 1,073 cubic meters in 1962 to 410 in 2015; and Algeria’s per capita availability sank from 998 in 1962 to just 294 in 2014; Libya’s availability in 2014 was the lowest at 115 cubic meters, compared to 455 in 1962. See Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, “AQUASTAT,” http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/data/query/index.html. 14. See World Bank, “Population, total,” 2016, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=MA-LY-DZ-TN. 15. According to a recent World Bank report, 80 percent of water withdrawals in the Middle East and North Africa are for agricultural purposes, which is higher than the global average of 70 percent for agriculture. See World Bank, Beyond Scarcity, 46. 16. See World Bank, “Agriculture, value added (% of GDP),” 2016, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS?locations=MA-DZ-TN; and World Bank, “Employment in agriculture (% of total employment) (modeled ILO estimate),” 2017, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS?locations=MA-TN-DZ. 17. See World Bank, “Agriculture, value added (% of GDP),” 2016, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS?locations=MA-DZ-TN; and World Bank, “Employment in agriculture (% of total employment) (modeled ILO estimate),” 2017, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS?locations=MA-TN-DZ. 18. See World Bank, “Urban population (% of total),” 2016, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS?locations=TN-MA-DZ-LY. 19. Tunisian Ministry of Development, Investment, and International Cooperation, “Plan de Développement,” http://www.tunisie.gov.tn/uploads/Document/02/978_445_Plan-developpement_2016_2020.pptx. 20. The IRDP targets agriculture, infrastructure, micro-trades, and crafts. Tunisian Ministry of Development, Investment, and International Cooperation, “Plan de Développement,” http://www.tunisie.gov.tn/uploads/Document/02/978_445_Plan-developpement_2016_2020.pptx; “Tunisia starts third phase of national development plan,” Xinhua News Agency, April 17, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-04/18/c_137118397.htm. 21. Tunisian Ministry of Development, Investment, and International Cooperation, “Le Programme de Développement Intégré (PDI),” http://www.cgdr.nat.tn/fr/index.php?rub=260&srub=318. 22. Before 2011, tourism accounted for 6.5 percent of Tunisia’s GDP, but it then dropped dramatically after a wave of terrorist attacks and political uncertainty. Today, tourism revenue has started rebounding, bouncing back to 6.9 percent in 2017. See: Tim Cocks and Tarek Amara, “Interview: Tunisia’s tourist revenues to halve in 2011: minister,” Reuters, June 15, 2011, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tunisia-tourism/interview-tunisia-tourist-revenues-to-halve-in-2011-minister-idUSTRE75E4EW20110615; Travel & Tourism Economic Impact 2017 Tunisia, World Travel & Tourism Council, 2017, https://www.wttc.org/-/media/files/reports/economic-impact-research/countries-2017/tunisia2017.pdf. 23. “Moroccan authorities target diversification to secure long-term economic growth,” Oxford Business Group, 2018, https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/transition-phase-authorities-target-diversification-secure-long-term-growth-0. 24. Aziz E Yaakoubi, “Gulf states to invest over $730 million in tourism infrastructure in Morocco,” Reuters, April 1, 2014, https://af.reuters.com/article/moroccoNews/idAFL5N0MT4EC20140401. 25. “Tourism sector in Morocco emphasizes diversification and improved air connectivity,” Oxford Business Group, 2016, https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/regional-leader-sector-plan-emphasises-diversification-offering-improved-air-connectivity-and. 26. “Morocco Works to Solve Agricultural Challenges Posed by a Constrained Water Supply,” in The Report: Morocco 2016, Oxford Business Group, 2016, https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/analysis/drop-drop-solving-challenges-posed-constrained-water-supply. 27. Oil prices dropped by nearly 70 percent between the summer of 2014 and the beginning of 2016. See “Despite low oil prices, Algeria invests in its untapped energy potential,” Oxford Business Group, 2016, https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/ready-more-despite-current-climate-low-oil-prices-country-investing-its-vast-untapped-potential. 28. The government also seeks to double the production of potatoes and expand irrigation by 700,000 hectares from 2018 to 2019. See Hamid Ould Ahmed, “Algeria to open farming concessions to foreigners: document,” Reuters, May 7, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-algeria-farming/algeria-to-open-farming-concessions-to-foreigners-document-idUSKBN1I81WH. 29. “Plumbing the Sahara,” The Economist, March 11, 2011, https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2011/03/11/plumbing-the-sahara. 30. Kieran Cooke, “Trouble ahead for Gaddafi’s Great Man-Made River,” Middle East Eye, December 28, 2016, http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/trouble-great-man-made-river-1331047422. 31. Cooke, “Trouble ahead.” 32. “Rapport de l’Observatoire Social Tunisien Mars 2018,” Forum Tunisien pour les Droites Economiques et Sociaux, May 15, 2018, https://ftdes.net/ar/ost-rapport-mars-2018-des-mouvements-sociaux/. 33. Aida Alami, “Protests erupt in Morocco over fish vendor’s death in a garbage compactor,” New York Times, October 30, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/31/world/middleeast/protests-erupt-in-morocco-over-fish-vendors-death-in-garbage-compactor.html. 34. Intissar Kherigi, “Local elections in Tunisia: The last hope for real change,” Middle East Eye, October 21, 2017, http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/local-elections-tunisia-last-hope-real-change-1511501287. 35. See World Bank, “People using safely managed drinking water services, urban (% of urban population),” 2015, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.H2O.SMDW.UR.ZS?locations=MA&name_desc=true; and World Bank, “People using safely managed drinking water services, rural (% of rural population),” 2015, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.H2O.SMDW.RU.ZS?locations=MA&name_desc=true. 36. Abdellah Ouardirhi, “Ouezzane: vives tensions entre citoyens et autorités à cause du manque d’eau,” H24 avec Le Figaro, July 20, 2017, https://www.h24info.ma/maroc/ouezzane-vives-tensions-entre-citoyens-autorites-a-cause-de-khardala/. 37. The National Office of Drinking Water had been charging residents “connection fees” for access to the network of drinking water. Local sources claimed that it cost 3,700 dirhams per household ($389). In a region where the per capita expenditure is estimated at 11,745 dirhams (approx. $1,230), this would be a huge expense. See “Le HCP dévoile les résultats de l’enquête nationale sur «la consommation et les dépenses des ménages»,” Aujourd’hui le Maroc, October 28, 2016, http://aujourdhui.ma/economie/le-hcp-devoile-les-resultats-de-lenquete-nationale-sur-la-consommation-et-les-depenses-des-menages; and “Violentes manifestations dans la région de Beni Mellal pour l’accès à l’eau potable,” Bladi.net, July 29, 2017, https://www.bladi.net/violentes-manifestations-dans-la-region-de-beni-mellal-pour-l-acces-a,49032.html. 38. “Violentes manifestations dans la région de Beni Mellal.” 39. Sophie Nunnally, “In Zagora, Morocco, residents never know when water will flow so they leave the taps on,” USA Today, April 5, 2018, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2018/04/05/morocco-water-shortage/465498002/. 40. “Water shortages parch Moroccan towns, prompt protests,” News24, November 5, 2017, https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/water-shortages-parch-moroccan-towns-prompt-protests-20171105. 41. “Vidéo. Après la police de l’environnement, voici la police de l’eau,” H24 avec Le Figaro, December 20, 2017, https://www.h24info.ma/maroc/video-apres-police-de-lenvironnement-voici-police-de-leau/. 42. Souhail Karam, “In Morocco Boycott, Anger, Layoffs and Bloated Udders,” Bloomberg, May 29, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-29/danone-cuts-milk-purchases-in-morocco-as-boycott-gathers-pace. 43. “Morocco Consumer Boycott has Big Business in its Sights,” Reuters, May 30, 2018, https://uk.reuters.com/article/morocco-protests/morocco-consumer-boycott-has-big-business-in-its-sights-idUKL5N1SP35Z. 44. One minister of the PJD resigned his post after attending a rally in support of workers of Centrale Danone who were hurt by the boycott. “Moroccan minister resigns over consumer boycott move,” Reuters, June 6, 2018, https://in.reuters.com/article/morocco-politics/corrected-moroccan-minister-resigns-over-consumer-boycott-move-idINKCN1J232G. 45. “Tunisia phosphate exports halted by job protests,” Middle East Monitor, February 16, 2018, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180216-tunisia-phosphate-exports-halted-by-job-protests/. 46. By August 2016, agricultural losses from the shortages were reportedly as high as $900 million. See “Tunisia: Water scarcity hits country, people called to pray for rain,” The North Africa Post, September 21, 2016, http://northafricapost.com/14163-tunisia-water-scarcity-hits-country-people-called-pray-rain.html. 47. Borzou Daragahi, “Environmental movement blocks fracking in Algeria’s remote south,” Financial Times, March 9, 2015, https://www.ft.com/content/db622d4c-c0f6-11e4-88ca-00144feab7de. 48. Karim Zeidane, “Algerie: L’annonce de l’exploitation du gaz de schiste réveille les tensions à In Saleh,” Le360afrique.com, October 4, 2017, http://afrique.le360.ma/algerie/politique/2017/10/04/15540-algerie-lannonce-de-lexploitation-du-gaz-de-schiste-reveille-les-tensions-salah-15540. 49. Lamine Chikhi, “Algeria’s Sonatrach hopes for Exxon Mobil deal on shale gas,” Reuters, May 24, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-algeria-energy/algerias-sonatrach-hopes-for-exxon-mobil-deal-on-shale-gas-idUSKCN1IP369. 50. Fatma ben Hmad, “La crise de l’eau en Afrique du Nord, une bataille incontournable,” Jeune Afrique, November 30, 2017, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/485651/politique/la-crise-de-leau-en-afrique-du-nord-une-bataille-incontournable/. 51. A. Allia, “Annaba: La crise de l’eau persiste,” Liberte-Algerie, September 3, 2017, https://www.liberte-algerie.com/actualite/annaba-la-crise-de-leau-persiste-276581. 52. Aidan Lewis, “Libya: Residents in Tripoli drill through pavements in desperate bid to find water,” The Independent, October 28, 2017, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/libyans-dig-water-well-test-for-tripoli-residents-a8024646.html. 53. “Protests erupt as Libya plant closes on lack of chemicals,” International Desalination Association, August 16, 2017, https://www.desalination.biz/news/0/Protests-erupt-as-Libya-plant-closes-on-lack-of-chemicals/8820/. 54. Government of the Kingdom of Morocco, “Maroc: Contribution Déterminée Au Niveau National Dans Le Cadre De La CCNUCC,” September 16, 2018, http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/PublishedDocuments/Morocco%20First/Morocco%20First%20NDC.pdf. 55. Ibid., 4. 56. According to one report in the Moroccan press the plan has created 250,000 jobs since 2008 and boosted agricultural exports by 65 percent. See Kawtar Tali, “La stratégie agricole boucle sa première décennie : Plan Maroc Vert, 10 ans déjà,” Aujourd’hui Le Maroc, April 24, 2018, http://aujourdhui.ma/economie/la-strategie-agricole-boucle-sa-premiere-decennie-plan-maroc-vert-10-ans-deja. 57. There are already more than 25 golf courses endorsed by Morocco’s Ministry of Tourism according to the official English language website for Moroccan tourism powered by the National Tourist Office. See “One of the world’s best places to play golf,” Much Morocco, http://www.muchmorocco.com/experiences/golf/. 58. “Morocco, Kingdom of Golf,” Morocco’s Ministry of Tourism, http://igtm.wtm.com/__novadocuments/36904?v=635140891236200000&v=635140891236200000. 59. Algeria and Tunisia treat 40 percent and 80 percent of wastewater, respectively. See Beyond Scarcity. 60. Other challenges include institutional barriers and cost recovery. See Beyond Scarcity, 15. 61. “Technological innovation helps with Tunisia’s dry agricultural climate,” Oxford Business Group, June 1, 2017, https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/analysis/preparation-and-innovation-drier-conditions-are-being-met-technological-innovations. 62. Government of the Republic of Tunisia, “Tunisia – Intended Nationally Determined Contribution,” August 2015, http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/PublishedDocuments/Tunisia%20First/INDC-Tunisia-English%20Version.pdf. 63. “Algeria: A Desert Nation.” 64. Government of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, “The People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria: Intended Nationally Determined Contribution,” September 3, 2015 http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/PublishedDocuments/Algeria%20First/Algeria%20-%20INDC%20(English%20unofficial%20translation)%20September%2003,2015.pdf. |
