| 摘要 | THE ISSUE
The Trump administration’s proposed 2020 budget is not a masterpiece for missile defense. Its actions are inadequate to the challenge of complex and integrated air and missile attack from major powers and therefore insufficiently aligned with the National Defense Strategy.
The budget’s principal shortcoming is the failure to prioritize a space sensor layer, a critical capability for the birth-to- death tracking of hypersonic glide vehicles and ballistic missile threats.
The modest funding for space sensors is largely confined to the repetition of studies and analysis that have already been done. Further delays are likely by transferring the payload development to the nascent Space Development Agency.
Both the top line for the Missile Defense Agency and the percent of funds for research and development of advanced technology continue to decline.
Army and Navy budgets included several important investments to bolster air and missile defense.
At the review’s release, President Trump declared the “beginning of a new era in our missile defense program,” setting a goal to “detect and destroy any missile launched against the United States—anywhere, anytime, anyplace.”3 Unfortunately, neither the modest language of the Missile Defense Review nor the activities and funding levels in the proposed 2020 budget come anywhere close to achieving that goal. They specifically lack the programmatic and budgetary muscle movements to contribute meaningfully to overall U.S. deterrence and defense goals in relation to Russia and China. The Missile Defense Review nominally widens the scope of missile defense policy from a focus on ballistic missiles to countering the full spectrum of missile threats. Yet these new policy and budget proposals remain remarkably consistent with the program of record that preexisted the National Defense Strategy. Apart from steps within the services for incremental improvements to air defenses and some studies on countering hypersonic glide vehicles, the focus remains on the limited ballistic missile threats posed by otherwise weak rogue regimes. Too little attention is given to the threat of complex and integrated missile attacks from major powers like Russia and China. Shortcomings of the 2020 proposal include: Low funding levels for a space-based sensor layer, primarily confined to the repetition of past studies, and its relocation to the Space Development Agency; A declining topline for the Missile Defense Agency (MDA); Insufficient research and development of advanced technology, with continued decline in future years; Nearly nonexistent adaptation of the current interceptor families or new interceptor development to counter more advanced missile threats; and The apparent decision to significantly delay development of volume kill capability.
Accelerated funding for the Army’s new Patriot radar;
Initial procurement of Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD);
New interceptor development for the Army to counter future ballistic missile threats;
A larger and faster airframe for the multi-mission Standard Missile-6 (SM-6);
Rapid acquisition of Iron Dome for near-term cruise missile defense and the restructuring of the Indirect Fires Protection Capability (IFPC);
A new directed energy program, the Neutral Particle Beam, and continued focus on laser scaling;
Continued interoperability improvements for THAAD and Patriot; and
Upgrades to the Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communication (C2BMC) network.
MDA FUNDING DOWN
Table 1: MDA’s 2020 Budget Request
MDA funding will fall to $8.1 billion in 2024, lower than anytime since the Clinton administration.
Figure 1: MDA Budget and FYDP Trends, 2002–2024
Table 2: MDA Appropriations Over Time
MDA BUDGET FOLLOWING WIDER PENTAGON TRENDS
The overall trend for missile defense funding tracks some broader trends within the Pentagon’s budget. The 2020 presidential budget request includes $750 billion for defense, of which $718 billion is for the Department of Defense. Within that figure, DOD-wide procurement accounts shrink relative to the past two years, a trend that continues into the FYDP after adjusting for inflation. The Pentagon’s overall Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) account rises to $104 billion in the 2020 request but then declines by 18 percent, after inflation, over the course of the FYDP. MDA’s RDT&E line declines about 25 percent over the same period.
Like other entities, MDA may face increased pressure to be a bill payer amid the so-called “bow wave” of nuclear and conventional modernization in the broader Department of Defense.4 As a percentage of overall Pentagon spending, MDA’s projections decline from a recent peak of 1.7 percent in 2018 to 1.3 percent in 2020, shrinking to 1.2 percent by 2024 (Figure 2). The Congressional Budget Office has previously criticized the Pentagon’s FYDP projections for failing to sufficiently anticipate likely future costs, in addition to future growth in personnel compensation and operations and maintenance.5
Figure 2: DOD Appropriations by Title and MDA Percentage of DOD Appropriations, 1998–2024
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AT GREATEST RISK
Other internal MDA budget trends do not bode well for the development of new technologies to defeat new and emerging missile threats. The combination of a declining top line and increased procurement is renewing a squeeze on research and development. The RDT&E account falls from 75 percent of planned MDA expenditures in 2020 to 67 percent by 2024 (Figure 3).
Figure 3: MDA Budget Categories, 2004–2024
Figure 4: MDA Procurement Appropriations, 2009–2024
FAILURE TO PRIORITIZE THE SPACE SENSOR LAYER
The 2020 budget’s pace, level, and location of funding is inadequate to develop and field space sensors anytime in the foreseeable future.
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Figure 5: Selected DOD Missile Defense Space Sensor Layer Programs, 2003–2024
Note: *Appropriated dollars. **Based on 2020 President’s Budget. ***No FYDP information for DARPA Blackjack program was released in the 2020 budget submission.
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PROGRAMMATIC CHANGES: RKV DELAYED, MOKV ON LIFE SUPPORT
Figure 6: MDA Selected Program Modernization Budgets, 2002–2024
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Figure 7: MDA Volume Kill Programs, 2006–2024
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THE QUEST FOR INTEGRATION
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HYPERSONIC GLIDE VEHICLES
BOOST PHASE
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MDA also continues work on laser scaling to develop a boost phase directed energy weapon mounted on an aerial platform. While MDA funding for directed energy has grown in recent years, it represents a fraction of earlier appropriations for the Airborne Laser (ABL) (Figure 8). The more recent acquisition strategy has been different from that of the ABL, however, focused on the gradual increases in power and reductions in weight of solid state lasers to fit aboard smaller platforms. MDA’s unfunded priorities list includes $78 million for laser scaling programs to produce a 500 kilowatt laser demonstrator by 2025.
Figure 8: MDA Directed Energy RDT&E 2003–2024
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SERVICE BUDGETS
While MDA is focused mostly on ballistic missile defense, the military services play an important role in both air defense and shorter-range rockets and missiles. In particular, the Army and Navy budgets for 2020 include significant proposed investment in air defense platforms for defense against emerging cruise missile threats and short- range air defense (SHORAD). Both military services are attempting to catch up in addressing cruise missile threats to make up for previous underinvestment.
Figure 9: Select Navy Air and Missile Defense Modernization, 2004–2024
The Navy’s 2020 budget proposal continues significant investment in air and missile defense systems from the 2019 appropriation (Figure 9). The 2020 request includes slightly less procurement, particularly for the Aegis Weapon System (AWS) and Standard Missile-6 (SM-6), in favor of increased RDT&E for SM-6 and the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR). The SM-6 RDT&E budget includes initial funding for developing a new Block IB interceptor with a uniform 21-inch airframe similar to the SM-3 Block IIA, which would extend the range of the current system. That increased range would enhance SM-6 capabilities across its multiple missions, including air defense, ballistic missile defense, and antiship strike. The Navy requested $116 million to begin the program and slated the SM-6 Block IB for rapid prototyping and development, aiming to accelerate its acquisition.
The AMDR RDT&E request includes new funding for both a program to backfit older Arleigh Burke-class destroyers with a smaller version of the radar and to develop a new Advanced Distributed Radar (ADR) capability. The backfit program will need to shrink the AMDR design, which is slated for the larger Flight III destroyers, to fit on the smaller Flight IIA ships. The ADR project seeks to enhance AMDR performance against ballistic missiles and add the ability for AMDR to operate in passive receive-only modes in cooperating with other radars to increase the survivability of ships in contested environments.
Figure 10: Select Army Air and Missile Defense Modernization, 2004–2020
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THE NEW ERA WILL HAVE TO WAIT
Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan has written that the “scale and urgency of change to restore conventional and missile defense overmatch must not be underestimated.”27 Unfortunately, the actions in the 2020 budget submission reflect an inadequate scale and urgency relative to the threat.
The 2020 budget is not a masterpiece for missile defense, it is masterpiece theater.
To be sure, the budget request proposes several important new investments for air and missile defense, but it contains significant disappointments. The budget fails to prioritize SSL and invites further delay by transferring its sensor development from MDA to SDA before SDA is even up and running. Although the development of new interceptors to counter hypersonic glide vehicles is present, the inability to move quickly enough on an analysis of alternatives will likely result in another year’s delay. Overall research and development is down and continuing to decline. To be sure, MDA and the services propose important investments to integrate existing BMDS platforms and a handful of new program starts, but the budget overall largely remains too tethered to the past program of record focused on limited ballistic missile threats.
Promises of a “masterpiece” and “a new era of missile defense” are as yet unfulfilled. Like the Missile Defense Review, the activities described in the 2020 budget submission do not break china. Instead, the administration’s third budget request signals that President Trump does not intend to undertake the meaningful adaptations necessary to align U.S. missile defenses with his own National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, at least not in this term. The 2020 budget is not a masterpiece for missile defense, it is masterpiece theater. In the absence of significant correction by Congress, the new era for missile defense will apparently have to wait.
Figure 11: Fiscal Year 2020 Missile Defense Agency Budget Tracker
Dr. Thomas Karako is a senior fellow with the International Security Program and the director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Wes Rumbaugh is a research associate with the CSIS Missile Defense Project. This report is made possibly by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this report.
CSIS Briefs are produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
© 2019 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
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