| 摘要 | THE ISSUE
This brief presents a summary of key historical events in Afghanistan since 1989 and outlines a possible worst-case scenario following a U.S. and allied withdrawal from the country. The United States, Afghanistan, and its allies must work together in search for greater Afghan self-reliance, security, and stability in order to avoid a catastrophic scenario. Only then will Afghanistan be able to free itself of foreign presences and embark on its own journey to prosperity and self-reliance.
INTRODUCTION
A RETROSPECTIVE
POST-SOVIET AFGHANISTAN, 1989-2001
Figure 1: Conflict-Related Deaths (Civilian and Military), Afghanistan 1978–2017
Source: Central Asian Survey (1978-1987) and Uppsala Conflict Data Project (1989-2017)
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Figure 2: Deaths by Communicable Disease, Afghanistan, 1990–2017
Source: Central Asian Survey (1978-1987) and Uppsala Conflict Data Project (1989-2017)
RECENT TRENDS
AFGHANISTAN IN 2001-2019
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Figure 3: Revenue, Excluding Grants, Afghanistan
Source: World Bank Development Indicators and USAID, “Domestic Resource Mobilization: Case Study of Afghanistan”
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PAST AS PROLOGUE
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Figure 4: Afghan Refugees, 1970–2017
Source: Migration Data Portal
The Afghan government is only able to pay for its armed forces with U.S. assistance, and without such assistance, it is not clear how long they would be able to sustain the fight: the government’s collapse would be a real possibility. The billions of dollars spent on training and paying the Afghan forces could be rendered useless, and fighters could use their skills and U.S.-funded weapons to join the Taliban or other armed groups. There are currently significant challenges in the Afghan forces. The Afghan air force is particularly underdeveloped. Estimates optimistically suggest that the Afghan air force will be self-sufficient in the next three or four years, except for maintenance.34 The United States has a plan to provide the air force with 81 Black Hawk helicopters, but the program is unlikely to be completed until 2030.35 If the United States withdraws its support before then and leaves a half-trained air force, instead of fully training it or ending the program and retraining personnel, the air force could collapse, wasting the billions of dollars of U.S. investment. Moreover, the Afghan army has been trained to rely upon air power in accordance with U.S. doctrine, and the collapse of the air force would quickly lead to overall collapse of government forces. If the United States withdraws and the Afghan government collapses, it is easy to imagine a multi-dimensional and kaleidoscopic civil war ensuing. The current rifts within the Pashtun community are likely to deepen, with some joining the Taliban and others potentially joining other militant groups. Some non-Pashtun minorities may reunite under a revamped Northern Alliance, while others may form separate allegiances. A complex armed standoff could follow and leave millions of civilians stuck in conflict. Soldiers trained and equipped by the United States would have to pick sides, and some would abandon their positions or join the groups that the United States has worked hard to fight against since 2001. Already, the Afghan army struggles to meet its quotas and observes high rates of casualties and esertion, including 150 members of the Afghan armed forces who received training in the United States and have since gone absent.36 A sustained spike in violence could lead many Afghans to consider the possibility of leaving their homes, adding to the existing millions of Afghan refugees and internally displaced persons. The number of Afghan refugees could rise again to the 6 million figure mark surpassed in 1992 (see figure 4) and even grow beyond that, given decreases in cost of travel, greater access to information, and a larger population. The number of migrants in Pakistan and Iran, currently around 3.8 million, could plausibly increase to 6 million, and the migrant populations of India and the United Arab Emirates could also increase. In 2017, there were 72,000 Afghans in the United States and 335,000 Europe, and it is conceivable that these numbers combined could rise to over 600,000 (around 60,000 per year over 10 years). These refugee influxes would be most untimely, given that these countries are already struggling to accommodate forced and voluntary migrants amidst a strained international system and growing domestic resistance against surges in foreign migrants. However, they would not be impossible to manage. The United States has granted nearly 65,000 refugee and special immigrant visas to Afghans since 2007 and should expect to grant at least twice this amount over the next decade if Afghanistan collapses.37 This number is not implausible and should be accepted, similar to the Indochinese refugee resettlement program after the Vietnam War. From 1975 to 1985, over 482,000 Vietnamese refugees and 277,000 Cambodian and Laotian refugees arrived in the United States.38 If the Taliban were to regain power, their regime might look different than it did in the 1990s, although it remains to be seen how much would actually change. For example, the Taliban has stated it no longer oppose having girls in school, although they believe girls should receive religious education, in segregated schools, and for shorter periods of time—at least until there is sufficient funding for separate teachers.39 Even this minimalist vision would require substantial long-term planning and accommodation and is unlikely to succeed without enforcement and regulation. Consequently, the number of girls in school would inevitably decrease, both by Taliban-imposed restrictions and security concerns, depriving millions of girls of basic education and affecting Afghanistan’s future prospects for growth. Media and political freedoms gained would also be reversed. Drug production would likely continue to skyrocket. The Taliban banned opium production during its rule, but now it receives approximately 65 percent of their income from narcotics.40 If it regains control of Afghanistan, it is unlikely that drug production or income to the Taliban will decrease. On the contrary, given the recent spikes in poppy production, it is conceivable that drug-related revenue will continue to increase in this scenario. Terror organizations could also continue to thrive. Al-Qaeda rejoiced after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and, thereafter, Afghanistan became a den for terrorists. Similarly, Salafi- jihadist groups will perceive a Taliban victory following a U.S. withdrawal as their own victory.41 Amidst greater disputed territory, terror organizations in Afghanistan are likely to be encouraged to become more active, and the country may once again become a playground for training terrorists and harboring weapons against the West. There have been recent reports of new al-Qaeda training camps springing in Afghanistan, so it is not unlikely that a new major attack against the United States be plotted from an Afghanistan free of counterterrorism operations.42 This could happen even if the Taliban does not promote or oppose it.
THE GREAT GAME
CHOOSING THE BETTER PATH
Richard Olson
is a non-resident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He is the former U.S. ambassador to the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan; most recently he served as the U.S. special
representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan during the Obama administration. Daniel F. Runde is senior vice president, director of the Project on Prosperity and Development, and holds the William A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis at CSIS.
The authors would like to thank Carmen Garcia Gallego for her research contribution.
This brief is made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this brief.
CSIS Briefs are produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
© 2019 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
Alan Taylor, “The Soviet War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989,” Atlantic, August 4, 2014, https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2014/08/the-soviet-war-in-af- ghanistan-1979-1989/100786/. Note: 1988 conflict-related deaths missing. See: Taylor, “The Sovi- et War in Afghanistan”; Migration Data Portal, “Total number of refu- gees by country of origin,” IOM, 2017, https://migrationdataportal.org/data?i=refug_origin&t=2017&cm49=4; Noor Ahmad Khalidi, “Afghanistan: Demographic consequences of war, 1978-1987,” Central Asian Survey 10, no. 3 (September 1997): 101-126, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ abs/10.1080/02634939108400750. Robert Pear, “Arming Afghan Guerrillas: A Huge Effort Led by U.S.,” New York Times, April 18, 1988, https://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/18/world/ arming-afghan-guerrillas-a-huge-effort-led-by-us.html; Michael Rubin, “Who Is Responsible for the Taliban?” The Washington Institute, March 2002, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/who-is-re- sponsible-for-the-taliban; Greg Bruno, “Saudi Arabia and the Future of Afghanistan,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 10, 2008, https:// www.cfr.org/backgrounder/saudi-arabia-and-future-afghanistan. Robert Pear, “Arming Afghan Guerrillas: A Huge Effort Led by U.S.,” New York Times, April 18, 1988, https://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/18/world/ arming-afghan-guerrillas-a-huge-effort-led-by-us.html; Michael Rubin, “Who Is Responsible for the Taliban?” The Washington Institute, March 2002, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/who-is-re- sponsible-for-the-taliban; Greg Bruno, “Saudi Arabia and the Future of Afghanistan,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 10, 2008, https:// www.cfr.org/backgrounder/saudi-arabia-and-future-afghanistan. Rubin, “Who Is Responsible for the Taliban?” Zachary Laub, “The Taliban in Afghanistan,” Council on Foreign Rela- tions, July 4, 2014, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan. Ibid. Uppsala Conflict Data Project, “Afghanistan,” Uppsala University, 2017, https://ucdp.uu.se/#country/700; Global Health Data Exchange, “GBD Results Tool: deaths, communicable diseases, Afghanistan,” Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, 2017, http://ghdx.healthdata.org/gbd-re- sults-tool. WHO Central Asia Crisis Unit, “A population at risk: Communicable diseases in the Afghan crisis,” World Health Organization, October 29, 2001, https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/population-risk-communica-ble-diseases-afghan-crisis. SIGAR, Afghan Refugees and Returnees: Corruption and Lack of Afghan Ministerial Capacity Have Prevented Implementation of a Long-term Refugee Strategy ( SIGAR, 2015), https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/sigar-15-83-ar. pdf; Migration Data Portal, “Total number of refugees by country of origin.” David Rohde and C. J. Chivers, “A Nation Challenges; Qaeda’s Grocery Lists and Manuals of Killing,” New York Times, March 17, 2002, https://www. nytimes.com/2002/03/17/world/a-nation-challenged-qaeda-s-grocery-lists- and-manuals-of-killing.html?pagewanted=all; Mike Shuster, “How Al Qaeda Has Evolved Since Sept. 11,” NPR, July 7, 2005, https://www.npr.org/tem- plates/story/story.php?storyId=4734552. Daniel F. Runde and Earl Anthony Wayne, “Finishing Strong: Seeking a Proper Exit from Afghanistan,” CSIS, February 6, 2019, https://www. csis.org/analysis/finishing-strong-seeking-proper-exit-afghanistan; World Bank, Afghanistan to 2030: Priorities for Economic Development under Fragility (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2016), http://documents.worldbank. org/curated/en/156881533220723730/pdf/129161-WP-P157288-Afghani- stan-to-2030-PUBLIC.pdf. There were over 1.1 million deaths in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989 and over 133,000 deaths from 2001 to 2017. See: Taylor, “The Soviet War in Afghanistan” and Uppsala Conflict Data Project, “Afghanistan.” UN DESA Population Division, World Population Prospects 2017 (New York: United Nations, 2017), https://population.un.org/wpp/DataQuery/. UNHCR Operational Portal Refugee Situations, “Refugee returnees to Afghanistan,” UNHCR, 2018, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/afg. WHO, Afghanistan Situation Report: July 2018 (WHO, 2018), http:// www.emro.who.int/images/stories/afghanistan/EHA_update_Jul_2018_fi- nal_15082018_2.pdf?ua=1&ua=1. USAID, Disease Surveillance and Prevention Afghanistan July 2014 – June 2022 (USAID, 2016), https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/docu- ments/1871/Disease%20Surveillance%20and%20Prevention_0.pdf; World Bank Development Indicators, Life expectancy at birth, total (years) (Wash- ington, DC: World Bank Group, 2017), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ SP.DYN.LE00.IN; World Bank Development Indicators, Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2017), https:// data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN. Global Health Data Exchange, “GBD Results Tool.” “Afghanistan: Education,” USAID, 2018, https://www.usaid.gov/afghan- istan/education. “Freedom of the Press 2017,” Freedom House, 2017, https://freedom- house.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2017. USAID, Domestic Resource Mobilization: Case Study of Afghanistan, 2003- 2016 (USAID), https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1865/ Afghanistan_DRM_case_study_briefing_note_FINAL.pdf; World Bank Development Indicators, Revenue excluding grants (% of GDP), Afghanistan (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2015), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ GC.REV.XGRT.GD.ZS?locations=AF&view=chart. Uppsala Conflict Data Project, “Afghanistan.” UN DESA Population Division, International migrant stock: The 2017 revision (New York: United Nations, 2017), http://www.un.org/en/devel- opment/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates17.shtml; Migration Data Portal, “Total number of refugees by country of origin.” Ibid. UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Afghanistan Opium Survey 2017 Cultivation and Production (Vienna: United Nations, November 2017), https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghan_ opium_survey_2017_cult_prod_web.pdf. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress October 2018 (Ar- lington, VA: SIGAR, October 30, 2018), https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarter- lyreports/2018-10-30qr.pdf. Clayton Thomas, Al Qaeda and Islamic State Affiliates in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2018), https://fas.org/ sgp/crs/row/IF10604.pdf. Seth G. Jones, Danika Newlee, and Nicholas Harrington, The Evolution of the Salafi-Jihadist Threat (Washington, DC: CSIS, November 20, 2018), https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-salafi-jihadist-threat; Glenn Kessler, “Trump’s incorrect claim that 20 ‘U.S.-designated’ terrorist groups operate in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Washington Post, August 22, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2017/08/22/ trumps-incorrect-claim-that-20-u-s-designated-terror-groups-operate-in- afghanistan-and-pakistan/?utm_term=.b07a2629f0c6. Thomas, “Al Qaeda and Islamic State Affiliates in Afghanistan.” Shoaib Sharifi and Louise Adamou, “Taliban threaten 70% of Afghan- istan, BBC finds,” BBC World Service, January 31, 2018, https://www.bbc. com/news/world-asia-42863116.
SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress January 2019 (Ar- lington, VA: SIGAR, January 30, 2019), https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarter- lyreports/2019-01-30qr.pdf. James Dobbins, Jason H. Campbell, Sean Mann, and Laurel E. Miller, “Consequences of a Precipitous U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” RAND Corporation, 2019, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE326.html Ibid. David Zucchino, “The U.S. Spent #8 Billion on Afghanistan’s Air Force. It’s Still Struggling,” New York Times, January 10, 2019, https://www.nytimes. com/2019/01/10/world/asia/afghanistan-air-force.html. Ibid. Ibid. Refugee Processing Center, “Cumulative Arrivals by State for Refugees and SIV Reception and Placement (R&P) Recipients – Afghan,” U.S. Depart- ment of State, 2019, http://www.wrapsnet.org/admissions-and-arrivals. Linda W. Gordon, “Southeast Asian Refugee Migration to the United States,” Center for Migration Studies, May 1987, https://onlinelibrary.wiley. com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.2050-411X.1987.tb00959.x Majia Liutho, “The Schools of the Taliban,” Diplomat, 2016, https://the- diplomat.com/2016/11/the-schools-of-the-taliban/. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress October 2018. Jones, Newlee, and Harrington, The Evolution of the Salafi-Jihadist Threat. Eric Schmitt and David E. Sanger, “As U.S. Focuses on ISIS and the Taliban, Al Qaeda Re-emerges,” New York Times, December 29, 2015, https:// www.nytimes.com/2015/12/30/us/politics/as-us-focuses-on-isis-and-the- taliban-al-qaeda-re-emerges.html. |
